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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES: BUSINESS-STATE RELATIONS
AND NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY-MAKING IN WEST GERMANY
JAMES ALLEN COONEY
(Submitted to the Department of Political Science on 12 January 1982 in par-
tial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.)
This thesis analyzes how technological choices are made in advanced
industrial societies. Using German nuclear energy development as a
case study, it examines technological choices both on the general level
of overall policy and on the more detailed level of one project, the
pebble bed high temperature reactor (HTR). The discussion centers on
the varying interactions of the business and state sectors during the
research and development, demonstration, and commercialization stages of
development.
Part I sets forth the theoretical framework and explains the
rationale for the choice of the specific case studied. Two approaches
for explaining technological choices are presented: the market
approach and the political-organizational approach. The market
approach allows us to ask to what extent private industry can guide
policy in the Federal Republic where conditions and attitudes are
highly favorable to the market determination of technological
choices. The political-organizational approach lets us test whether
the state can control these choices when its interest in doing so is
high, as it seemingly has been with the German designed and developed
high temperature reactor.
Part II examines overall post-war German nuclear energy policy,
looking especially at the light water and fast breeder reactors. In
contrast to the French and British reactor programs which concentrated
efforts early on a specific design, the Germans intentionally sought to
foster multiple options. The changing objectives, the institutions
established to determine policy, and the division of responsibility
among sectors at different times are described and their impact on
actual policy decisions considered.
Part III provides a parallel analysis to Part II, but the focus
on the HTR permits us to qualify the findings for the overall policy
described in Part II. Part III emphasizes the differing objectives and
institutional interactions not only between the business and state sec-
tors but also within them over the three phases of development of the
HTR: the 15 MW experimental reactor, the 300 MW demonstration thorium
high temperature reactor (THTR), and post-1975 efforts to decide upon
a successor to the THTR project.
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The conclusions of the thesis are summarized in Part IV.
(1) Both market and political-organizational factors are impor-
tant for explaining how technological choices are made. Although
market forces may appear determinant (such as with the commercial
breakthrough of light water reactors in the Federal Republic),
underlying political-organizational factors play a crucial role
in defining the context in which market factors operate. (2)
The various actors within the business and state sectors should
be differentiated. For the high temperature reactor, for example,
we cannot refer simply to "business" or "state" objectives.
Rather we must consider which reactor manufacturer, which utili-
ties and which branch of government stood behind the reactor's
development. International factors can also limit the scope of
action for the policy actors; for high temperature reactors, how-
ever, the international factors were not too significant so that
development was essentially domestically determined. (3) Policy
leadership for a high technology varies with the project's stage
of development: the government has maximum impact in the research
and development stage; the reactor manufacturers are most important
in the demonstration stage; the utilities are especially influential
as commercialization nears. Transitions from-one stage to the next
are of special importance in determining the course of technological
choices. (4) The German approach to technological development is
decentralized and made on a case-by-case basis. The government
has been more successful at promoting the development of a number
of options than in compelling other policy actors subsequently to
narrow options. This is the problem which the government now
faces for high temperature reactors. German policy actors have
learned that a balance has to be struck between supporting the
most sophisticated and the most feasible technological applications
of a project.
Thesis Supervisor: Suzanne Berger
Title: Professor of Political Science
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CHAPTER ONE
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES
Jerome Wiesner, former science advisor to President
Kennedy and M.I.T. president, has called technology "the
most dominant force in modern life" and "the engine that
propels modern society." Donald Cook, then president and
chief executive officer of the American Electric Power
Company, has described technology as a "primal event" in
the history of the world and suggested that it must be
understood as a "mainspring of history" if man is to com-
2prehend it. The economist Robert Heilbroner states that
the "extraordinary predominance of technology" is the
"decisive characteristic of modern times "3 and argues fur-
ther that although technological development may not have
caused every single event of this century, it is the ulti-
mate cause of what this century has become as a whole. 4
Whether or not such claims are exaggerated, it is clear
that technology is a central and defining characteristic
of modern society.
World War II marked the beginning of large-scale govern-
ment promotion of certain technologies. With the intensive
national attempts to master technologies such as radar and
atomic energy, new doors were opened for understanding how
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significant technological choices can be for societies.
Since then, both governments and private industrial firms
have become increasingly aware of the importance of tech-
nological choices and recognized the direct bearing which
the development of new technologies has on political and
economic power.
A prime example of this development is the nuclear
energy sector with the political and economic questions
which pertain to it. The nuclear industry certainly rep-
resents one of the most sophisticated industries a nation
can have, and at the same time it stimulates other high
technology products.5 On the economic side, high stakes
are involved for business and government because of both
the huge expenditures and the long time frame needed for
technological development. On the political side, national
prestige and security issues are relevant. In addition,
energy interdependence and the establishment of superiority
in export markets are factors which relate to both economic
and political considerations.
The development of nuclear energy in the Federal Re-
public of Germany is particularly striking. Although the
Allies did not permit the Germans to resume nuclear re-
search after the war until 1955, the German nuclear industry
quickly overcame the head-start other countries had. By
the late 1960s, the industry had established itself as
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competitive with other reactor producers, and German pro-
ducts had gained world-wide respect. In fact, the former
director of the U.S. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Alvin
Weinberg, suggested in the mid-1970s that West German tech-
6
nology might even be superior to that in America.
Nuclear energy has always enjoyed the status of being
the most favored high technology in the Federal Republic.
West German governmental research policy started in the
1950s with the support of nuclear policy, and industry and
government expenditures have continued to be more directed
to nuclear energy than to other advanced technologies such
as space, computers or the aircraft industry. Both the
Federal Republic and other European countries realize that
nuclear technology may play as important an economic role
in the future as the aerospace industry and computers have
played in the past, and they want to guard against U.S.
domination of this field as well. National interests are,
therefore, high.
From the start of their nuclear program, the Germans
have followed a cautious approach, keeping several options
open. Domestic and international factors have influenced
the German policy choices. They were willing to import
reactor technology, especially from the United States. As
a result, the Germans had a wide range of reactor alterna-
tives as opposed to the French or British who, for mili-
tary and prestige reasons, each concentrated efforts on one
-17-
design. At the same time, the Germans were very protec-
tive of their domestic industry because they wanted it to
develop and become internationally competitive. The Ger-
mans joined few international partnerships. Our aim is
to see how and why the choices in the German nuclear pro-
gram were made and what impact they had on further tech-
nological development. Special attention will be given to
the pebble bed high temperature reactor (HTR) which was
the one solely German designed and developed reactor.
PURPOSE OF THE THESIS
The purpose of this thesis is to use the example of
German nuclear energy development to gain some insight into
how technological choices are made in advanced industrial
societies. We will consider both the determinants of tech-
nological choices and the feedback from the political sys-
tem on the course of technological development. By the
term technological choices, we refer to the series of de-
cisions taken in the course of technological development.
To understand how such choices are made, we must under-
stand who the actors are, and what their roles and objec-
tives are over time. Specifically, we will examine how
the business and state sectors are related. To do this,
these sectors will be broken down to identify the relevant
actors within each -- the reactor manufacturing firms, the
electrical utilities which purchase and operate the reac-
tors, and the government actors on both the federal and Land
(i.e, state in the American sense) level.
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The argument presented is that economic, political and
organizational factors all affect the course of technolo-
gical development, but the degree of importance and nature
of effect varies according to the stage of development.
The development is traditionally broken down to three
stages and we will also use these three stages for our
analysis: first, there is a research and development
stage, then a demonstration stage, and finally a commer-
cialization stage. For the German nuclear energy case, and
in line with the findings of Peter DeLeon in his study of
8the development of nuclear reactors in six nations, this
thesis suggests that government has been -most important
in the initial R&D stage of development, manufacturers in
the demonstration stage, and utilities in the commerciali-
zation stage. We will further suggest that our findings
about the relationship between the stages of development
and the input of the.different actors have relevance beyond
just the German nuclear example; they also are relevant to
other technological choices beic'ause of what they indicate
about transitions between stages of development.
Although there is a body of literature which views
technological choices mainly as a function of economic
factors, we argue here that political-organizational fac-
tors have a broader relevance. As we will see, even in
those instances in which economic factors appear to be most
influential, for example with light water reactors in the
-19-
Federal Republic, the political context often defines the
economic context and has a major impact on the technolo-
gical choices made.
Our analysis of political factors also leads us to
argue that political decisions made in the early stages of
development retain a lasting impact, thereby disputing the
claim made by market advocates that technological choices
in the commercialization stage should rest fully on the
private sector. Both the government and private sector
in West Germany pay lip service to the assertion that the
government should stop influencing technological develop-
ment after the R&D stage of development. We will show,
though, that by the time complex technologies reach the
commercialization stage, so many political decisions have
already been made with government participation that it is
impossible to separate out the political concerns. The
choices of technological objectives, the setting up of
policy-making structures and institutions, and decisions
on financing all involve political inputs, and the effect
of these inputs does not disappear simply because a tech-
nology moves to commercialization.
While emphasizing political factors, we will see that
technological choices result from a complex interaction of
the business-state sectors, and this interaction changed
over the course of development of the nuclear program in
-20-
West Germany. We have identified three such developmental
phases*: (1) an open-ended period from 1955-1963 in which
serious debates about nuclear energy took place; (2) a
period of consensus from 1963-1973 within the nuclear com-
munity that nuclear energy should be developed because of
the benefits it brought the German economy; and (3) a post-
1973 period of opposition to nuclear energy from outside
the nuclear community which Prompted the community itself
to close ranks in favor of nuclear development.
The thesis is structured around the interactions of the
policy actors and objectives involved in making technological
choices for nuclear reactors in these three phases. We will
see how relations varied over time not only among the manu-
facturing, utility and government sectors, but also within
them.
ORGANIZATION
To examine the linkage between the German policy-making
process and technological decisions, we will study how choices
of specific nuclear designs were made in the Federal Republic.
This chapter sets out the context for the analysis. The
first section deals with the relationship of technology and
public policy. The increasingly critical perspective on
*The phases refer to specific periods of German energy
development; the stages refer to a general pattern of
technological development.
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technology in the 1970s, a definition of technological
choices, and the relation of technological choices to in-
stitutions and market decisions are first considered. The
second section presents a discussion of how economic and
political-organizational factors determine technological
choices; it highlights the over-riding significance of
the political context. The third section of the chapter
applies the framework to the German case and justifies why
we are studying German nuclear energy and, in particular,
the pebble bed high temperature reactor.
The body of the thesis examines the case of German
nuclear energy development in detail. Part II, consisting
of Chapters Two and Three, provides an overview of German
nuclear policy to show how the relationships of actors and
objectives have changed over time. Chapter Two introduces
the three phases of development in the German program and
relates them to the three reactor types (the light water,
high temperature and fast breeder reactors) being actively
developed at present. The chapter focuses on changing ob-
jectives within the German program and explains the key
roles played by the utilities in determining German nuclear
energy strategy. Chapter Three focuses on the institutions
established for nuclear policy-making and their continuing
significance. It outlines the-political reasons which
enabled the utilities to exert such influence: the govern-
ment and manufacturing industry left a policy vacuum which
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the utilities readily filled, to the surprise of the other
policy actors who preferred a different strategy.
Part III, consisting of Chapters Four to Seven, Toves
from this general discussion of overall German nuclear de-
velopment to a more specific study of the pebble bed high
temperature reactor (HTR). In parallel with Part II, it
looks first at the changing objectives over the course of
HTR development and then at the interactions among and
within the sectors. Chapter Four relates the development
of the HTR to the three phases described for overall nuclear
policy. Chapters Five, Six and Seven then focus in depth
on each of the three stages of the HTR program: the small
15 MW experimental reactor, the 300 MW demonstration re-
actor, and the post-1975 efforts to reach agreement on a
successor to the prototype reactor constructed in the
demonstration stage..
Chapter Eight, the conclusion, relates the findings of
the HTR case study to the conceptual argument outlined in
Chapter One. It points out the advantages and disadvantages
of focusing narrowly on German nuclear policy and the HTR,
and it discusses the broader applicability of our findings.
TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES
As background to our discussion of technological choices,
we will first examine how technology itself is viewed and
-23-
how these views have changed. Because technology has a
profound effect on the social and physical environment --
whether we speak of nuclear reactors, sophisitcated weapons
systems, space exploration or standards for water quality --
the interactions of technological factors and political,
economic and social developments should be considered care-
fully. The catalyst for the contemporary emphasis on tech-
nology as one of the important responsibilities of govern-
ments stems from World War II. The American victory in
the war caused a new awareness in Europe of the significance
of technological advances. Many shared the belief, as
asserted here by the economist Harry Johnson, that the
United States won the war "by virtue of its vastly superior
natural resources and technology rather than by virtue of
any apparent superior moral fiber, political determination
and diplomatic skill, to which the European powers cus-
tomarily credited their victories."9 The Western Europeans
saw clearly the need for increased productivity, based on
deliberate efforts to cultivate technology, if they were
to regain their international political importance. They
too placed their hopes for the future on technological
development.
The Relationship of Science and Technology
For the first 20 years after World War II, science and
technology were associated with economic and social progress.
The prevailing concern was to find strategies and institutions
-24-
which would effectively support scientific research and
technological development. Considered historically, the
alliance.between science and technology is new. In earlier
centuries, technology was quite independent of science.
Science was a thought process, an accumulation of basic
knowledge about the natural universe. Technology was the
practical application of such knowledge to aid in the pro-
duction of goods and services. The inventions which pro-
vided the basis for the industrial revolution -- the steam
engine, the loom, the lathe -- were not a product of science
but of technology. They were invented by practical men.
Today, though, the methods of science and technology
are essentially interdependent. Studies about the indus-
trial research process have described "the marriage of.
science and technology," particularly after 1945. Al-
though some researchers still stress the "autonomy of tech-
nology" from science, the more classic description of the
,12
relationship is that of "mirror-image twins."~ In the
twentieth century, or at least certainly since World War
II, science has become the major source of new technolo-
gies, to the extent that they are usually considered as
applied science. From a social perspective, some welcome
the relation because they feel that science has been har-
nessed to the purposes of obtaining desirable practical
consequences. Others are concerned about it because they
feel that scientific progress does not adequately consider
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social needs. E. J. Mishan, for example, argues that
science and technology only address specific and immediate
ends and fail to perceive social repercussions: according
to his argument, society loses control over the larger
destiny to which it is impelled by the forces of science
and technology.1 4
Changed Perspectives on Technology
The social crises which emerged in the late 1960s
caused a waning of the optimistic faith in science and
technology that had flourished in the earlier period of
unprecedented economic growth.1 5 Both growing disillusion-
ment with the excessive beliefs that science and technology
possessed the key to painless economic and social improve-
ment, and growing concern with the effects of technological
change, increasing affluence, and associated social strains
on "the quality of life"- caused a marked decrease in faith
in science policy and technological development.1 6
The decreasing faith in technological development is
not surprising and is in line with the major shifts in
thinking in' the last 20 yeArs about the benefits of eco-
nomic development and social change in general. In the
1960s there was a dominant optimism regarding political
modernization and economic development, but the stormy
course of the 1970s with its economic recessions and energy
crises brought an abrupt awareness that the stability
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perceived earlier was a myth.. Shirley Williams, one of
the founders of the British Social Democratic Party, even
calls it-a "delusion," and says we should not expect sta-
17
bility today, but rather instability. In the 1960s there
was a smug satisfaction about the predictability of poli-
tics in advanced industrial nations. It was seen as a
function of social and economic transformations. Andrew
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Shonfield's book, Modern Capitalism, reflected this op-
timism and marked the high water point among economists
who felt that they understood the economic dynamics of
political systems: the system could be controlled through
management and "fine tuning." Technological advances were
just another contribution to this rosy picture; they were
another part of the "fine tuning."
The perspective of the 1970s was quite different. It
brought a preoccupation with political instability, the
intractibility of policy, the possibility of policy failure,
19
and the political alienation of mass publics. The poli-
tical process came under question and politics took place
increasingly outside traditional political institutions --
witness the regional ethnic movements, ecologists' and
feminists' movements, and anti-nuclear protestors. The
role of politics and the state was obscured in the first
two post-war decades by rapid economic growth and far-
reaching social transformation, but it was rediscovered
in the 1970s. Recognition emerged that neither economic
-27-
and social developments nor technological developments
can be insulated from political factors.
The widespread protests which took place against nu-
clear energy during this period in West Germany and else-
where shared common motivations with other protests of the
1970s. The protests were not against the state and society
for failing to provide for economic growth and material
prosperity, but against their very success in doing so.20
The protesting groups were disillusioned in part because
they disagreed with the growth-oriented philosophy which
seemed to motivate state actions and in part because the
traditional institutions of government, such as political
parties, were seen as unresponsive to changing conditions.
Irvin Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian echo this argument
in their book, Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved. 2 1
They argue that the way the innovation process for light
water reactors was managed by business and government in
the U.S. and Western Europe contributed to the identifica-
tion of nuclear power technology with something that many
citizens in these countries dislike and distrust about
their societies; this dislike and distrust is the principal
cause for the dissolution of the nuclear dream.22 Here too,
the successes achieved by business and government are the
root of the complaint. Bupp and Derian maintain that such
political factors can have unintended consequences on
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technological development. Thus, in the 1970s the poli-
tical .aspects of technological development have become more
evident and these aspects merit close scrutiny because of
their intended or unintended consequences on technological
choices.
Technological Choices
As a more critical perspective on technological progress
arose and as the political side of technological develop-
ment became apparent, the issue of how technological
choices are in fact made took on greater significance. In-
depth studies of decision-making and influence on specific
technological projects became an especially useful tech-
nique for trying to sort out the actual influences on tech-
nological development.
The development of a technology occurs in a series of
steps -- or technological choices -- which are influenced
by political, economic and social conditions as well as by
the individual actors involved with policy-making. As
used here, the term technological choices refers to the
series of decisions made in the course of development of
a technology_ it does not refer to one specific decision
or choice, but rather to the series of decisions culmina-
ting ideally in a final commercializable product.
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Our focus on technological choices will make it clear
that there is nothing inevitable about the course of tech-
nological development. It is, instead, the result Qf a
complex interaction of innumerable decisions reflecting
technological, political and economic inputs. Following
a similar approach in his study of national reactor devel-
opment programs, Peter DeLeon, the editor of Policy Sciences,
suggests juxtaposing the "objectives" and "attributes" of
technological development.24 For him, the objectives are
couched largely in terms of organizational goals (e.g.,
an active science community, an integrated decision-making
system, a concomitant military program, the effect of being
a late-comer or early-starter for a technology, national R&D
heritage, multiple options, and resources invested)
The benefit of this framework is that it focuses atten-
tion on the ties between a set of institutional objectives,
which represents various economic and political goals, and
a set of attributes which influences the formulation of ob-
jectives. The framework "provides a concept and tool for
coherently explaining a technology development in terms
of the political, institutional and economic forces that
shape a given public policy."26 DeLeon's objectives of
technological development center on the policy level, and
the attributes center. on the structural level -- i.e., they
are characteristics which influence how the organizational
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structures are established. Our concentration on techno-
logical choices also stresses the linkage between policy
objectives and structural arrangements.
Technological Choices and Stages of Devel'oment. Both
the importance of the actors for technological choices and
the nature of the objectives of a specific project change
over time, and this influences the direction of a program.
The normal route of technological development is (1) a
research and development stage, (2) a demonstration stage,
and (3) commercialization. These stages are important
since the factors influencing technological choices vary
across the stages. In terms of policy actors in German
nuclear energy, governments or government research establish-
ments tend to dominate the R&D stage, the reactor manufac-
turing industry is usually most critical in the demonstra-
tion phase, and the utilities, as reactor operators,
assume their most critical role as commercialization nears.
Objectives also shift from stage to stage. Nuclear pro-
grams are usually launched with explicit government state-
ments about the importance of national prestige and basic
science, but the efficient production of a technology even-
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tually becomes the major objective. Governments are more
interested in national prestige, utilities in efficient
technology.
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The transitions from one stage to the next are a key
element in the success or failure of reactor development
programs. The transitions functioned smoothly in some
countries, including the Federal Republic, but serious
problems arose in the early British and French programs
where control of the program remained in the hands of the
government after an institutional transition should have
occurred.28 This emphasis on transitions highlights the
requirement for policy actors to work together; successful
technological development depends on the cooperative and
continual involvement of the reactor developers (usually
the government through research programs), the vendors and
the operators from the early stages of development through
commercialization. Our focus on technological choices pro-
vides a means to monitor how these interactions have Progressed
in one technological area.
Technological Choices and Institutions. Our examina-
tion of the impact of structure on technological choices
particularly emphasizes the role of institutions and their
influence on policy-making. Both the institutional format
as a whole and the individual institutions will be considered.
In his study of the political aspects of attempts to
control the use of plutonium, Gene Rochlin argues that
different technological options will be recognized if more
attention is paid to political and institutional considerations
than to technological and industrial ones.29 Rochlin says
that decisions for technologies such as nuclear power often
serve as a means to play out political disputes. No intel-
ligent policy choice can be made that is inconsistent with
economic or technical realities, but neither can an intel-
ligent policy be put into practice if it is inconsistent
with the social and political constraints within which it
must operate.30 The issue for Rochlin is not whether one
set of criteria replaces the other, but which set dominates
in defining a range of choices.
Rochlin suggests that the true significance of political
and institutional constraints is too often overlooked.
Henry Lambright makes the same point, arguing that there
is a great deal more "politics" in the mangement of defense,
space and atomic energy than is commonly realized. According
to Lambright, "High technology is more than advanced or
science-based technology. In the military, space and atomic
contexts, it is government-based technology. The agencies
that sponsor the launching of technology influence the de-
ployment of their creations." 31
The type of organizational structure established for
the development and implementation of a technology has a
direct bearing on the success of the project. Roger Williams,
former Science Advisor with the Science Council of Canada,
maintains that the structure of the British nuclear industry
basically guaranteed the failure of British nuclear policy.
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The British institutional format -- consisting of a public
R&D monopoly supplying a virtual operator monopoly with
five consortia squeezed uncomfortably between the two --
precluded any open discussion of important issues such as
differences about reactor designs, non-nuclear alternatives,
or demand modification for reactors rather than supply
expansion.32 Williams says that good decisions and good
execution are the sine qua non of a carefully designed
policy and management structure, but if one simply throws
institutions up and together -- as the British did -- success
is highly unlikely.33
In the case of German nuclear energy, we will look
closely at the institutional arrangements that were first
established because they have remained influential through-
out the stages of development. Moreover, institutional
factors go beyond the relationship of government actors
to manufacturing firms or utilities; they also include re-
lations within each of these sectors. Here too, institu-
tions can constrain or facilitate technological development.
Technological Choices and the Market. Success for ad-
vanced technologies is usually measured by the number of
commercial orders placed -- i.e. the market determines
whether a technology is successful. The appropriateness of
the market for such determinations continues to be a matter
of debate which relates to the interaction of political
and economic objectives.
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One argument is that the market mechanism, which tradi-
tionally has been the means for people to register their
preferences, does not work for advanced technological in-
novations. Edward Chase, for instance, believes that the
market mechanism is not a reliable guide for making techno-
logical choices because it does not become engaged quickly
enough, and it "simply is not up to reflecting the long-
range values that have to be weighed if a rational use is
to be made of the new technology."34 Supporting the notion
that markets have a declining functional relevance, John
Kenneth Galbraith asserts that advanced technology is the
"enemy of the market" because the specialization of men and
process and the commitments of time and capital required
by advanced technology make the market work badly.3 5
Galbraith maintains, further, that the market system can-
not provide the control of the environment which is needed
for the development of advanced technologies.3 6
The opposing argument is that only the market judges
technological options objectively, and that decisions on
commercialization for advanced technologies should be left
to supplier and user firms. In that way, a more realistic
economic assessment and better accounting of the trade-
offs between time and cost are likely to be made. The
claim is that proper economic assessment leads to rational
technological outcomes, but governmental assessments are
not very reliable. Government involvement tends to distort
the market 'according to this argument, and therefore it should
be kept to a minimum.
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The crux of the debate between those criticizing and
defending the market is whether political or economic ob-
jectives.are seen as more important. In fact, though,
political and economic objectives should be seen in terms
of how they balance with each other. This balance should
be considered both in terms of its development through the
three stages described earlier and in terms of the changes
of leadership between the stages. The -motivations for a
project at the R&D stage do not necessarily reflect the
objectives of .the project as it approaches commercilization.
At the commercialization stage, the utilities as the or-
derers and operators of reactors are likely to play a more
significant role and more attention will be given to
economic calculations, but this role is shaped by political
decisions based on the political objectives of earlier
stages. Moreover, the structure of the decision-making
process, which itself is a function of political factors,
also shapes the abilities of specific actors such as the
utilities to influence policy. The advocates of the no-
tion that economic factors are the key variable in techno-
logical development fail to note the inevitable impact of
political factors_ the critics of the notion fail to acknowl-
edge -the modifying influence of economic factors.
In contrast to the view that the market alone deter-
mines technological outcomes, the view can also be taken
that political factors can be used to create conditions
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favorable to technological development. These then act as
incentives for the private sector, and thereby facilitate
commercialization. J. Herbert Hollomon makes this point
in describing how the classic studies of railroad technology
"demonstrate that significant railroad invention followed
the decision to grant land-to railroads and expand the rail-
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road system in the U.S." Government actions contributed
directly to the diffusion of railroad technology by influ-
encing the conditions for diffusion. In the case of nuclear
reactors, the complexities involved with development make
the intricate interactions among actors and objectives
even more important. The next section sets out a specific
framework for viewing the interactions between political
and economic objectives.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF ECONOMIC FACTORS AND POLITICAL-
ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS IN DETERMINING TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES
Two Approaches to Policy-Making
The main thme of the preceding section on technological
choices is that the successful development of a given pro-
ject depends on the pattern of interactions between eco-
nomic and political objectives. Policy actors can be di-
vided into those who stress the economic objectives and those
who stress the political objectives of technological de-
velopment. We propose to call these two approaches to
technology policy-making (1) the market approach and (2)
the political-organizational approach. Each approach sees
-37-
a different pattern of how economic, political and social
factors relate, and each has a different view of the
business-state relationship. The market approach empha-
sizes economic factors and-cost calculations of the private
sector as the main determinants of technological choicesl
the political-organizational approach looks at the national
priorities and institutional arrangements to determine
what channels economic factors.
Although we contend that the political-organizational
factors define the context in which the economic factors
operate and thus are more significant, this is just part
of our larger argument that policy outcomes depend on how
the two sets of objectives interact. The balancing is
part of a learning process for the actors in advanced tech-
nology projects: the business and state actors learn to
cooperate and form alliances with each other. A greater
sharing of resources is required due to the technological
complexities, the long time frame, and the large expendi-
tures involved. The balancing of political and economic
objectives reflects an awareness among the policy actors
for a specific project that policy-making leadership must
shift as the project moves through the stages of development.
Our aim is not to see which approach provides a better
explanation of policy-making because each has relevance.
Instead, our aim is to see the relative importance of each
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approach and the relationship between the two approaches at
each of the three stages of development. In the past, the
responsibilities of individual actors in technological de-
velopment were seen as isolated, and the stages of develop-
ment were viewed as distinct. Utilities waited for the of-
fers of power plant manufacturers before making decisions
on orders; supplier firms concentrated only on the compo-
nents they produced, and not on larger-scale plans. Govern-
ment subsidies ceased when the prospect of commercialization
became evident. Now, though, new patterns are emerging
because efforts, skills and resources have to be pooled
for advanced technological projects.
The next two sub-sections look respectively at the market
approach and political-organizational approach to technologi-
cal policy-making. The two approaches will form the basis for
our analysis of German nuclear energy policy.
The Market Approach
People whose thinking reflects the market approach to
technological policy-making believe that economic signals
provide good incentives for making choices as long as these
signals are not distorted. Governments may distort the
economic signals if they let intervening variables like
prestige or international competition interfere. Govern-
ments are too apt to concentrate support on advanced tech-
nological projects, such as fast breeder reactors or
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supersonic planes, which they are then unwilling to give
up even when the projects are not profitable to pursue.
The innovative spirit is dampened. Private industry, on
the other hand, makes decisions about whether to go ahead
with new ideas based on potential profits. This provides
a clear-cut measure for evaluating technological develop-
ment and hence decisions determined by market forces are
easily changed if necessary. Bad ideas are dropped more
readily than the government is willing to do. The market
approach focuses mainly on the commercialization stage of
technological development, and its supporters argue that
the private sector makes the best decisions about commer-
cialization when other factors interfere as little as
possible with calculations of profit.
The role of politics in the market approach is a nega-
tive one -- or a corrective one. Supporters of the approach
feel that decisions made in terms of political factors are
made on too limited a basis, because such decisions are
not usually a reflection of open competition among techno-
logical alternatives. Decisions made according to the
marketability of a technology, in contrast, are more incre-
mental and flexible than those based on political factors.
The role of the government, according to the market approach,
is to do its utmost to create a free market environment by
trying to remove the regulatory and legal barriers to tech-
nological development. Government can help to put the eco-
nomic system back in working order, and this would help
overcome the nuclear stalemate of the 1970s because people
would understand better the economic necessity of nuclear
energy.
In this approach, government involvement in the R&D
stage of development is acceptable and even essential, for
example to stimulate interest in a project or reduce the
risks for industry. With controversial technologies such
as fast breeder reactors, the government could also guaran-
tee industry at least a partial refund of R&D expenditures
in case a political decision against the project is made.
Once commercialization nears, however, economic considera-
tions determine outcomes. The belief is that the govern-
ment should not get involved with direct subsidies to com-
mercial technology; private industry is capable of financing
technological development, even for expensive, sophisticated
technologies. According to Keith Pavitt, even when civilian
technologies were successfully developed with government
support, it was not government policy which made the dif-
ference. Rather, it was the close interweaving of technology
policy with production and marketing policy, combined with
the essential ingredient of competent management in the
firms involved, that was responsible.3 8
Proponents of the market model focus attention on tech-
nological innovation, and claim that it occurs most effi-
ciently if market decisions determine its course. Pavitt,
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for instance, maintains that the best way for a government
to influence industrial innovation is not to have any policy
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which specifically promotes industrial innovation.
One of the most elaborate arguments against governmen-
tal support for advanced technology has been presented by
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George Eades and Richard-Nelson. Eades and Nelson use
the cases of fast breeder reactors and the civilian super-
sonic transport (SST) in the United States to show that
"forcing technology" through government support is bad be-
cause ideas are rigidly adhered to and never abandoned.
The projects are pushed to attention at federal policy-
making levels as "opportunities to be seized" rather than
as reactions to problems. According to Eades and Nelson:
The federal government increasingly is adopting
the role of deciding in detail the R&D projects
that will be undertaken, paying the bill and
taking the risks, and being generally respon-
sible for th ikinds of products and processes
that evolve..
This is a new departure in national policy which the authors
feel should be watched with suspicion because it counters
past practices which accounted for American technological
success. American policy used to be characterized by inno-
vative ideas originating from a diversity of sources. Bad
bets were abandoned quickly in a process which might not
have been orderly but which worked. Eades and Nelson,
however, cite the civilian reactor program, the SST, and
military R&D since the 1950s as a sad contrast to the former
practice because now everyone sticks to a "game plan." 4 2
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There is no incentive to abandon a project even when it
should be dropped.
Eades and Nelson disagree with those who claim that ad-
vanced technologies require government subsidies because
of long lead times, high risks, and scale of development
costs. They say that governments should not underestimate
the ability of capital markets and firms to undertake
large projects involving substantial risks and long-term
horizons. IBM, after all, risked $5 billion in the early
1960s to develop its System-360 family of computers, and
industrial R&D on television and polymers in the 1920s are
other examples of firms undertaking long rangie projects
with uncertain returns.43 The real reason why American in-
dustry did not invest in the SST or the breeder reactor
was that the expected rate of return (i.e. the commercial
prospects) was very low. Furthermore, the time-cost trade-
off should also be noted. Speeding up development through
government support may bring benefits sooner, but it also
brings added costs and risks. The question is whether it
is worth it to get fast breeders slightly earlier. The
measurement has to be in terms of the marginal differences;
too often, government intervention is mistakenly ration-
alized in terms of "all-or-nothing" arguments, but the
technology might well have been developed in either case.
The message conveyed by Eades and Nelson regarding
technological choices is that the direct government support
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displayed in the American SST and fast breeder cases should
not be repeated. Some government sponsorship is appropriate
to guarantee that social benefits are heeded, but the sup-
port should be only for basic research and development and
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not for commercial projects. Eades and Nelson prefer
a decentralized traditional structure characterized by
many sources of technical knowledge and flexible decision-
making. They admit that relying on diverse sources to
steer industrial policy might create certain inefficiencies,
but imposing order through government subsidies leads to
worse results. Governments are too reluctant to abandon
projects because of pressure groups and questions of prestige.
Arguments similar to Eades and Nelson's have been ex-
pressed by Duncan Burn for British nuclear energy policy,
John Zysman for the French electronics industry, R. Miller
and S. Sawers for aircraft development, and Otto Keck for
the German fast .breeder reactor.46 Zysman shows how dif-
ferent government policies can affect the organizational
response of firms. Protection and subsidies dampened the
competitive pressure to adopt more effective organizations
in France so that state support ended up sustaining tradi-
tional organizations that are incompatible with modern and
competitive industry. 47 Sir Alec Cairncross is even more
critical of government's role. Following his own career
in the British civil service, he claims:
The last thing that governments are equipped to
do is to promote industrial innovation. They
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can never spot the real winners because they are
far too clumsy, ignorant -and bureaucratic. In-
stead they are likely to go in for expensive
prestige projects that tie up scarce design teams
until another 4 government comes in and scraps the
whole affair.
Keck traces the development of the German fast breeder
reactor to show that the government's decision to construct
the sodium-cooled SNR-300 demonstration reactor was reached
more by a process of elimination than by a specific deci-
sion. The alternatives such as the steam-cooled prototype
reactor were gradually dropped until nothing but the sodium-
cooled reactor remained. It had become the core of the
program and to have opted against it would have meant dis-
mantling the entire government/industry apparatus. Thus,
the program's momentum, rather than any specific decision,
paved the way for the SNR-300.49 Keck is critical of this
and recommends a decision strategy which would distinguish
between exploratory R&D financed by the state and commer-
cial R&D financed by business enterprises from their own
funds.50 This would assure proper economic assessment be-
cause industry would be making it. Government subsidies
would only be for risk-sharing in unforeseeable operation
losses and for background R&D performed in the government
research centers. Keck says that such a strategy is within
the financial capabilities of the firms involved; he cites
the small percentage of sales income it would amount to
for Siemens and mentions that it is in line with previous
expenditures on nuclear reactors. 51
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The market approach to technological policy-making sees
technological choices as a function of economic and politi-
cal factors, but it goes further to urge that market con-
siderations guarantee more emphasis on innovation and hence
better outcomes. Government policy which forces technology
along a certain course almost certainly will backfire.
The market approach, on the other hand, leads to a multiple-
option, sequential, experimental strategy according to its
backers, and this increases the chances for a project's
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success. Industry thus is left to pursue the path it
sees as best.
The Political-Organizational Approach
The advocates of the political-organizational approach
to technological policy-making see technological choices
largely as a response to pre-existing political develop-
ments. The two main-developments to consider are (1)
national political goals and (2) the way in which govern-
ment priorities influenced the establishment of institutions
which deal with a given technology. Political aims and
organizational constraints are often treated separately
in political science literature; we combine them in this
approach, however, because for technological development
they both reflect political choices which condition and
shape the direction of a specific technology, and that is
our focal point. When.we speak of "political objectives"
or "politics" for this model, we refer to the goals of the
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state and institutional arrangements. Whereas the market
approach viewed political factors as a source of distor-
tion for-technological development, here they serve as
the context through which economic conditions are defined.
This approach emphasizes the historical aspects of
specific technological projects, and it assumes an on-
going impact of politics. Relations between business and
state sectors are defined less in terms of proper roles
and more in terms of trade-offs. The distinction between
stages of development is therefore much less sharp than
with the market approach because the cumulative effect of
national aims and institutional structure inevitably
carries over into the commercialization stage.
In the market approach, we have seen that politics
only referred to government actions and not to institutional
impact; it had a negative role, was a means to clear the
way for the market to operate efficiently, and thus was
reactive to other conditions. In the political-organizational
approach, on the other hand, politics has a positive role.
It is seen as a continuing influence, not merely as peri-
odic interventions or adjustments. The argument is that
a truly free market cannot be attained and politics will
not lose its significance since economic interests, however
cloaked, also reflect political objectives.
A "7-
A second point emphasized by this approach is the
interaction of political and economic objectives. When
industry turns to the government to create certain economic
conditions, its actions are not only economic but also
political. The firms involved in a given sector are eager
to establish stability and control within their branch of
an industry, and they are quite amenable to having their
economic problems solved by political means. Most firms
show little hesitation about discarding their market
ideology when they stand to gain by government support.
Similarly, objections to state planning can also be over-
come quickly by firms when planning seems beneficial to
them.
Such overlapping of political and economic objectives
it not new. In fact, Gabriel Kolko has chronicled how the
American railroad barons of the 19th century embraced regu-
lation as a means to stabilize their industry and protect
themselves from cutthroat competition.53 The point is
that industry and government are well aware of their inter-
dependence, and hence any policy analysis of technological
development- should pay close attention to the interactions
between the sectors.
Political Aspects of the Political-Organizational
Approach. The political-organizational approach centers
attention on the effect of politics on the sharing of
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functions between business and state sectors (e.g., initi-
ating projects, risk-sharing, profit-taking) and on the
establishment of decision-making structures. Since poli-
tics is involved in the parcelling out of tasks among the
relevant business-state sectors and in the way in which
government is organized, political goals have a critical
impact on technological outcomes. National security and
national prestige are prime examples. According to this
approach, military objectives steer developments in cer-
tain directions, and projects such as the Concorde are
supported because of the supposed prestige they will bring.
The interest in "national champion industries" during the
late 1960s and early 1970s was very much a function of
the so-called "technological gap" between Europe and the
United States.54 The assumption was that the national
champion industries should be state-supported because
otherwise they could .not compete with large American firms.
They had to be subsidized to uphold the honor of the state.
The state backed technological development to further its
own needs.
As we have seen, political factors often seemed of secon-
dary importance in the 1950s and 1960s when the role of
politics was obscured by an expanding pie of economic
benefits. Now, though, the role is becoming more apparent.
Henry Nau makes this point in his study of nuclear reactor
development in Western Europe. The purpose of his study
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is to show how nations have sought to accommodate civilian
technologies to national aims, and he emphasizes the im-
pact of national structures of interest on international
technological and economic.activity by examining how groups
-- identified primarily along national lines -- behave in
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the development of big technologies. The willingness to
cooperate internationally is directly related to domestic
strengths and weaknesses. Technological outcomes are seen
as a response to pre-existent political developments;
political choices condition and shape the direction of
technology. Politics, in Nau's estimation, cannot be
avoided in the new milieu of European technological relations. 5 6
Two corollary arguments emerge from the claim that
political choice is of prime importance in technological
development. The first, represented by advocates of the
"appropriate technology" school, is that political consider-
ations may lead to the rejection of certain technologies.
When Volvo, for example, replaced its assembly line success-
fully with 250 individual car carriers which permitted
more personalized work, it demonstrated that low technology
can be productive and can require as much engineering
genius as high technology.57 This view criticizes those
who tend to believe in the inevitability of "grand techno-
logical solutions," especially concerning energy.
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The second argument concerns the possible misuse of
political factors in technological choices. John Kenneth
Galbraith relates the problem to political alignments within
society. Galbraith says that "massive and complex business
organizations are the tangible manifestation of advanced
technology," and these organizations are compelled to turn
to the state for help because the problems of planning which
arise inevitably with technology are beyond the reach of
individual firms.58 If society wants to reap the benefits
of advanced technology, it has to bear the costs, and hence
state support becomes an imperative of technology. The
line separating public and private authority becomes
blurred, and the state ends up promoting national goals
which reflect the needs of the "industrial system."59 The
industrial system should no longer be regarded as separate
from government because corporations are becoming part of
the larger administrative complex associated with the
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state. Galbraith assumes that political arrangements
affect technological choices; his message is to be cautious
about how these political arrangements are evolving.
Organizational Aspects 'of the Political-Organizational
Approach. We should be cautious when we speak of the
"government" or the "state" because the terms are so amor-
phous. Instead, there is a need to see which actors within
the governmental process have an impact on technology policy.
In addition, the stage at which they exert influence is also
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critical. More attention should be paid to the process
of reaching decisions to clarify how that process is an
essential part of formulating policy.
W. Henry Lambright has presented this viewpoint cogently
in his book Governing Science and Technology. According
to him, policy formulation should be studied in terms of
both interest groups and organizational analysis. Too
often, technological decisions involve coalition building
rather than a rational search for solutions to public prob-
lems. Technological choices, hence, are important not
only due to the technologies selected, but also due to the
closing off of alternative options.6 2
The long development period for advanced technologies
makes them particularly susceptible to organizational con-
straints. One reason for this relates to changing objec-
tives and the struggle to keep coherent goals in sight.
Milton Shaw, onetime head of R&D on the American liquid
metal fast breeder reactor project for the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), stated the problem clearly:
Bringing to completion long-term technological
projects is one of the toughest problems that
a democratic society faces. The political pro-
cess inevitably focuses attention on short-term
payoffs, and long-range programs, whatever their
promise, have a difficult time surviving.6 3
The momentum which large-scale technological projects gain
is a second reason which underscores the relevance of or-
ganizational concerns. Part of the momentum derives from
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the expenditures involved, but part of it comes from or-
ganizational alliances that evolve. Lambright points out
that as nuclear critics grew in stridency and number in the
late 1960s, "the technological partnership among the AEC,
industry and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE)
became a tight and closed political sub-system."6 4
The AEC is one example of how an agency can influence
the policy process. In addition to regulating atomic
energy, the AEC also assumed the role of chief promoter;
it was the developrs and marketers of nuclear energy (and
not the regulators) who governed the agency. The AEC be-
came so overly protective of the atom that one New York
Times reporter said the agency "repeatedly sought to re-
press studies by its own scientists that found nuclear re-
actors were more dangerous than were officially acknowledged
or that raised questions about reactor safety devices." 6 5
The consequence was that the AEC was not in a position to
anticipate or even respond to growing public concerns; in-
stead it fought change. Lambright draws a telling conclusion:
Seldom has a federal agency pushed harder on a
private industry to innovate a new technology.
Initially, the AEC did so in the wake of a
national mandate. It continued to do'so even as
the national policy climate 6ghanged. In the end
the AEC itself was changed.
This is a prime example of what Lambright labels "gov-
ernment-based technology" to show how the government is
actively involved in the pace and direction of high
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technology deployment. Those agencies which launch a tech-
nology. usually retain a major influence on its subsequent
67deployment. Another key facet of the government's role
in technology decision-making is that where there is a
policy vacuum, agencies will move in to fill the gap.
NASA planners, fol instance, had already chosen a lunar
landing objective as one of their agency's major goals two
years before President Kennedy made his historic decision
-- and they were directing their program to that objective. 6 8
Because organizational interests fit into a larger pic-
ture of interests, organizations can have a significant
impact on technological outcomes. Bupp and Derian describe
the organizational constraints caused by the activities of
the AEC and JCAE. The authors say that the AEC and JCAE
pursued institutional interests which were only distantly
related to the public's interests, and they blame the 1946
atomic energy legislation for this because it established
the JCAE as "a perfectly insulated, self-perpetuating or-
ganization with plenary power. ,,69 That virtually ensured
many of the events of the next 30 years of American nuclear
energy policy. According to Bupp and Derian, scientists
had an intellectual stake in the success of nuclear power,
politicians had a political stake, bureaucrats had an or-
ganizational stake, and businessmen had a commercial stake.
Each side reinforced and amplified the others' claims:
"The theology of nuclear power and the sanctification of
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light water technology created an interlocking set of
intellectual, political, and commercial interests."7 0
APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO GERMAN NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how techno-
logical choices have been made in German nuclear energy
policy and to consider what broader applications our find-
ings may have. We focus on advanced technologies because
it is here that the domestic and international priorities
of the state are most evident and that the challenges to
industry are greatest. This does not deny that ailing sec-
tors, such as the coal industry, or low technology products
(meaning that R&D amounts to a low percentage of sales) such
as steel also provide challenges; still, advanced technolo-
gies involve more status and prestige questions, and they
also have more open-ended policy options which enable us
to look more carefully at why certain choices were made.
The market and political-organizational approaches to
how technological choices are made provide the basis of
our analysis. The two approaches should not be viewed as
exclusive categories; we are not trying to decide which
one explains policy-making better because they are related
to each other. Our aim is to see (1) the relevance of
each approach, (2) the relative significance of each ap-
proach at the various stages of technological development,
and (3) the linkages between the two approaches. The aues-
tions become: with shifting objectives and leadership
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roles in the promotion of a technology, which actor is able
to exert maximum influence at which stage of development?
Are there more or less optimal roles for each actor at each
stage of development -- optimal with respect to advancing
development of the project? Attention, in short, is direc-
ted to how the policy actors coordinate efforts over the
course of development within and among the government,
manufacturing and utility sectors.
The two approaches allow us to observe how political
and economic objectives balance in German nuclear energy
policy-making. The aspect of nuclear energy policy on
which we will concentrate is the choice of nuclear reactor
designs. Design refers to the type of reactor system --
meaning the light water, fast breeder and high temperature
reactors for the Federal Republic. Of course reactor sys-
tems are complex and involve countless technologies, but
the standard categorization of reactors is by overall de-
sign because reactor vendors have to convince potential
customers to buy their line of reactors. The success of
a reactor refers to the overall line.
Two Contexts for Applying the Two Approaches
In their extreme forms, the two approaches can be re-
duced to two questions: at the risk of oversimplification
we can say that the market approach allows us to ask whether
private industry can exert its will even under the best of
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market conditions, while the political-organizational
approach lets us test whether the state can control tech-
nological choices when it most wants to. German nuclear
energy policy provides good contexts to examine each of
these questions: the first question relates to the over-
all German context for nuclear energy policy; the second
relates to the specific case of the high temperature re-
actor and the issues of national prestige inherent in it.
The high temperature reactor example allows us to qualify
the description of the overall policy context.
Starting with the overall case, we see that the nuclear
energy policy context in West Germany is favorable for the
market determination of technological choices for several
reasons:
(1) The Germans renounced the use of nuclear energy
for military purposes, and therefore there are
no military priorities steering nuclear technol-
ogy development.
(2) Given the bad memories of the strong Nazi state
after World War II, the Germans opted for a de-
centralized decision-making structure which
restricted the powers of the federal government.
(3) The Germans championed free market attitudes,
especially until the late 1960s when the Social
Democrats gained power, but after that as well.
According to the market approach, these conditions should
have allowed private industry to play a maximum role in
policy formulation, and they were propitious for pursuing
several reactor design paths simultaneously. The state
provided some funding for R&D work, but left the decisions
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on narrowing options to the market. The nuclear industry
decided which designs had commercial potential.
We will look at the extent to which the private sector
did, in fact, exert its influence under such favorable
circumstances. The utilities, for example, circumvented
the government atomic program in the late 1950s and opted
for the internationally available light water reactors
(LWRs). The utilities felt that the LWRs had better mar-
ket prospects and they preferred commercial reactors over
experimental ones, The government had little choice but
to go along with the decision.
At the same time, though, the second question leads us
to consider the nature of government influence on a favored
project such as the German designed and developed pebble
bed high temperature reactor. The Germans take special
pride in this design because their most original contribu-
tions to reactor design are embodied here. They see, for
example, special advantages of the HTR in terms of safety
features, the application of process heat, the saving of
uranium, and the production of synthetic fuels. Several
distinguishing features of the HTR have to be kept in mind:
it is a "German" technology; there are no immediate pros-
pects of commercialization; the reactor manufacturing firms
and utilities involved are not the most important in their
respective sectors; the strongest government support came
from a Land', North Rhine-Westphalia, and not from the federal
government.
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This leads us to ask certain questions about the German
HTR over the three stages of development:
--What role did national pride play?
--What role did cost calculations play?
--What was the main priority'?
--Where did initiatives come from? Did the utilities
have as important a role as with the LWRs?
--To what extent did the official government programs
influence development?
--How did objectives change over the stages of tech-
nological development?
We want to analyze why the Germans initially decided to
emphasize the pebble bed high temperature reactor and why
they have continued to support it even in the face of al-
most no interest in ordering the design except inside the
Federal Republic.
Our attempt in this thesis is not to prove that the
market approach or the political-organizational approach
is correct, but rather to look at the qualifications that
have to be applied to each. The qualifications give a
better sense of how political and economic objectives inter-
act. They also direct attention to the need for the various
policy actors in the business-state sectors to coordinate
efforts.
As technological projects progress from the R&D stage
to the demonstration stage to the commercialization stage,
-59-
the interests of the actors change, and so do the contri-
butions which the actors can make toward technological
choices.. As we will see, government support can be most
effective in the initial stage, the manufacturers' exper-
tise is most essential for constructing prototype reactors
in the demonstratfion stage, and the utilities as reactor
operators exercise the most influence as commercialization
comes closer. Increasingly, though, these stages must be
integrated because the cost of technological development
is so high and the time frame so long.
The advantage of focusing on German nuclear energy and
the HTR is that we can examine one national context in de-
tail, and then look at how it must be qualified. Peter
DeLeon concludes in his comparative analysis of reactor
development programs that the German program has been a
success story because of its decentralized policy process.
MAns Lbnnroth and William Walker reach the opposite con-
clusion in their report for the International Consultative
Group on Nuclear Energy, arguing that the difficult poli-
tical and economic conditions that have prevailed since the
early 1970s have put countries with strong private sectors,
such as West Germany, at a distinct disadvantage to those
countries with strong government control.72 We will re-
turn to this dispute in the last chapter; our analysis
should shed light on why such contradictory conclusions
arise.
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Our focus is on the limits of explanatory power for
the market and political-organizational approaches, and
the intensive study of German nuclear energy policy should
serve to clarify the nature of the limits. Understanding
the coordination -- or lack of coordination -- within each
sector and unders'tanding the changes of leadership functions
in the transitions between stages of development will be
particularly important.
Of course the conclusions will be most relevant for
the Federal Republic, but they also will be generalizable.
First of all, they should add to our knowledge of how poli-
tical, economic, social and technological factors affect
each other. Second, even for countries that leave less
scope to the business sector for decision-making, they
should be instructive about how the business and state
sectors are related. Third, nuclear energy in itself is
a multi-billion dollar a year enterprise, and studies of
how the policy process operates in the key producing countries
should be welcome. Fourth, if nuclear energy does have a
future, the high temperature reactor seems destined to
play a significant role, and therefore its development in
West -Germany is important. It is the one reactor which
has applications outside of the production of electricity.
Japan, Switzerland and the United States are all quite in-
terested in the long-range industrial uses of the German
high temperature reactor- even though commercialization is
not feasible until the mid-1990s at the earliest.
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Our analysis will proceed by looking at overall German
nuclear energy development in the next two chapters. Then
we will concentrate on the high temperature reactor to see
the qualifications it adds to the general policy-making
context.
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PART II
TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES AND THE OVERALL
WEST GERMAN NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM
The next two chapters examine the 25 years of post-war
German nuclear energy policy. In contrast to the French
and British programs which concentrated efforts early on
a specific reactor, the German program began with many op-
tions which were only gradually narrowed down. We are con-
cerned with what accounts for this approach, whether it
can be called successful, and what we can learn about
business-state relations by studying reactor design choices.
Chapter Two presents the argument that reactor types
were not selected on the basis of market factors alone.
It suggests that market factors are most important when a
technology approaches commercialization, but that they
have more limited applicability for the earlier R&D and
demonstration stages. The chapter outlines changing ob-
jectives in the German nuclear program over the course of
three time periods. It looks specifically at the light
water, fast breeder and high temperature reactors.
Chapter Three switches the emphasis from the changing
objectives in the nuclear program to the institutions in-
volved with policy-making. It draws attention to the
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political-organizational context which determine the im-
pact of market factors on technological choices. The
chapter, for example, explains why the utilities were so
critical in the development of the light water reactor.
The broad overview in Chapter Three focuses on the dif-
ferences among the utilities, manufacturers and government
in nuclear policy-making. The more specific examination
of the high temperature reactor in Part III (Chapters Four
to Seven) will consider differences within the individual
sectors as well.
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CHAPTER TWO
CHANGING OBJECTIVES WITHIN THE GERMAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
In Chapter One we introduced two approaches for analyzing
technological choices. The context we will use to test
the applicability of the two approaches is German nuclear
energy policy, particularly with regard to the selection
of reactor designs. In setting out the framework for anal-
ysis in the last chapter we said that looking at how tech-
nological choices occur necessitates looking at the linkage
of technology and public policy, or in other words, how
different actors and multiple objectives are related over
time. This chapter focuses on the changing objectives that
have occurred in the 26 years of West German nuclear energy
policy. The next chapter will focus on the individual ac-
tors and the institutional aspects of reactor design choices.
Our argument in this chapter is that although the mar-
ket approach often explains how actors are motivated and
how decisions are made, it does not give a complete under-
standing of the policy-making process. In order to show
the limited applicability of the market approach, we will
look first at three phases of development in German nu-
clear energy policy and then at three examples of reactor
choices. The argument is that market factors are not
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usually the determining factor in technological choices for
German. nuclear reactors, and when they are, they reflect
narrow economic objectives and not the broader objectives
which allow the market factors to be determinant. In the
first section, we will demonstrate how the relationships
among political, 'economic and technological concerns
vary across the three phases of development. The second
section applies these findings about the changing objec-
tives to the choices made for three specific reactor de-
signs -- the light water, fast breeder and high tempera-
ture reactors. This is not a detailed description of
each reactor design but rather an overview of the factors
that influenced the choices. The final section assesses
the explanatory power of the market approach in the German
nuclear policy context.
THE BACKGROUND FOR GERMAN REACTOR TDEVELOPMENT
Nuclear energy has played an important role in the
Federal Republic since 1955. The country today has the-
third highest nuclear capacity in the world, behind the
United States and Japan; and it is the. second major ex-
porter of nuclear technology, behind the U.S. In May 1955,
the Paris agreements came into effect, allowing the Fed-
eral Republic to regain full sovereignty and consequently
resume nuclear research. German reconstruction was pro-
ceeding so quickly then that its power demands had ex-
ceeded available resources. The reconstruction effort was
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seriously threatened when Europe suddenly confronted an
energy shortage in the summer of 3955. Consequently, the
prospect of an additional energy source such as nuclear
energy was eagerly welcomed by the Germans. The first
atomic conference in Geneva in August, 1955 also spurred
German developments, even though it showed-the relatively
weak position of German technology. In the 1930s, Germany
had dominated nuclear science. The Federal Republic has
apparently never entertained any notion of assuming such
a dominant position again, but it certainly has recognized
the significance of the nuclear energy sector. To the
Germans in the 1950s, nuclear energy was a means to re-
assert their scientific and economic excellence, and the
type of program developed was a demonstration of West
German allegiance to the West. Matters of political,
economic and technological prestige were all wrapped up
in the advancement of the technology, and the Germans
approached nuclear energy development with a great deal
of commitment.
Several special circumstances had an impact on the
resumption of nuclear research in West Germany. Domestic
manufacturing firms which logically might have started a
nuclear industry after the war were forbidden by the Allied
Powers to conduct any research on nuclear energy until 1955.
In addition, German technology was not linked to any mili-
tary applications which elsewhere often guided research
and funding. In West Germany, the whole notion of govern-
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ment research support started with nuclear technology in
1955, and for several years the nuclear sector was the
chief beneficiary of this policy. The Federal Republic,
moreover, unlike France or Britain, adopted foreign re-
actor technology early in its development program. It
came primarily from the United States. Finally, because
of the abuse of power by the state under Nazism, the Fed-
eral Republic has always been wary of directing such sensi-
tive technological developments nationally; this has in-
creased the willingness to cooperate internationally. The
German reactor program was not an outgrowth or continuation
of wartime atomic research experiences; rather, it was ini-
tiated largely at the insistence of West German industries,
utilities and scientists.
At one point in the late 1950s the Federal Republic was
pursuing 13 different types of nuclear reactors, but even-
tually the choices were narrowed down to.the three designs
still being actively developed today -- the light water,
fast breeder and high temperature reactors.2 It is the
process of how this narrowing down took place and why these
designs were picked that is interesting because by the mid-
1970s the fledgling German nuclear energy industry of the
1950s had become a showpiece of German economic and tech-
nological progress. Starting with licensing arrangements
with U.S. firms and honing its skills through the construc-
tion of several light water reactors domestically, the
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German nuclear energy industry quickly asserted its in-
fluence on world markets. The leading producer of nuclear
reactors, Kraftwerk Union, had more orders in 1975 than
all the U.S. vendors combined and America's monopoly of
the market seemed to have been broken. 3
Fortunes changed quickly, however, and KWU has not had
another domestic order since then. The picture of the future
is not much brighter for the nuclear industry either. Even
though all the political parties advocate nuclear develop-
ment according to their official statements, they also are
reluctant to stir up the anti-nuclear forces again. There
was even some speculation that the Federal Republic con-
ceivably could be the one major nuclear power producer to
curtail nuclear expansion following the Three Mile Island
nuclear accident.4 In April 1979 the Federal Minister of
the Interior, Gerhart "Baum, said, "We must ask ourselves
whether nuclear energy really is unrenouncable in view of
its risks, compared to those of other energy forms." 5
THREE PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT
The development of the Federal Republic's nuclear
reactor program can be understood better if we divide it
into three phases. The phases are:
(1) an open-ended period of development in which
debates inside the nuclear community about
whether nuclear energy should be pursued
were common,
(2) a period of consensus within the nuclear
community that nuclear energy should be de-
veloped because of the benefits it brought the
German economy, and,
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(3) the present period of opposition to nuclear
energy from outside the nuclear community
while the community itself has closed ranks
against the opposition.
The term nuclear community refers to the actors in-
volved with producing nuclear energy. It includes the in-
dustry representatives (both suppliers and users), the
government officials, the politicians, and the scientists
involved with nuclear policy decisions. As the phases in-
dicate, the internal relations of the nuclear community
have fluctuated in the past 25 years, and external influ-
ences also have significance. Through this chapter and
the next one, we want to discover how relations formed
between actors who share objectives in certain stages of
development are influenced when objectives change.
Phase One: The Open-Ended Period of Development
The first phase lasted from 1955 until 1963 and was
marked by indecisions and uncertainty among actors over
directions and objectives. The government did not assert
much leadership despite its strong interests in nuclear
energy. There was confusion whether the primary goal
should be to provide energy or close the technological gap
between the Federal Republic and other countries. The
Bonn government wanted to prove its solid identification
with the West and was not sure which nuclear policy most
furthered this: should closer ties be established with
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America or with Europe? The result of the confusion was
essentially a compromise policy for the first years which
sought to reconcile the different concerns of government
6
and industry. The new Atomic Law was therefore less di-
rected to safety standards and liability regulations than
to establishing Bonn's position in the Atlantic community.
Within the government there were clear differences of
opinion about how to approach nuclear energy. The Chancellor
and Foreign Minister leaned more to the French approach of
state determination of atomic policy because they felt that
the policy might contribute to European integration; the
Economics Ministry strongly objected to such plans and sided
with industry in insisting on private development of atomic
energy. The newly formed Federal Ministry for Atomic
Questions also faced problems because so many other federal
ministries were also involved with nuclear energy. In addi-
tion, the individual Bundesldnder had carved out their own
areas of competence, and hence the scope of action for the
new ministry was quite narrow.8
The early years of this phase (1955-57) were charac-
terized by unintended outcomes which resulted from the
centrifugal forces affecting the policy process. It was
not just the government which was divided. The Foreign
Ministry and Economics Ministry had even sided with in-
dustry in opposing the formation of the new Ministry for
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Atomic Affairs because they wanted to avoid introducing new
actors into decisions on nuclear energy. Within the busi-
ness sector, too, there was disagreement. At the begin-
ning, the electrical utilities and the coal industry were
opposed to developing nuclear power because they were ori-
ented to traditional energy sources. In addition, although
the reactor manufacturing firms were testing different
options for reactors, government support of initial re-
search took the edge off: the competitiveness between designs.
Differences of opinion were also evident among the
parliamentary parties and between the nuclear research cen-
ters. The SPD felt that the significance of nuclear energy
required that it be placed under public control with long-
9
range planning. After its crushing 1957 defeat in the
general elections, though, the SPD made its peace with the
business.sector and dropped any objections to private in-
dustry being involved with nuclear development.10 Party
differences on nuclear policy since then were essen-
tially non-existent until the late 1970s. The major nu-
clear research centers were also in competition because
during this phase the two largest centers at Karlsruhe and
JUlich each adopted a major project to support, respectively,
the fast breeder and high temperature reactors. Moreover,
the JUlich center was the pet project of West Germany's big-
gest Land, North Rhine-Westphalia, and the federal government
supported the center only grudgingly in these early years,
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although government assistance for nuclear R&D projects
was generou.s.
Some major issues remained totally unresolved:
should industry invest in basic research or aim at pro-
ducing commercial reactors quickly? what amount of govern-
ment aid would be proper? how much international coopera-
tion should there be? The situation chanaed, however, be-
ginning in 1958. The energy crisis was replaced by an
energy glut caused by cheap oil. At the same time, the
very generous state subsidies for basically all aspects of
nuclear R&D continued to reduce the incentive for firms to
compete with one another.
For utilities, the need for new alternatives for tra-
ditional power supplies no longer existed once the energy
crisis was over. They were therefore less willing to
assume the investment risks which nuclear reactors entailed
and which the manufacturing industries were trying to un-
load on them. The outcome of this and the fact
that the utilities had been excluded for the most part
from the government-industry policy-making process led to
a greater independence on the part of the utilities. They
worked directly against some government goals and instead
pursued their own objectives. They focused on profits, low
initial capital investments, and the availability of tech-
nology. These goals inclined them toward the American-made
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light water reactors even though the government wanted to
support domestic designs and preferred natural uranium
fuel since it avoided dependence on American enriched uranium,
In contrast to the government, the utilities were
clear about their objectives, especially after the energy
crisis disappeared. By 1958, the debate was whether to
continue in the experimental phase of reactor construction
or build operational plants. The utilities still were pre-
pared to invest in nuclear reactors but they opted for the
operating plants course, and the government either had to
go along with those plans or pour massive subsidies into
the rest of the nuclear sector. moreover, the utilities
effectively sabotaged the government's first atomic pro-
gram, the Eltville program, because they financed their
own 15MW experimental reactor rather than go along with
the government's proposed 100MW reactors which the utilities
considered too large. The government had counted on the
utilities to provide financing for the Eltville program;
when they did not, the government proposed a supplementary
"advanced reactors" program which did not rely on the
utilities to place the orders.
Phase Two: The Period of Consensus
The second phase of development lasted from 1963-1973
and was characterized by a much greater consensus on objec-
tives. This consensus on the direction of nuclear energy
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development was based mostly on economic, technological
considerations. Objections to building advanced technology
reactors were minimal because the reactors showed promise
of being economically successful in domestic and foreign
markets. Following the lead of the electrical utilities,
the actors in the nuclear community all accepted the
economic priorities of development. Developing nuclear
power as an additional energy source for a comprehensive
national energy program was less important than the shorter
term economic goals. Since nuclear energy seemed to promise
economic success through more exports and more jobs, no
one felt a need to criticize it or to keep a critical eye
on reactor design decisions. For reasons not entirely
technological, the light water reactor emerged victorious
from the competition with other reactor types. Analyses
of particular designs were usually carried, out by the build-
ers or eventual operators of the reactors, and the two
reactors of the second generation -- the.fast breeder and
the high temperature reactors -- were never compared
directly. This was a period of consolidation in German
nuclear policy, and one author says it was at the end of
this time that the "naive period" of development in German
policy came to an end.
The most striking feature of this phase is the close
cooperation between industry and the state, One observer
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of German nuclear energy, Robert Gerwin, says that the first
seven years of development had been lean and improvised
and that by -1962 the government wanted a more comprehensive
12program. The first atomic program, the Eltville program,
had not really been publicized. The second and third programs
were issued more publicly in 1963 and 1968, and they tried
to provide more of a guide to what could be expected of the
government.
The basis of the second program was "a concentration
and coordination of efforts and a strengthening of the means
of public support."1 3 The major goal of the program,
according to the then Minister for Atomic Affairs, Hans
Lenz, was to bring German nuclear research and technology
in all areas up to par with world standards and to make all
branches of the German nuclear sector competitive on world
markets. 1 The major goals of the third program were to
(1) maintain research at the international level it had
achieved and to expand it further, (2) lower electricity
production costs, and (3) increase the capability of the
German nuclear industry to keep pace with the rapid inter-
national developments that were taking place. 1 5
Even though German nuclear industry had become compe-
titive internationally, the government made it clear that
state support would be continued and increased substantially.
Total state expenditures for the second program were DM
3.791 billion compared to DM 6.154 billion for the third
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program. The amount set aside for reactor development was
DM 584 million in the second program and DM 1.317 billion
16for the third program.
The major developments of this phase were the economic
breakthrough of the light water reactor and the concen-
tration of government support on the high temperature and
fast breeder reactors. The success of the light water re-
actor was clearly due to its development in the United
States. It appeared successful there on the basis of
several orders, and consequently the Germans were eager
to jump on the bandwagon. One of the main goals of the
second atomic program was to build two large demonstration
reactors based on technologies already proven elsewhere --
i.e., light water reactors. Of course, the fact that German
utilities preferred the U.S. LWRs due to their availability
and due to the fact that German industry was working with
American licenses influenced the decision. The fast breeder
reactors were the major long-range focus of the second pro-
gram, and by the third program the high temperature re-
actor had been elevated to equal status. This reflected
the federal government's 1960 decision to fund the Jiulich
nuclear research center at the same level as the Karlsruhe
center.
The driving force behind the government's program
was its desire to be internationally competitive, and this
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meshed with the objectives of nuclear industry. The indus-
try itself was undergoing a consolidation process as firms
backed out of it. Siemens, for example, had done all the
work on the heavy water reactor essentially at government
cost. In the long run the reactor proved uneconomical
but the experiences which Siemens had accumulated were
invaluable for other areas of application. And it was
only the larger firms like Siemens which were able to pur-
sue more than one line of research so that alternatives
existed if one approach had to be dropped.
The most striking merger in the German nuclear indus-
try was the joining together of Siemens and AEG to form
Kraftwerk Union in 1969. The two firms were both among
the largest firms in the Federal Republic and they had de-
veloped the two types of light water reactors: Siemens
worked together with Westinghouse on the pressurized water
reactor, and AEG worked with General Electric on the boiling
water reactor. The impetus to merge arose from the recog-
nition of how tough international competition was for re-
actor exports, and the government was supportive of the
merger from the start. With the formation of Kraftwerk
Union, Siemens and AEG had a virtual monopoly on the domes-
tic light water reactor market, and they also controlled
the fast breeder reactor development through their subsidi-
ary firm, Interatom. In the field of high temperature re-
actor development the German firm Brown, Boveri and Cie
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and BBC' s American partner, Gulf General Atomic, had es-
tablished similar dominance.
in sum, largely because of the role of the private
sector, economic objectives were primary in the development
of German nuclear policy in this phase. They were more sig-
nificant than some other factors which might have affected
policy. The Federal Republic was launching its Ostpolitik
and was engaged in a domestic debate about whether to sign
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it was also becoming a
world economic power and that seemed to have the major im-
pact on nuclear policy. The development of nuclear tech-
nology was a means to use the country's growing economic
clout. Support for nuclear technologies was not fostered
by urgent energy needs, but by desires to be competitive
internationally. The late 1960s marked the high point for
European fears of a "technology gap" with the -United States.
"National champion" industries were a common response,
and the formation of Kraftwerk Union fits this category,
The differences of opinion among members of the nuclear
community in' the first phase' of development disappeared in
this second phase. Government officials, politicians and
industry representatives all viewed nuclear energy in terms
of how it would benefit the economy and found no reason to
object to it. Nuclear energy policy in these years should
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not be characterized as energy policy per se, but as
"industrial structural policy" because it solidified a
17
"nuclear energy coalition" among the actors involved.
This was not a conscious plan, but rather the result of
fragmented decisions which were mainly profit-oriented.
The heavy water reactor was dropped as a project by Siemens
because its marketability seemed limited. The steam-
cooled fast breeder reactor was dropped because international
developments seemd oriented to the sodium-cooled alter-
native. German objection to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
centered on the worry that the German nuclear industry
would be handicapped in its international business.
In general, the background of world geopolitical sta-
bility allowed the military and civilian aspects of nuclear
energy to be separated. They had been intertwined earlier,
but the establishment and maintenance of international
trust between East and West led to the liberal trading con-
ditions and interdependencies of the 1960s and early 1970s.1 8
Countries were not oriented to the political problems of
nuclear fuel supply, waste storage and the proliferation
of plutonium. These seemed less pressing at the time than
they appeared a few years later. Until the 1970s, the
unprofitable aspects of nuclear energy such as. storage
questions, reprocessing or accident research were only
marginally considered. 1 9
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Phase Three: The Period of Opposition from Outside the
Nuclear Community
The third phase covers the period from late 1973 to
the present. One German analyst categorizes the time up
to 1973 as the "depoliticization of nuclear energy" be-
cause so little attention was paid to the social consequences
of the policy pursued.20 The impetus of a politicized nu-
clear energy policy stemmed from the 1973 oil crisis which
suddenly made energy needs the main priority of nuclear
energy policy. For the first time the goal of nuclear
policy related to a secure energy supply rather than to
competitiveness of the nuclear industry.21 On the one
hand there was a shift in objectives and on the other
hand new actors and new authorities seeking to regulate
nuclear energy appeared in the picture. No longer was
just the nuclear community involved. The movement against
nuclear energy came as a surprise to the government and
industry when it emerged in 1973-74 even though opposition
had been evident in the United States before this. The
first response of the government to the 1973 energy crisis
was a nearly total embracing of nuclear possibilities, but
since then responses have been more varied.
After 1973, the economic objectives which had charac-
terized the development of nuclear energy policy were sub-
ordinated to political objectives. Energy supply was a
major factor in these objectives and so too were efforts
to defuse political protests. It is difficult to pinpoint
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the reasons for the protests, but they related to doubts
about the safety of nuclear energy, environmental concerns,
objections to the.constant orientation toward economic
growth, and a lack of trust in the government given-its
22long, close association with the nuclear industry. The
shift away from ec'onomic objectives as the main component
of nuclear energy policy did not mean, however, that these
economic objectives lost their importance. The effort be-
came to incorporate them in other objectives,
Given the massive reliance on nuclear energy which
the fourth.atomic program envisioned in 1973, it is not
surprising that new actors became involved in German energy
policy. The plan was to increase nuclear capacity from
2,400 MW to 40-50,000 MW by 1985. That meant increasing
the nuclear energy proportion of primary energy capacity
from 3.1 percent to 15 percent and the nuclear energy
proportion of electricity provided from 6 percent to 40
percent.23 In the 1960s the investment decisions were
made on an economic basis, and this narrow view of nuclear
energy meant that certain problems were-not foreseen. The
electrical utilities had been particularly guilty of not
considering the implications of site planning, and with
all the new reactors being planned, more and -more people
were affected. Not only individuals were expressing con-
cern about the location of reactors, but also the L*nder
were protesting because the reactors raised water temperatures
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of the waterways on which they were located, The public
protest and Ldnder protest finally led the state to initiate
some state-supervised site planning in the mid-1970s.2 5
The government presented its fourth atomic program in
1973. This was the first program that was actually prepared
by the government (the Federal Ministry for Research and
Technology) and not by the German Atomic Commission which
the SPD disbanded in 1971 (although the German Atomic
Forum, a lobbying organization for the German nuclear in-
dustry, was able to carry on most of the functions of the
Commission which also reflected industrial interests).
The goals of the fourth atomic program were (1) a con-
tinuation and intensification of support for basic nuclear
research, (2) the long-range guarantee of energy supplies
which are affordable and nQt damaging to the environment,
and (3) the further development of a competitive nuclear
industry for the future.26 In practice, this meant a con-
tinuation of former policies. In fact, over 80 percent of
the new budget was already committed to on-going projects.
This was the first government program that presented an
overall concept of energy use, complete with goals and
measures for energy usage and the expected contribution
27
from different sources of energy. In 1977 the government
issued a program on energy research and energy technology.
For all practical purposes, it amounted to a fifth atomic
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program. It was a continuation of the fourth program, but
it also was a response to criticism of nuclear energy and
thus stressed the support for non-nuclear energy technolo-
gies. The ratio of nuclear to non-nuclear research changed
dramatically from 78.9:1 in 1972 to 4.9:1 in 1975 to 2,7:1
after 19772. 2
Not all the new actors involved in nuclear energy
policy-making were anti-nuclear energy. -Many were simply
pulled in because of the increase in size of the nuclear
sector. Within the government, agencies dealing with ecolo-
gical standards, site-planning and the regulation of con-
struction all became involved. Their impact did not replace
the objectives of the old nuclear community, but rather was
a factor added on top of the old objectives, Government
control of nuclear policy became more, not less difficult.
The nuclear community itself responded to the protests
by closing ranks. In effect, it lobbied for pressing for-
ward with nuclear energy. The disagreements of the first
phase of nuclear development dissolved completely and nu-
clear industry, the utilities and the government presented
a united front at least in the first years of this phase.
Some doubts began to set in, though, in 1976 following the
German-Brazilian nuclear deal that aroused strong foreign
protests because of the implications for nuclear prolifera-
tion. The safeguards issue was an especially sensitive
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one following the 1974 Indian nuclear detonation, and
other countries objected to the German sale because it in-
volved the transfer of proliferation-sensitive fuel cycle
technology.
The sale had been called "the nuclear deal of the
century" because of the large sum of money involved (four
billion dollars) and because nuclear fuel and reactor tech-
nologies had never been linked before in one transaction.2 9
The significance of the sale for our purposes is that it
shows the close linkage between government and industry.
The agreement was signed by the respective foreign ministers;
declarations concerning the agreement were signed by the
ministers concerned with research and energy and they in-
cluded detailed guidelines for the industrial commitments;
and business representatives signed pre-contracts for the
delivery of the first two reactors. 30 The problem inter-
nationally was quite simple: the Germans focused on the
economic aspects of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and felt
that it permitted such exports, Legally they were correct,
but other countries, particularly the U.S., felt that such
transactions went against the political intentions of the
treaty.
By 1977 the Germans had acquiesced in part to the
objections of their allies and agreed at least not to con-
clude similar deals in the future. The example remains
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instructive, though, because it demonstrates the importance
of economic interests and the problems of competing minis-
tries in German nuclear policy. For the Germans, non-
proliferation policy had become an economic concern.
Industry pressed the government to carry the deal forward,
but they might have had less success if the German policy-
making process had not made it so difficult to control
corporate and bureaucratic actors.32 An American, Edward
Wonder, claims that "it would not be unfair to describe
the agreement set before the German cabinet as a fait
accompli, carried off by a coalition of corporate and govern-
ment actors who went farther than the more diplomatically
aware would have allowed had they been better informed."3 3
The German who has done the most thorough account of the
transaction, Lothar Wilker, claims that the communication
problems revealed by the German-Brazilian negotiations
resulted in the formation of the Nuclear Cabinet in
341977. The Nuclear Cabinet provided the Administration
(Bundesregierung) with a coordinating body in which to
discuss nuclear issues, and it strengthened the Chancellor's
role in policy formulation.
The German government is struggling with how to pro-
ceed with nuclear energy. Publicly it continues to empha-
size the necessity of building more reactors, but practically
it has halted development by holding up any construction
permits. The 1973 projections of nuclear needs for the future
have been modified downward continually, but even so a num-
ber of new reactors will have to be built if the revised
projections are accurate. The special Enquete Commission
of the Bundestag reached a similar conclusion in its June
1980 report. The government finds itself not able to con-
trol nuclear policy except indirectly by providing more
funding. Private industry has shown only limited willing-
ness to participate in nuclear technological research un-
37less the state supports it. As a result, a partnership
has evolved in which both sides need the other partner,
but new questions have to be factored in -- concerning
public objections and international objections -- to see
what the goals of nuclear policy should be.
Conclusion
Phase one (1955-62) shows how nuclear policy in the
Federal Republic was seen as a means to re-establish the
country in the international political system. The idea
of federal support for research started in the nuclear sec-
tor. The government wanted to boost German industry in
world markets, restore lost prestige and confirm its
alliance with the West. Economic factors were important,
but so too were energy needs -- at least until 1958 -- and
political goals. The government programs, first set out in
the 1957 Eltville program, were important primarily due to
the pattern of government support they established. Ba-
sically, the government supported all nuclear options, but
'y
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the scope of its decision-making was limited, It relied
on the German Atomic Commission, comprised chiefly of in-
dustrial interests, for advice and program formulation.
Government support was critical for nuclear energy devel-
opment since it meant that early, hard decisions narrowing
reactor options could be avoided. The government did have
certain priorities such as emphasizing natural uranium re-
actors and domestic designs, but the nuclear industry and
especially the utilities undermined these priorities. No
real consensus on the direction of nuclear energy existed
until the last years of this phase. Moreover,-the nuclear
energy programs represented support for a particular tech-
nology rather than a long-range energy program.
Phase two (1963-73) shows how the nuclear community
united behind the development of the light water reactor
as a commercial project and the fast breeder and high tem-
perature reactors as research projects. There was not out-
side interference with policy formulation. The measure-
ment for success of a project became its economic feasi-
bility, but this was an odd measure given the massive state
support for these reactors, Government cost assessments
tended to be notoriously inaccurate. For a while, the
justification for financing FBRs was that they would pro-
duce electricity more cheaply than LWRs, When that assump-
tion proved untrustworthy, new rationales were sought. 8
European assessments of the LWRs were also inaccurate. The
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European licensees adjusted their nuclear pricing to
guarantee themselves a market share in the business.3 9
Decisions for the LWRs were made more on mutually reinforcing
hopes than on actual operating experiences.
The priority of the government was to be competitive
internationally. Decisions were made very much with an eye
to the international market. That explains why some re-
actor types were dropped (for example, the steam-cooled
fast breeder reactor and the heavy water reactor), and why
the LWRs were purchased. The problem is that using the
market as a measure when the reactors are still in the R&D
phase essentially guarantees that misinformation, or at
least inaccurate information, will plague the decision.
The German .government was quick to accept the Karlsruhe
Nuclear Research Center's figures justifying an accelerated
FBR project in 1964, but the reactor manufacturing industry
and the utilities were much more cautious. They felt that
the economic utilization of fast breeders was not foresee-
able, and hence they were not prepared to sink their
funding in the project.4 0
Phase Three (1973-present) shows how the economic
standards of the earlier years were replaced by new poli-
tical objectives concerning energy supply and the response
to anti-nuclear political protests. For the first time
German nuclear energy policy was determined by energy needs.
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Immediately after the 1973 oil crisis, the government an-
ticipated a huge increase in the size of its nuclear pro-
gram, but protests and indications that the additional
amount of energy needed is far less than expected have
caused major reductions in those plans, A wide range of
new actors entered the nuclear policy-making scene, and
the traditional nuclear community has tended to be critical
of them and their calls to reassess objectives. The re-
sponse of the government is ambiguous: it still insists
on the need to press forward with nuclear energy, but it
has brought about a halt to developments through its action.
Patterns of industry-government cooperation have clearly
been established in the past 25 years, and they will have
an important impact on future policy. The government, for
instance, in line with its market orientation originally
expected only to support basic research, but government
involvement is now a foregone conclusion. Economic fac-
tors alone have played less a part in nuclear policy as
the process has grown more complicated.
REACTOR DESIGN CHOICES AND GERMAN OBJECTIVES
The three phases give a background for looking at
specific reactor choices in the German program to see how
well the market approach explains technological outcomes.
The phases demonstrate that objectives shifted over the
25 years of development, and this affected the actors in
the policy process and their relationships, But even in
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the instances in which-market considerations guided German
policy, it is wise to see the background variables which
permitted this.
Light Water 'Reactors
In a sense, the light water reactors are the most ob-
vious choice for arguing that market factors determined
reactor selection. When the German reactor program was
launched, the expectation was that natural uranium gas-
graphite reactors would be the major design backed because
of the progress that had been made on them, especially in
Great Britain, and because they would free West Germany
from reliance on American enriched uranium. Nevertheless,
by the early 1960s the Federal Republic had opted for the
American LWRs. The major reason was that the electrical
utilities preferred that design. To see how well the mar-
ket approach explains this preference, we should look
first at why the German domestic market selected the LWRs
and next at why the United States supported them.
The German utilities were cautious about plunging into
nuclear energy at the start. RWE, the largest domestic
producer of electricity, was basically opposed to it in
the beginning because it had its own coal supplies. None-
theless, RWE also placed the first order for a nuclear
reactor in West Germany -- a 15 MW experimental reactor,
the Versuchsatomkraftwerk at Kahl/Main (VAK). RWE was
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willing to develop a small experimental reactor because of
the potential payoff, but it resisted the larger scale
plans advocated by the government. From an economic stand-
point, one could argue that'the LWRs were chosen because
of lower investment costs and Quicker payoffs, but the
simple fact was that the order placed by RWE was a direct
challenge to the government's nuclear program.
One explanation of this direct challenge is that RWE
wanted to show that a better development strategy was
41possible than what the government had chosen. The utili-
ties felt that foreign technologies should be relied on,
that using enriched uranium was not problematic, and that
the 100 MW plants envisioned by the Eltville program were
far too big. A second account of why RWE worked outside
of the government's wishes and program argues that the
utility wanted to show that nuclear energy was uneconomical,
and it wanted thereby to hinder the construction of larger
reactors.42 The difficulty with this second account is
that it does not explain why RWE pushed ahead so aggres-
sively with development plans.
In either case, RWE's attitude that the government
should stay out of the business of selecting reactors is
evident. In 1960, the chairman of the board of RWE,
Heinrich Sch51ler, said:
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The state should occupy itself with research and
developments this has always been its primary
task. When we build the nuclear experimental
plant Kahl, we are doing something that actually
is not our task, but the task of the machine industry.
And if I may be quite frank, my decision to order
this plant was determined by the reflection that
if the state already wants to engage in the follies
of constructing plants prematurely, then we had
better engage in similar fo ies ourselves in order
to keep them under control.
Schbller criticized the government for moving ahead with a
nuclear program which supported reactors that his utility
considered too large; and he felt that manufacturing firms,
rather than the government, should be making decisions
about which reactor to build. This reflects the tradi-
tional German approach to making technological choices:
keep the government out of decisions; let the manufacturers
(i.e. vendors) develop options, then let the utilities
(i.e. operators) choose among options. With advanced
technologies such as nuclear reactors, however, the long
development times for reactor designs necessitate more
coordination between the vendors and operators. RWE felt
that the options being encouraged by the government were
not what market considerations alone would have dictated;
the utility felt that the governmental assistance was
forcing nuclear policy along a certain path, and hence RWE
pursued an independent path (referred to by Sch5ller as
"similar follies") to keep policy developments under con-
trol. It is not clear whether the decision in favor of
LWRs by RWE was made for economic or for uneconomic
reasons.
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In any case, the 1961 decision to build a 237 MW
plant at Gundremmingen was a turning point in German nu-
clear development. The consortium of utilities involved,
including RWE, selected a light water design over a British
plan for a 300-400 MW gas-graphite plant. The utilities
did not choose the LWR on the basis of a careful cost com-
parison with the gas-graphite reactor, but rather because
Euratom would fund it. One reason was that only the LWR
was eligible for assistance from the Euratom cooperative
program. When the order was placed, no reactor of the
size contemplated by the utilities was even operating in
the U.S., but the decision convinced the principal German
reactor manufacturer, Siemens, to reverse its own develop-
ment priorities in favor of the American technology. 44
Moreover, the Germans were concerned about French hegemony
over the Euratom Commission and this provided a way to
escape the problem by developing an independent program.
After 1962 the German program was already geared to the
LWRs and it was the utilities who were responsible for
this emphasis. The government had not expected this out-
come, and we will see in the next chapter how the policy
process played into the utilities' hands.
Thus, external conditions were more important than
market considerations in determining LWR development in
West Germany. Developments in the U.S. were especially
critical. But in the U.S. too, market considerations only
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partially explain why the LWR.was pursued. The American de-
cision.was a function of (1) the LWR having been developed
for nuclear submarines and therefore being available, and
(2) American enriched uranium supplies. Milton Shaw of the
Atomic Energy Commission said once, "If Admiral Rickover
hadn't been so damned successful with the Naval LWR Program,
the AEC might well have gone directly to the breeder." 4 5
The Americans also opted for the LWR in large part "because
it was there."
The Americans persuaded the Europeans to order LWRs
on the basis of hopes rather than actual operating experi-
ence.46 Manufacturers were taking orders for plants six
times larger than the largest one then in operation, and
political leaders had essentially no credible, independent
evaluations of light water reactors available to them.4 7
Europe became a proving ground for American technology
and this continued through the early 1970s.48 One of the
economic rationales for choosing LWRs was the supposed 15
percent cost advantage over gas-graphite systems, but in
retrospect that appears small and insignificant given the
habitual inaccuracies and cost overruns of nuclear reactors.
The decisive factor in persuading the Europeans to accept
the light water technology was not so much market consider-
ations as a great job of marketing on the part of the U.S.
firms.
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The commercial break-through for LWRs occurred in
1963 in the U.S. and in 1967 for West Germany. It might
be argued that German nuclear policy simply mirrored Aameri-
can advances, but that neglects some other key factors.
During the early years of the 1960s, a serious debate
took place in the Federal Republic about the advisa-
bility of developing LWRs. The debate pitted the German
Atomic Commission against the utilities. After the utili-
ties had opted for the Gundremmingen LWR and were showing
signs of ordering two more, the Commission told them in
1964 that it could hardly recommend public support for the
simple purchase of foreign proven reactors, especially
when the Federal Republic already had such reactors. 4 9
Leading voices in the Commission such as the Chairman of
the Board of Hoechst, Karl Winnacker, and the top person
at the KFZ Karlsruhe, Karl Wirtz, made it clear that the
further construction~ of American LWRs in West Germany
worked against the German atomic program which emphasized
German technology and natural uranium reactors.50 The
German program deserved protection according to these
people.
The utilities, in contrast, showed no desire to en-
gage in what they considered needlessly risky experiments.
They did not feel that experiments, even when successful,
contributed to reactor operating experience. They
argued before the Atomic Commission that they should
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adhere to the LWRs because proven reactors -- i.e. re-
actors which seemed to be already commercially viable --
were much less risky than hew prototype models.51 This
was at a time when the "proven" LWR had one commercial
order in hand worldwide. Eventually the Commission
acquiesced to the utilities, and orders were placed for
the Lingen and Obrigheim reactors. One reason the Com-
mission gave in is that construction was wholly under
the guidance of German firms -- in contrast, General Elec-
tric had been involved with the Grundremmingen reactor.
A second reason, however, is that the Atomic Commission's
sub-commission to deal with financing such projects as
Grundremmingen, Lingen and Obrigheim never convened.
It was in a strong position to oppose the projects. The
chairman's decision, however, that meetings were "super-
ficial" and his failure to call them essentially excluded
52
the sub-commission from playing a policy role.
Again the policy process worked to the advantage
of the utilities. They themselves were influenced pri-
marily by market considerations, but the political-
organizational arrangements allowed them to push through
their wishes. Within the government, the nuclear in-
dustry and the Atomic Commission, there were strong
feelings against an over-commitment to the LWRs but
the utilities overcame this.
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Fast Breeder Reactors
In the case of fast breeder reactors in West Germany,
market considerations were also less instrumental than
other factors -- most significantly, the pressures of
international competitiveness. The competition was to
develop FBR technology to the point that the German
design could capture a substantial share of the inter-
national FBR market when the reactor went commercial.
The policies of the German government were not based on
careful market analvses of the reactor's potential, but
on responses to developments in other countries. The
U.S., France, Japan and the U.K. were all supporting
their FBR projects generously, and consequently the Ger-
mans felt compelled to do the same. According to
Winnacker.and Wirtz, the breeder reactor became "a
classic example of how the state is nowadays financially
and organizationally involved in technological develop-
ment."53
In the Federal Republic the initiative for the FBR
came from the Nuclear Research Center in Karlsruhe. In-
dustrialists and the responsible Working Group of the
Atomic Commission gave it a sour reception because
they felt that design and engineering work should be
given to industrial firms, and they doubted that the
structure of the KFZ Karlsruhe would permit this.54
I
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Government officials were also in favor of the project,
and the then Minister for Atomic Questions, Balke, re-
commended a commitment to the fast breeder in March 1958,
just a few months after discussions had begun at Karls-
ruhe. German scientists had been prompted to look at
possibilities of the breeder reactor by discussions at
the U.N. Geneva Conference in September 1958; they de-
cided to seek American assistance partly because they
wanted to avoid the military overtones of French and
British programs, partly because they felt that the po-
tential for American assistance was higher, and partly
because they wanted to avoid the French and British
pattern of centralized nuclear research and instead give
more responsibility to industry.56
The course of the German program was almost always
determined by competitive factors. At the beginning,
the FBR development was a function not of a "sober anti-
cipation of economic need," but of a "supposed competition
with foreign state-financed programs."57 The rivalry
with France and the relationship with Euratom were espe-
cially pertinent. The Federal Republic was determined
to establish parity with France, and thus it was wary of
relying on central Community institutions or French in-
stitutions for cooperation,58 It also felt that it had
to compete directly with the French for Euratom FBR
funds, but to do so required supporting FBR development
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to the same degree as the French, This led to the deci-
sion of the KFZ supervisory board in May 1961 to in-
crease efforts on the FBR project, even though the
Working Group had given the project a cool appraisal a-
few months earlier. 5 9 Starting in 1962, the fast breeder
became the main task of the Karlsruhe center. Other
firms involved with German nuclear policy had little ob-
jection to the FBR emphasis because their own support
was not curtailed at all.
Competitive concerns also determined the response to
General Electric's 1964 annoucement that it would offer
a commercial reactor within ten years. The Karlsruhe
group was startled by the American firm's announcement
which implied that rapid progress had been made by
General Electric, placing it far ahead of other reactor
vendors. Instead of questioning the Americans' claims
(which subsequently provedover-optimistic), the Karlsruhe
people felt compelled to push ahead with the German pro-
gram faster than planned in order not to leave the in-
ternational market to the Americans. This meant moving
immediately'into the prototype construction phase, but
since the Germans had not chosen between the sodium-
cooled and steam-cooled versions of the reactor, they
decided to build both, despite the high added costs.
The government accepted Karlsruhe's justification for
increasing support of the FBR project: it related to the
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vast commercial potential of the reactor and the pressing
international competition. The leading reactor manu-
facturing industries and utilities, however, were not
convinced enough by the economic utilization arguments
to pour additional money into the project. They re-
garded the Karlsruhe cost projections "as a numbers game
which was not to be taken seriously."60
By 1968/69 the steam-cooled design was given up.
Internationally, all the interest centered on the sodium-
cooled design, and the Germans did not want to be left
out of the international market. The U.S. had just
cancelled its steam-cooled experimental project. The
German government told AEG, the industrial firm involved,
that no more government money would be forthcoming to
cover the increased costs of an isolated national pro-
gram. AEG was willing to terminate work both because
it had lost some of its interest in nuclear power61
and because it had an arrangement with Siemens which
protected it from too many losses.62 The unusual element
in all this was that the 1966 decision by the Atomic Com-
mission to support the two designs equally had gone
against international opinion. Only the Americans had
even a small steam-cooled project, and furthermore the
May 1966 fast-breeder conference clearly recommended
giving up the steam-cooled for the sodium-cooled design.63
The Germans, by moving too quickly to the prototype stage
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of the reactor development and retaining two expensive
options, pushed reactor development too fast and ended
up adding significantly to the costs. If cost calcula-
tions had been heeded more than international competi-
tion, development would probably have taken place more
slowly and cheaply; as it was, the utilities were the
only actors to urge some delay in FBR construction aside
from the licensing authorities.64 Their own cost esti-
mates were more pessimistic than those of the government.
In sum, it is the government which has mainly de-
termined FBR policy, and its decisions have been influ-
enced significantly by the Nuclear Research Center at
Karlsruhe. The objective of policy has been interna-
tional competitiveness. Even the late 1960s' initiative
toward broader international cooperation for the FBR can
be explained in large neasure by the Federal Republic's
desire to protect the reactor's commercial prospects
from the potentially adverse effects of the non-
proliferation treaty which was being discussed then. 65
German industry was concerned that there might be dis-
criminatory applications of the treaty by the U.S., but
within an international consortium German industry
would be less vulnerable to such applications. As a re-
sult, the Belgian, Dutch and German governments announced
agreement in October 1967 to construct a common 300 MW
prototype plant.66 Although the utilities are engaged
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actively in the FBR project, for example in the construc-
tion of the SNR-300 demonstration reactor, their share of
the funding amounts to only seven percent of the costs.6 7
In addition, the utilities showed little inclination to
support the project until the funding for the other 93
percent of costs was assured.
Keck maintains that the state has been too active
in the determination of the FBR. It is unable to assess
prospects for a new technology as well as industry can be-
cause its economic calculations are inaccurate. Keck's
recommendation is for the government to make further
steps toward commercialization of fast breeders dependent
on whether supplier and user firms are prepared to finance
these steps with their own money; only then will there be
a realistic economic assessment and a better awareness
of time-cost trade-of fs. 6 8 The fast breeder reactor, in
short, was not determined by market considerations, al-
though Keck argues it should have been.
High Temperature Reactors
The determinants of the HTRs appear to be quite dif-
ferent from those of the light water and fast breeder re-
actors. We will only consider them here briefly since
a more detailed analysis will be presented in Part III.
First, the German pebble bed HTR was hardly determined
by American technology since the Americans have focused
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on the distinctly different block design. There was,
though, a brief flirting with the American technology in
the early 1970s when the Gulf General Atomic block HTR
seemed destined for commercial success. Bat after the com-
mercial contracts fell through, the emphasis in the Ger-
man program returned to the pebble bed reactor. Second,
the German HTR was also not pursued because a commercial
breakthrough for the design seemed imminent. Although
the steam cooled FBR was cancelled because it did not
seem marketable, work on the HTR has continued despite
the lack of any commercial orders in the past or foresee-
able future.
Third, the Germans (meaning one manufacturing firm
and the nuclear research center in Julich in this case)
insisted on developing the HTR on their own. As with the
fast breeder, they were afraid of having their program
swallowed up by more advanced national programs. The 15
MW AVR experimental high temperature reactor was thus de-
veloped independently of the supranational Dragon project
located in the United Kingdom. The federal government
also adopted a rule of thumb for its overall nuclear pro-
gram which stipulated that "whatever one did internationally,
one must do at home on at least twice that scale."69 The
government was also unwilling to sub-contract its work out-
side of the Federal Republic. Since 1975, the Federal Re-
public has been the only country carrying out a full pro-
gram on the HTR.
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Fourth, the domestic situation of the HTR is also
noteworthy and different from the situation for LWRs and
FBRs, but it does not reveal why support for the reactor
has continued at a high level. The reactor manufacturing
firm behind the HTRs, Brown, Boveri and Cie, does not
have the dominant status that the major German reactor
vendor, Kraftwerk Union, and its parent firm, Siemens,
command. In addition, the utilities behind the HTRs
have tended to be the small regional and communal ones.
Until 1966, even the federal government was lukewann in
its support, but since then the project has been thought
of as just as vital as the FBRs, Through the years,
though, the Nuclear Research Center in JUlich and the
government of North Rhine-Westphalia have staunchly
backed the HTR, but the rationale presented to the federal
government and the public has varied. At one point the
HTR was characterized as an interim project between the
LWRs and FBRs; then it was put on an equal footing with
the FBRs as a second generation nuclear reactor; now it
is even considered by many as an alternative to the FBRs
since the breeder reactors have been so controversial
while the HTRs have shown promise as the only reactors
with a wide range of non-electrical applications.
It is hard to find any point at which market con-
siderations have been the major determinant of the German
pebble bed reactor's course of development. Rather, the
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development has been steady, consistent, and at times
downright slow -- the THTR was originally scheduled for
completion in 19'76, but now 1984 is the earliest expected
date. The high temperature reactor has also aroused re-
markably little controversy in either the public or poli-
tical circles. In Part III we will examine whether the
treatment accorded -to the HTR has differed from that given
other reactors and whether its status as a German-developed
technology has been important.
CONCLUS ION
The effort in this chapter has been to evaluate the
progress of the German nuclear energy program and speci-
fic reactors in it to see to what degree market considera-
tions account for the technological choices made, Al-
though such considerations have steered reactor develop-
ment at certain points, usually some other aspect of the
policy process accounts for why this is possible. In
addition, when the market factors do seem to determine
outcomes, they sometimes prove to be unreliable guides in
the long run as we saw with the FBRs,
Market considerations in the German nuclear policy
process are most relevant for the utilities. The utili-
ties, in turn, have had an impact on policy-making mainly
because the government and industry left a policy vacuum
for the utilities to fill, which they gladly did, The
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vacuum arose because of German thinking on the role of the
market: commercial orders were the key measure of suc-
cess for nuclear reactors, but the government and industry
left the orders in the hands of the utilities. The utili-
ties were not included as equal partners in planning nu-
clear policy -- for example, their role in the German
Atomic Commission was minimal -- but the other policy
actors expected the utilities to accept their policy
recommendations. The utilities, however, had their eyes
on reactors which could be ordered commercially, and
thus moved quickly when commercial LWRs became available.
For us, the key point is that the structure of the policy
process permitted this to happen.
The Federal Republic subscribes to a market ideology,
at least outwardly, although in practice it has moved away
from a strict adherence to market principles. When Andrew
Shonfield wrote Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance
of Public and Private Power, he cited the United States
and West Germany as the two countries out of the main-
stream of modern capitalism because they left so much
8 70
control in the hands of the private sector. After the
war the Germans set out deliberately to reduce the power
of the state.in managing the economy. Ludwig Erhard, the
Minister of Economics and later Chancellor, fervently de-
71fended private enterprise against government power.
The hallmarks of the "social market economy" of the 1950s
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were private ownership of the means of production, free
entrepreneurial initiatives, unrestricted competition and
the guarantee of a certain social stability by the state. 72
Since the German nuclear sector grew up in this en-
vironment, one might have expected it to be a prime target
for market attitudes. In reality, though, market prin-
ciples were not carried over into practice. In the first
place, the market existed only to a limited degree in the
nuclear sector. In the second place, to the extent that
it did, it was not very relevant for determining policy
because the market mechanism comes into play following
the research and development and demonstration stages of
reactor development, but the initial steps taken ,in
these years were all still in the R&D stage.
There are several indications that no free market
existed in German nuclear policy. Even in .1955 as the
Ministry for Atomic Questions was being set up, it was
clear that the other ministries had already staked out
their positions and expectations with respect to atomic
problems.73 These were important for steering national
development. In addition, the German Atomic Commission
was effectively a planning commission for nuclear energy,
not only for technical planning but also for financial
74
planning, An editorial in the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung in 1959 after a nuclear energy conference for
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European industries related that foreign participants
"could barely suppress smiles" as a German participant
spoke of~the German nuclear energy industry being en-
75trenched in the market economy.
The West German business and government leaders
made a pretense of operating under market conditions,
but in practice they ignored the market (as with HTRs)
or used it as a rationale either to drop projects (e.g.,
the steam-cooled FBRs or the heavy water reactor project)
or to cover up other objectives, The LWR case demonstrates
this last point: market analyses alleged that the LWR
was the best alternative, although the differences with
the British gas-graphite reactors were minimal. A bet-
ter explanation for why the LWRs were chosen is that Ameri-
can business used superior marketing skills to convince
West Germany and Europe to order them. With the fast
breeder reactors too, the claims of marketability were
highly inaccurate, but they provided the basis for the
policy followed.
Nevertheless, market thinking did have an impact
on German policy because the expectation was that future
decisions on commercializing reactors would fall to the
market. Thus, at the start of its nuclear progam the
government maintained that it would support only the basic
research stages of development, but the light water reactors
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are clearly beyond that point now and government assis-
tance is still increasing. Market principles, however,
have not proven to be a very good gauge of what to do in
reactor development, In the first place, measures of
cost-effectiveness cannot be applied very well when mas-
sive domestic and international support of certain tech-
n'ologies is involved. None of the reactors could be
deemed profitable were it not for state aid. Economic
assessments of reactors also vary widely depending on
where costs are attributed, and many of the long range
costs such as waste storage are ignored,
Secondly, market criteria are not widely applicable
to the R&D phase of advanced technological development.
The commercial breakthrough for LWPs in the Tederal Re-
public came in 1967. All the nuclear construction before
then was essentially-part of the research and development
phase. We saw how the German utilities opted for avail-
able American light water technology in the early 1960s;
they were not interested in taking a gamble on still un-
developed German technology. Their narrow economic ob-
jectives prevented them from seeing larger political
objectives despite the pleas of the German Atomic Commis-
sion not to order more American LWRs. The market is not
a good guide to R&D projects because it evaluates them
from only one perspective.; it may therefore overlook
national objectives, research priorities, military concerns,
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and even longer term economic goals. In both the U.S. and
the Federal Republic, the LWRs were chosen not because of
market considerations but because they were available at
the right time.
-Market considerations are sometimes used as rationales
for why specific reactor designs should be pursued, but
these rationales usually manifest larger political objec-
tives. For us, the important issue is how the larger
political objectives are formed and how they affect tech-
nological choices. This leads us into the structural
features of the policy process, and these will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE GERMAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Chapter Two described the objectives of German nuclear
energy policy and showed how these changed over the three
phases of development since 1955. To gain a more complete
understanding of how technological choices were made in
this case, however, we must also examine the institutions
involved and see how their interrelationships changed over
time. This chapter deals with the structural, or institu-
tional, aspects influencing technological choices for
German reactor designs and analyzes how the structure of
the German policy process influenced technological out-
comes. Structure refers to the patterns of control and
interest that exist among institutions in the policy
process. It serves as a mediating variable between do-
mestic and international pressures and the responses of
policy actors. Structural factors are a key attribute of
the political-organizational approach outlined in Chapter
One.
In analyzing the structural aspects of decision-
making we will consider: (1) how institutions first be-
came involved with nuclear energy policy and (2) how re-
sponsibility was divided among the government, manufacturing
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and utility sectors in each of the three phases. These
two considerations are important because, as we will see,
initial patterns of cooperation often significantly affect
subsequent political behavior, and policy leadership
varies across the three phases. The considerations will
allow us to see why the utilities were so instrumental in
directing early nuclear policy, why the government deferred
to nuclear industry in planning initial nuclear programs,
and why the manufacturing firms were not a critical fac-
tor in stipulating the course of nuclear development.
Whereas the last chapter pointed out the limitations
of the market approach alone for explaining the path of
technological choices in German nuclear policy, this chapter
shows how.our understanding is increased when the political-
organizational approach is added. Both organizational and
political aspects are relevant.. Policy leadership shifts
among the actors as a technology develops: not suprisingly,
utilities as reactor operators (who place orders) are es-
pecially important in the commercial stage of reactor de-
velopment. Still, the importance of the utilities in
German LWR policy was not just a function of LWRs being
close to commercialization, but also of the context left
to the utilities by the government and manufacturing
sectors.
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The first part of this chapter evaluates the policy
influence of the major federal government institutions
concerned with German nuclear energy; the second part-
focuses on the division of responsibilities between the
business and state sectors, particularly regarding the
role of the electrical utilities.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The main responsibility for nuclear energy policy
on the federal level lies with the Ministry for Research
and Technology (BMFT -- Bundesministerium fUr Forschung
und Technologie), originally established as the Ministry
for Atomic Questions. An industry-dominated group called
the German Atomic Commission (not equivalent to the U.S.
Atomic Commission) was instrumental in guiding the minis-
try's formation and early policy. In contrast, the Bun-
destag played a very'insignificant role in nuclear energy
policy-making. This section examines these three insti-
tutions. It concentrates mainly on the conditions sur-
rounding their establishment for, as we will see, the way
in which an institution initially enters the policy pro-
cess often accounts for its subsequent ro]e.
The Federal Ministry for Atomic Questions
From the beginning, the Ministry for Atomic Questions
had a limited role inside and outside of government and
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was oriented largely to economic objectives, Set up in
1955, it was immediately swept into the middle of compe-
tition between industry and other federal ministries.
The Foreign Office sought to guard its own responsibili-
ties in the nuclear field and wanted guarantees that it
would still represent German interests in such interna-
tional meetings as the 1955 Geneva Conference on the Peace-
ful uses of Atomic Energy. German industrialists, on
the other hand, were anxious to use the new ministry to
exclude the Foreign Office from decisions on the supply
of nuclear materials and the construction of research
reactors.2 Industry did not favor a strong ministry but
did want a centralized place in the federal government
for nuclear policy. Through the offices of the industry-
dominated German Atomic Commission the industrialists
made their wishes clear: the new ministry's functions
should be limited to-dealing with the legal aspects of
nuclear development, preparing budgets and facilitating
cooperation; everything else -- above all, decisions on
reactor designs3 -- should be left to industry.
German industrialists were closely involved both
with planning the new iMinistry for Atomic Questions and
formulating its policy once it was established. As a
-result, the ministry emphasized economic considera-
tions. This was augmented by the fact that many of the
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responsibilities taken over by the new ministry were of
an economic rather than a foreign policy nature. Ludwig
Erhard, the economics minister at the time, neither saw
the importance of nuclear questions nor was convinced
that a new ministry was needed at all. Erhard went so
far as to say,
What do I care about nuclear energy? That's
all physics and all nonsense. Why do we need
an atomic ministry? We don't have a steam
ministry.
Because of this indifference, Erhard readily transferred
responsibility from the energy section of his economics
ministry to the new ministry.
Franz Josef Strauss, the first Minister for Atomic
Questions, described the tasks of his ministry as fol-
lows: (1)' to prepare a nuclear energy law; (2) to pre-
pare a law protecting the population against radioactive
materials; (3) to draft a coordinated research program;
(4) to establish a manpower training program; (5) to
5
coordinate international negotiations. Strauss saw the
ministry's goals as overcoming West Germany's 10-15
year lag in nuclear energyand making German industry
internationally competitive. 6
The scope of the ministry changed several times after
1955 and nuclear issues had to compete with a wide range
of other issues even within the ministry itself. In 3957
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it became the Ministry for Water and Atomic Questions,
in 1962, the -Ministry for Scientific -Research, in 1969,
the Ministry for Education and Science, and in 1972, the
7Ministry for Research and Technology.
The ministry also had to cope with several changes
in leadership and style. Strauss remained in office only
one year. He was succeeded by Siegfried Balke, a scientist
with little political experience or ambition who said he
had no particular goals except to enable the younger gen-
eration to practice science without interference from the
state or politics.8 In 1962 a political move by Chancellor
Adenauer brought in Hans Lenz, a scientist himself with
little interest in nuclear energy or politics. Both
scientists and industrialists were skeptical of him, and
for over two years he never even called the German Atomic
9Commission into session.
In sum, from the very beginning the Ministry for
Atomic Questions had to fight for its right to -make nu-
clear policy. An industrial interest group, the Physical
Study Society, made the initial suggestions for the ministry
in order to counter the role of the Foreign Ministry.
Winnacker and Wirtz, who were part of this industrialists'
group, write that the problem of competition with the
Foreign Office has always been present. 0 This has been
especially true concerning non-proliferation matters: the
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balancing of non-proliferation questions and economic
interests has been important over the past 25 years, and
the tensions between non-proliferation and the peaceful
use of nuclear energy have still not been politically
resolved. 1
Especially in the early years before the federal
government assumed a more major role in nuclear policy,
the atomic -ministry was relatively weak, with only 38
nuclear experts and a total of 130 employees in 1957 in
contrast to the more than 200 expert advisers of the
12German Atomic Commission. Although industry wanted
the new ministry, it did not want strong new decision-
makers in the field and so it sought to circumscribe
the role of the ministry. Strauss, for example, was
specifically required by the Federal Cabinet to listen
to the views of the Atomic Commission on all essential
questions,13 But Strauss' views were also very much
in line with those of the nuclear physicists and indus-
trialists. 4 He was convinced that a country could not
be a leading economic power in the future without a
nuclear basis) 5
The German Atomic Commission
The German Atomic Commission was set up as an advi-
sory body to the ministry in January 1956. Although it
reflected a business, especially a manufacturing, point
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of view, its members were not bound by traditional qerman
business beliefs: their major objective was to establish
a competitive German nuclear industry even if that
occasionally involved sacrificing adherence to free mar-
ket beliefs. The Commission, for example, was prepared
to engage in long-range economic planning. The Ministry
for Atomic Questions depended on the Commission to shape
nuclear policy at least until 1967 when the Grand Coali-
tion between the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats
came to power.
As with the Ministry for Atomic Questions, German
industrialists were active in establishing the German
Atomic Commission. In fact, the Commission was essen-
tially a continuation of the Physical Study Society which
the industrialists had organized. Strauss had made it
clear after he became minister in October 1955 that such
a commission would be formed with a wide-ranging scope. 16
Although the name of the Commission paralleled that of
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, its role was more
17limited.
There was some controversy about whether the Atomic
Commission's role in the policy-making process should be
official or unofficial. Several members of the Commission
demanded that it have a legally defined role, but the -ma-
jority opposed this because they wanted to limit the state's
influence in such an important field; the memories of the state's
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monopolistic position during the Third Reich were still
present. 8 Even without a legal role, the Atomic Commis-
sion was-probably the strongest state actor in nuclear
policy until it was disbanded in 1971. Actual leader-
ship of German nuclear policy fell to it and not to the
19
ministry. The Commission was responsible for formu-
lating the Federal Republic's first three atomic programs
from 1957-1968. JUrgen Peter Pesch has done the most
thorough analysis of the Commission's role, and like
Keck, Radkau and Christian Deubner, he had access to the
minutes of the Commission's meetings which were secret
at the time.20 He found that the Commission's recommen-
dations were followed nearly without exception by the
government, and that for all practical purposes the
federal government was an "executive organ" of the Atomic
Commission 21
Interestingly, the Commission never shied away from
advocating a type of central planning even in the early
1960s when West Germany stood ideologically opposed to
such planning. The Commission called for "genuine eco-
nomic planning on a large scale" and industry did not
condemn this approach. 2 2 The Commission was supposed
to be comprised of neutral experts, but these experts
came primarily from industry; initially the Commission
had 27 members: 15 from industry, 8 scientists, and 2 each
from the government and the trade unions. 23 The criticism
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can thus be made that national policy was being made
by those for whom the policy was designed. Because
the Commission looked like an interest cartel and bQ-
cause the early German nuclear program financed essen-
tially every firm that made a proposal, accusations
were made that the policy amounted to "give me an
accelerator and I will give you a nuclear reactor."2 4
In other words, the industrialists on the Commission
looked after each other.
Within the Atomic Commission at the start, though,
there were some hesitations about the orientation to
nuclear energy. Two interest groups -- the Ruhr coal
companies and the electrical utilities -- had reservations.
The coal companies did not want to lose their traditional
position as primary suppliers of energy, and the utili-
ties were concerned about costs and risks. Both groups
were able to slow the rush to nuclear energy. However,
both -- especially the utilities -- eventually dropped
their opposition for reasons which we will explore in
this chapter.
The utilities and coal companies were not particu-
larly influential in the Atomic Commission which repre-
sented mainly the manufacturing industries, After 1958,
though, the Commission.lost much of the initiative in
the Federal Republic's nuclear program to the utilities.
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The shift was due not to any change in the Commission's
relationship to the federal government, but to changed
conditions arising from the end of apparent energy short-
ages and internationally available technologies. A
rivalry between the manufacturers and utilities with
their different perspectives seened inevitable.25 The
Commission favored a reactor development program which
would establish an internationally competitive industry,
whereas the utilities favored proven technologies. The
Commission wanted to bolster domestic industry, but the
utilities preferred to order foreign reactors which were
already available.
Gradually, the federal government developed its own
expertise in nuclear energy and thus could rely less on
the Atomic Commission. The Commission was responsible,
though, for the formulation of the government's first
three atomic programs. Only the fourth program completed
in 1973 was done by the federal ministry. According to
Winnacker and Wirtz, the contacts between industry and
government started breaking down when the Grand Coalition
came to power in 1967.26 Eventually the Atomic Commis-
sion was disbanded in 1971 because the Social Democratic
government felt that a tighter advisory system was needed.
German industrialists, still sponsor an organization called
the German Atomic Forum, but it lacks the influence the
Commission had and is more of an industrial lobby.
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The Parliament
The role of the Bundestag in nuclear energy policy
has been limited. This may be inevitable in a parliamen-
tary system since initiatives are expected to come from
the individual ministries. The Bundestag lost any chance
to steer nuclear policy when it lost its regulatory con-
trol over nuclear developments through the Atomic Law of
1959.27 After that, the Bundestag demonstrated little
interest in nuclear affairs, and the parties differed
very little in their positions until the late 1970s when
anti-nuclear groups appeared within the SPD and FDP.
The one form of control which the Bundestag has is that
it must authorize budgetary expenditures each year, but
it has made no serious attempt to use this tool.
The SPD had major differences with the ruling CDU
in the 1950s about nuclear policy, particularly regarding
state control, but these disappeared after the Bad Godes-
28berc program in 1959. Debates within the parties over
nuclear energy did not take place until 1977.29 Par-
liament had been involved with the formulation of nuclear
safety regulations in the 1950s, but the only expert wit-
nesses it called to testify at hearings were members of
the Atomic Commission.30 The regulatory function was
transferred out of Parliament's hands with the enactment
of the Atomic Law in -1959, and after that debates in the
Bundestag took place before practically empty benches.3 1
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The members had almost no information about the govern-
ment's nuclear programs. In the third legislative session
the only information which the members of the special
committee on nuclear affairs received from the respon-
sible ministry consisted of -two short presentations by
Minister Balke at their request in 1958 and 1960; in the
fourth session Balke made one similar speech in 1962,
and the only hearing on the government's Second Atomic
Program in 1963 involved three civil servants, two par-
liamentarians, and a total of five questions; in the fifth
session there were no discussions of the government pro-
gram at all. 3 2
The committees were also unable to exert control
because the responsibilities of the committee changed
often and the members did not have much technical ex-
pertise. The special committees in Parliament had
areas of competence in line with those of the ministries.
Hence, as the responsibilities of the ministry shifted
to include water, education or research, so too did the
responsibilities of the committee most connected with
nuclear energy: in the third and fourth legislative
sessions the committee also had to deal with water regu-
lation; in the fifth and sixth sessions, with press con-
centration, space travel and the preservation of national
monuments; in the seventh sessionwith research and tech-
nology policy as well as postal and telecommunication
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policy.33 The committee was always dominated by farmers
or educators, never by scientists. Moreover, the in-
dividual legislators operated essentially without legis-
lative assistants most of the time, and the "legislative
research service" (Wissenschaftlicher Dienst) which nor-
mally supplied information to the members was not tech-
n'ically oriented or competent.
Parliament has not been a source of initiative in
nuclear energy policy-making. Ironically, it may well
be that the one-man campaign of the Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung's science editor, Karl Rudzinski, against
the cancellation of the steam fast breeder reactor in
1969 was more influential than the actions of the Bundes-
tag.35 The cancellation of that reactor, the development
of strong state support for developing nuclear power re-
actors, and the broadening of the government's atomic
programs to detailed policy tools all occurred without
the participation of Parliament or the public. Pesch
terms this a "short-circuit" in the public opinion-
making process.36
The evidence of the 1970s does not show a reversal
of tendencies even though the Bundestag did hold up
budgetary allocations for the fast breeder and high tem-
perature reactors briefly in the mid-1970s. The reasons,
though, were linked to regional disputes among
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parliamentarians who felt that the advanced reactor
program was tilted away from the reactars they favored
and which were being developed in their regions of the
country.37 The total government program was not called
into question and funds were eventually released. Like-
wise, the Enquete Commission on nuclear energy which
was formed in ]979 and reported its findings in June
1980 was not steering policy so much as justifying de-
cisions already made. 3 8
DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN GERMAN NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY
In the previous section's examination of how the
federal government became involved with nuclear energy
policy in the Federal Republic, we saw that no comprehen-
sive plan guided the establishment of institutions.
Policy-makers and industrialists alike simply wanted to
close the gap with other countries as quickly as possible.
Through its first atomic program (the Eltville program),
the government made clear its intention to support vir-
tually any nuclear reactor design. It did not feel com-
petent to choose among reactor design possibilities and
did not worry particularly about long-term technological
choices which it expected would be a function of market
factors.
Market factors were, in fact, instrumental in steering
the course of German nuclear policy and they became important
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far earlier than the government had anticipated. As
we saw in Chapter 1, the stage of development of a tech-
nology plays an important role in determining which
policy actors exert leadership in making technological
choices. This section examines how leadership shifted
from the government and its agencies to the electrical
utilities as the focus changed from research and develop-
ment to commercialization. The change occurred sooner
than expected because of international developments,
namely the availability of light water reactors. Be-
cause of their availability, the German utilities nar-
rowed the options for reactor development more guickly
than the government had anticipated. The government
policy-makers had assumed that the utilities would
support the wide-range of reactor technologies which
the government was subsidizing through the Eltville pro-
gram, but the utilities circumvented the government's
plan by concentrating on light water reactors. The
utilities' emphasis did not correspond either to the
government's wish to be independent of foreign enriched
uranium or to support domestic technologies.
This section highlights the important relationship
between the stage of development for a given project
and the policy leadership for that stage. The focus is
on the utilities, especially on their role within the
Eltville program, and their influence indicates how
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significant the prospect of commercialization of a tech-
nology can be for a project's development. The section
serves to tie together the points raised in the last two
chapters with the theoretical framework of Chapter One:
it demonstrates how the stages of development of a spe-
cific project are related to both the institutional
arrangements and the leadership exerted in a given stage.
We deal first with the utilities themselves and second
with the significance of the utilities within the Eltville
program.
The Electrical Utilities
German electrical utilities assumed an unexpectedly
important role in nuclear policy-making after 1957. The
government and the Atomic Commission did not anticipate
the policy-making significance of the utilities, but
their attitudes fostered it. The government and Commis-
sion expected to support nuclear research at the early
stages of development and then leave further decisions
to the market. This favored the utilities because they
placed the commercial orders, and therefore the rest of
the nuclear' industry had to keep the utilities' interests
in mind. Pesch claims that the German utilities are the
"controllers of the entire energy program."39 There are
over 300 of them and it is imperative to look at their
priorities. One official from the Federal Ministry for
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Iesearch and Technology complained that the ministry has
"no control" over such firms; especially with research
and development work the ministry responds to utilities'
decisions, but it is very hard for the ministry to take
40its own initiatives. In contrast to many other Euro-
pean countries, West Germany has an electricity industry
which is more decentralized, mixed publicly and privately,
and subject to communal and state participation. For
all practical purposes, though, it is organized and ori-
ented as a private industry.4 1
In addition to having power because they place the
commercial orders, the utilities also preferred to move
forward from the research stages more rapidly than the
government and Atomic Commission; given their private
nature and own resources, they were able to do this and
thus again direct initiatives, The minutes of the Commis-
sion in May 1958 reveal that even Commission members re-
cognized that the initiative had shifted from develop-
mental groups within reactor construction industry to
42
the utilities. It should be remembered that early
views about the application of nuclear power went beyond
just the electricity sector to the chemical industry, the
metal industry and the powering of nuclear ships. That
explains partly why the utilities were not fully integrated
into the Atomic Commission.
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West Germany's nuclear program was torn in the early
years between the wish for a wide-ranging experimental
program encompassing several reactor types and the
pressure for operating power stations supplying usable
electricity. The manufacturing industry was not inclined
to move beyond the experimental phase since the nuclear
projects of every firm were supported by the government.
The utilities, on the other hand, were impatient to
move beyond the research phase because they felt they
had only to look abroad to find reactor types that met
their needs. The utilities were quick to look at inter-
nationally available technology whereas the government
and Atomic Commission wanted to foster domestic designs.
Heinrich Mandel of RWE urged the Atomic Commission in
1956 not to shy away from a program relying on enriched
uranium even though that implied a dependence on the U.S.A.4 3
He recommended that three of the five experimental re-
actors in the government program be of the light water
type. It is interesting that although other scientific
and technical experts advanced technological justifications
for their choices, Mandel argued for his primarily on the
grounds of lower initial investment costs,4 4
For the government, it was important that the utilities
place orders for the whole range of reactors being developed,
but the government had no special influence on the utilities.
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Both the largest utility, RWE, and a group of small
utilities, AVR (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Versuchsreaktor e.V.),
set up study groups on nuclear energy in 1956. The utili-
ties, though, with their different and more cautious con-
ceptions of how to proceed with nuclear energy, felt
that the government's plans to build 100 N-W plants in-
volved too large a risk. The utilities argued that
plants should be as small as possible to minimize costs,
but as large as necessary to gain relevant technical ex-
perience. The advice of the utilities was for 15 MW
plants. The Atomic Commission had different ideas since
it regarded the development of an internationally com-
petitive domestic industry as the main priority; it felt
that the utilities had a premature and over-stressed bias
toward economic aspects. 4 6
Nonetheless, industry and government had little
choice but to accommodate themselves to the wishes of the
utilities because of the dramatic change in the energy
situation beginning in 1958. Suddenly there was an over-
abundance of conventional energy supplies. It became
clear through this energy glut that the vtilities would
only order nuclear reactors if they were enticed to do so
by the government subsidies. The manufacturing firms
were somewhat surprised by the .need to woo the utilities.
The minutes of the Atomic Commission show that the leading
manufacturing firms had expected that the government would
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be able to convince utilities to order the reactors being
47developed by German domestic industry. German laws and
the composition of the supervisory boards (Aufsichtsrdte)
of the utilities also contributed to the companies' in-
fluence and autonomy. 48 The public nature of the utili-
ties required diverse representation on the supervisory
boards. Through these appointments, interests tended to
neutralize each other, thereby leaving considerable free-
dom to the board of directors. 4 9
German utilities played a key -role in determining
the route of nuclear energy development. The next
section on the government's first atomic program out-
lines how the utilities supported the light water reac-
tors. One major reason they could do so was the situ-
ation created by the German government and Atomic Com-
mission.. Free market attitudes were not very important
for regulating nuclear markets, but they were pervasive
enough to increase the influence of the utilities insofar
as the government believed that the decisions following
the early stages of reactor development would still de-
pend on market competition. Subsidies were considered
appropriate for the early stages, but not for the later
ones.
The utilities played a significant role in the early
years of nuclear energy policy-making through their support
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for light water reactors, but they were less instrumental
in steering policy for the more advanced high temperature
reactors. Commercialization possibilities for the ITRs
were more remote, thereby reducing the willingness of the
utilities to make a full commitment to the technology.
With the LWRs the utilities were influential partly due
to the stage of technological development and partly
due to the role left to them by the other policy actors.
Opinion on the role of the utilities in German nu-
clear policy varies. Otto Keck, in his analysis of Ger-
man nuclear energy policy, concludes that German policy-
makers have not sufficiently appreciated the importance
of the utilities in decisions. If government policy
alone had determined which strategies to follow, the
results would have been disastrous according to Keck:
pressurized water reactors, which were eventually the
most successful design in West Germany, might have never
been developed because early government programs did not
50feature them. Keck praises the decentralized decision-
making in the Federal Republic. He feels that the deci-
sions by the utilities were the key to the success of the
German effort, and the fact that they were independent of
government programs -- and sometimes even against them --
shows that the development of high-risk technologies such
as nuclear power plants is not beyond the capability of
.51business enterprises.'
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Klaus Traube, on the other hand, criticizes the utili-
ties for the power they exert. Traube, formerly a leading
nuclear industry executive and now an opponent of nuclear
energy, attacks the utilities for controlling policy devel-
opments under the guise of "free market" decisions.52 He
maintains that the utilities, by claiming to protect the
consumer from state planning but in reality advancing
their own interests, subject the consumer to an even more
insidious form of planning.53 Traube is referring to the
utilities in his warning that "In the free market economy,
some have a more equal chance than others, "5 4
The Role of the Utilities within the Eltville Program
In contrast to most other countries, the German
government preferred not to exercise exclusive control
over nuclear policy. German scientists did not distrust
the private sector as Trench scientists did; indeed,
they realized that their own success depended on encour-
aging eventual industrial sponsorship of reactor de-
velopment programs.55 The scientists believed that they
could best advance German industry. A pattern of cooper-
ation between industry and science was established early
in the nuclear development program.
Certain disadvantages of this link soon became evi-
dent, however, once the debate on nuclear policy had sub-
sided in the later 1950s because the need for nuclear
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power was less urgent. Neither government nor industry
was prone to look critically at what was being done. It
became common practice that reports evaluating specific
reactors were only issued by the firms building or opera-
ting them. Laymen and even experts found it nearly im-
possible to make comparisons among reactors, and overall
analyses from supposedly neutral authors almost never
56
compared designs. For example, no comparative analyses
were done for the second generation fast breeder and high
temperature reactors. Radkau suggests that the involve-
ment of the two major nuclear research centers, Karlsruhe
and Julich, contributed to this because they wanted to
keep their projects separate and independent.57 Like-
wise, in the German Atomic Commission, Siemens and AEG
suppressed any critical comparison of their light water
reactor lines, the pressurized and boiling water reactors,
even though the designs were parallel, 5 8
By late 1956 German industry had gained some nuclear
experience through the research reactors imported after
1955, but it was eager to move forward to the design and
construction of working reactors, The task of proposing
an actual program fell to the working group on nuclear
reactors (Arbeitskreis II-III/1, "Kernreaktoren") of the
German Atomic Commission. The working group consisted of
three representatives of the manufacturing industry, three
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from the chemical indnstry, three from universities or re-
search centers, and one from the utilities. This program
was labeled as the Eltville program after the small town
on the Rhine River where concrete plans were formulated in
early 1957. Eventually it was referred to as the first
German atomic program after the government formulated
other "atomic programs" in the 1960s. The Eltville pro-
gram sipported the design and construction of five 100
MW nuclear power plants by five different companies.
Total installed capacity was to be 500 MW, scheduled for
completion by 1965. The five reactors supported by the
program were: (1) a light water reactor to be built by'
AEG; (2) a gas-cooled high temperature reactor using
enriched uranium to be built by BBC and Krupp; (3) a gas
graphite reactor similar to the advanced 'Calder Hall type
using natural uranium to be built by the German Babcock
and Wilcox; (4) an organic reactor to be built by Inter-
atom; and (5) a heavy water reactor using natural uranium
to be built by Siemens.
Industry wanted to obtain state support for the de-
velopment programs and to avoid open competition. The
Eltville Program essentially staked out the exclusive
domains of the firms involved, No hard choices between
projects were made- the program supported every project
59
which German industry had undertaken. No firm had to
give up anything, and actually the program even made
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provisions for one firm, Interatom, which still had to be
founded. 60 The Eltville program encompassed ongoing pro-
jects and, to the extent that industry had been more attached
to commercially viable designs beforehand, the program
also reflected favoritism to. market considerations,
Originally, the intention of the German nuclear policy
was to rely exclusively on natural uranium, but the apparent
commercial chances of light water reactors caused recon-
sideration.61 Earlier it had seemed that German efforts
would concentrate on the heavy water reactor -using natural
uranium, but in the Eltville program it became just one
project among several.
The significance of the Eltville program was that it
created a new division of responsibility between the state
and industry. The notion of state support for the design
and construction of high technology projects was embodied
in the program, and that was far -iore important than the
program's electrical production. The 500 MW figure had
been adopted as a kind of index for the first stage of
the reactors, but it did not reflect industry estimates
of need; it was merely intended to map out. the extent of
the work required.62 In the long run only 340 MW of the
proposed 500 MW were installed and only DM 250.6 million
of the expected expenditure of DM 600 to 800 million were
spent. 63 Most of the money spent (DM 225.9 million) went
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to the unsuccessful heavy water plant while only DM 6
million of government and utility funds went to the suc-
cessful light water reactor.
The Eltville program was important for the develop-
ment of nuclear energy and business-state relations in
Germany because it confirmed that the state had a role
to play in technological development. At the same time,
it also expressed the largely industrial and cautious
bias of German initiatives. In contrast to the French
and British programs announced in 1955, "Eltville en-
couraged a variety of reactor designs and emphasized
quality and experimentation rather than quantity and
series construction."64 The Germans kept their options
open, perhaps because of an uncertainty over whether to
stress their national interests (e.g.,technological pride
or the need for independence from enriched uranium sup-
plies) or commercial interests. In all events, the pres-
sures which drew the government into supporting the nu-
clear industry continued to grow in subsequent years.
The Eltville program was not successful, and the major
reason was the opposition of the electrical utilities. As
we saw earlier, they stressed that their decision whether
to build a reactor would be made on the basis of market
considerations and not the requirements of the Eltville
program. The program ended up being too general to appeal
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to the manufacturing firms or the utilities, Several fac-
tors contributed to the problems of the Eltville program:
it tried-to support too many projects; the electrical
utilities were wary of the project; the Ruhr coal mining
industry was adamantly against nuclear energy and the 500
MW program; and the changed energy situation after 1958 took
away the urgency for developing nuclear reactors.65
Although the Eltville program may have been a failure
from the point of view of achieving what was planned,6 6
it did have a lasting impact on nuclear policy in the
sense that it brought the government officially into the
nuclear sector. Industry and utilities complained that
sufficient public incentives to spark private undertakings
were lacking in these early programs, but German authori-
ties were increasingly drawn into more active involvement.67
Even the Atomic Commission conceded that the Elt-
ville program had failed.68 According to one government
official, "It was a time of stagnation . . there was no
body to place an order for construction."69 The govern-
ment responded by urging the Atomic Commission to set up
a joint program with the reactor building industry for
the development of 10 to 30 1MW advanced experimental re-
actors. This "Program for Advanced 'Reactors" also supported
every firm interested.in nuclear reactors. One firm,
Maschinenfabrik Augsburq-NUrnburg AG (MAN , had been
turned down by the working group of the Atomic Commission
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for its request for design work support of a 5 MW pres-
surized water reactor of the horizontal type. The working
group argued that the design was licensed abroad and was not
a domestic development. Nevertheless, the ministry over-
ruled this advice and financed 50 percent of the design
70
work in subsequent years.
The program for advanced reactors was not markedly
different from the Eltville program regarding reactor de-
signs, except it did not seek any collaboration from the
electrical utilities. The program stressed developmental
aspects and new technical ideas rather than commercial
aspects, and the design phase could be started immedi-
ately since funds were appropriated directly to the manu-
facturing industry. Again, the actual implementation.
of plans was not important -- only three of the five pro-
posed reactors were built. The same federal official
mentioned in the previous paragraph characterized the pro-
gram as "somewhat like an emergency assistance measure
72
or a stopgap program for industry." As with the Elt-
ville program, the most important result of the advanced
reactor program was the additional funding it provided
for the nuclear industry, but in this case with less re-
liance on the utilities.
Clearly the links between industry and the state were
close at the start of Germany's nuclear program, and this
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established patterns of cooperation and structural
arrangements that have continued to have an impact on
policy. -In. West Germany science and industry worked, to-
gether, and the role of the government in supporting
"big science" grew continually. The Physical Study Com-
mission, formed by industry, was closely connected with
the establishment of the German Atomic Commission, and the
Commission's role was openly acknowledged by the govern-
ment in establishing the Ministry for Atomic Questions.
Moreover, industrial interests played important roles in
the committees of the Atomic Commission too; for instance,
working group IV (AK IV, "Economy and Industry") had close
ties with the German manufacturers association, the Bund
73der Deutschen Industrie (BDI),
The utilities -- which Hans Jarass calls "the third
column in the nuclear energy picture" along with the
federal government and the small number of reactor firms74
-- were not fully integrated into these structures.
Nuclear energy was seen in broader applications than mere
electricity production and the utilities themselves were
cautious about nuclear commitments. The exception was
Heinrich Mandel from RWE who was always a staunch supporter
of nuclear energy. His influence and the influence of
RWE were important in later years for the positive atti-
tude of the utilities toward nuclear energy,
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The trend toward more government involvement in the
nuclear sector began immediately with the Eltville and
advanced -reactor programs. 'Federal contracts still .left
primary responsibility for technical and managerial con-
trol to the industry.75 On the government side, the
trend was to -nore federal involvement rather than state
involvement due to the huge funding requirements. The
Nuclear Research Center in JUlich originally received 50
percent of its funding from the Land North Rhine-Westphalia,
then 25 percent, then 10. percent. On the industry side,
firms relied increasingly on government support for develop-
ment. Industry had been actively involved with the devel-
opment of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center, but it
could not meet the additional financial needs of the re-
search reactor (FR2) being built there. 'Rather than
accept a minority position in line with a reduced finan-
cail contribution, industry forfeited its DM 30 million
share as a gift to the government. In return, two indus-
try representatives were retained on the center's super-
visory board for the next five years.76
The informal network of associations between scien-
tists and government officials allowed the government to
work behind the scene and keep a low profile. To a large
extent, the German Atomic Commission coordinated these
77
efforts. At the outset, when the German nuclear program
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was weak, an open orientation to the outside was favored.
West Germany tended to measure its capabilities against
France's. Gradually, West Germany's position became
stronger and policy changed because general competitive
concerns toward outside powers acquired new priority.7 8
These competitive concerns were manifested in West Germany
-- and elsewhere -- by a concentration process, -most
notable in the merger of Siemens' and AEG's nuclear in-
terests to form the subsidiary of Kraftwerk Union, KWU
not only built reactors but also controlled many fuel
element interests. Naturally, this concentration facili-
tated cooperation with state authorities, especially on a
federal level, because of KWU's dominant market position
and link to German prestige in the field.
CONCLUSION
When the German government was allowed to resume nu-
clear research in 1955, it did not want to assume too much
of a leadership role. This restraint was due partly to
the decentralized nature of the state, partly to its own
lack of expertise in atomic energy, and partly to its be-
lief in market principles. The government certainly felt,
though, that it was essential for the Federal Republic to
develop a nuclear capacity. Initially, energy needs were
seen as the paramount reason for pushing nuclear energy;
later economic motives were more salient. At certain times
security needs have also been important, Tnainly in terms of
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how the Federal Republic can be integrated into a European
nuclear deterrant.
In any case, the government favored keeping a low pro-
file regarding nuclear policy. It chose to work primarily
in conjunction with industrialists involved with nuclear
energy. The German Atomic Commission, comprised mainly of
industrialists, assumed considerably more significance than
the Ministry for Atomic Questions. The electrical utili-
ties were included only peripherally in the industrialists'
group at least in part because nuclear energy then was seen
to have several applications besides the generation of
electricity.
The first atomic program of the Federal Republic, the
Eltville program, was prepared by the Atomic Commission and
it basically supported all the reactor designs which the
German reactor manufacturing industry was pursuing. The
government wanted to provide R&D support, fearing that
otherwise the firms might not be willing to undertake the
risks involved. Several designs were expected to move
into commercial development; the utilities were expected
to place orders for such designs,
It is at this point that the government wrongly asses-
sed the workings of the market process. The utilities
simply were not amenable to staying in the experimental
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phase for as long as the government and the Commission
anticipated. The utilities wanted working reactors and
when they saw an available technology -- the light water
reactor. -- which provided'them what they wanted, they opted
for it. Their calculations were economic, not political
or nationalistic as were the calculations of the Atomic
Commission. The government never told the -utilities not
to choose the LWRs, but it certainly had expected that a
narrowing of options would come much later. The structure
of the policy process left the decision-making power to
the utilities by default.
The government had always expected that market forces
would determine the direction of the nuclear program, but
these forces became relevant sooner than anticipated.
The manufacturing firms did not play a critical role be-
cause their government subsidies meant that their need to
narrow options was minimized. Moreover, by the late 1950s
and early 1960s the energy and security reasons for devel-
oping nuclear energy were less significant than the economic
reasons -- i.e., supporting domestic firms and promoting
exports. In short, both the institutional aspects of nu-
clear policy-making and the domestic conditions affecting
decisions worked in favor of the utilities. They took the
lead in opting for light water reactors and no one opposed
this move.
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We should realize that the evidence in this section
relates mainly to the light water reactors which were
close to the commercial stage while these policy delibera-
tions were taking place. 'i'he situation is different,
though, for the advanced reactors such as the fast breeder
and high temperature reactors. Before we draw conclusions
about the role of economic factors or utilities in deter-
mining technological choices, we should look more closely
at what happens when economic pay-offs are not readily
available. In the next chapters we will examine how
technological choices have been made for the pebble bed
high temperature reactor.
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PART III
TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE HIGH TEMPERATURE REACTOR
The next fou'r chapters center on the development of
the pebble bed high temperature reactor in the Federal
Republic. The first part of the thesis, Chapter One,
set out ideas about how technological choices are made.
It stressed that although economic factors often seem
compelling for explaining the path of technological de-
velopment, one should pay attention to the underlying
political-organizational factors because the economic
context is often defined by the political context. To
study technological choices, the focus should be on the
phases of policy development for a technology, and on
the roles of individual actors and changing objectives
within these phases.
Part II used this framework to look at overall Ger-
man nuclear policy since 1955. Chapter Two proposed
three phases of development in the German nuclear reac-
tor program and looked at the changing objectives over
these phases. Chapter Three focused on the institutional
side of German nuclear policy-making in terms of (a) how
the institutions were established and continue to have
an impact on policy, and (b) how responsibilities are di-
vided among the manufacturing, utility and government
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sectors. For the first generation of nuclear reactors
in West Germany -- i.e., the light water reactors -- the
utilities played an especially significant role. We
saw, however, that the reason for this was not that eco-
nomic interests are necessarily the best determinant of
reactor choices, 'but that the government and manufacturing
firms unwittingly conceded a scope of activities to the
utilities which the utilities gladly filled. The market
may determine the choice of reactors in certain stages
of development, but it is not a good measure for the R&D
stage because economic considerations are limited in their
applicability then. Part II gives us several assumptions
to consider for nuclear policy subsequent to the first
generation LWRs.
Part III, therefore, uses the framework of Part I
and the assumptions from Part II to look at one second
generation nuclear reactor in depth, namely the HTR. In
focusing on one technology, we can be ,more specific in
our analysis and see better the development within each
of the sectors, not just among them. We can also focus
more on the relationship of the stage of a technology and
the policy choices made. Given the complexity of advanced
technologies, it is nearly impossible to keep the involve-
ment of actors distinct for certain stages. The distinc-
tion between the R&D and commercialization stages of
technological development is not particularly meaningful
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because the two are so closely linked. It makes no sense
to argue that economic factors should determine techno-
logical choices once commercialization nears because by
then political factors have influenced development to
such an extent that they will not disapper. Political
factors have a lasting impact. The key to technological
choices for advanced technologies lies in seeing how the
actors interact and adapt to conditions.
The organization of Part III parallels that of Part
II: Chapter Four gives an overview of HTR development;
Chapters Five, Six and Seven look at the roles of speci-
fic actors and the interactions among the manufacturing,
utility and government sectors. Part III strenqthens
the conclusion from Part II that the market is not a
good gauge on which to rely for technological choices;
here the reason is not only due to the developments that
occur in the R&D and demonstration stages preceding com-
mercialization but even more importantly due to the
wealth of HTR options which were available. Cost com-
parisons of diverse technological possibilities proved
to be very difficult. For the HTRs, economic calcula-
tions were used more to decide when to drop certain options
than to decide which ones were best. We argue that the
important issue with technological choices is not to iden-
tify the "best" or most "economical" technology, but to
see how choices are narrowed. The biggest challenge for
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the policy actors is to cooperative effectively to narrow
the choices and concentrate developmental efforts.
Chapter Four presents the changing objectives which
have influenced the HTR. Commercialization has always
been more remote than it was with the light water reac-
tors, and that affected the perspectives of the various
actors. The actors gradually learned that they would
have to work together to develop the HTR, given the lack
of any possible international partners, if the reactor
were to stand any chance of success.
Chapter Five explores the development of the first
experimental HTR, the 15 MW AVR. The focus is on the
struggles .within each sector about early HTR development,
on the individuals involved, and on the special signifi-
cance of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia. The role of
the utilities was less significant for the HTR than for
the light water reactor. In addition, the claim that
the Germans insisted on developing the pebble bed HTR
alone is shown to be overstated. Some national pride
was involved, but there were also circumstantial reasons
why the Germans were not involved in an international
partnership. The early years of HTR history are impor-
tant because they still have an impact on present working
relationships.
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Chapter Six focuses on the 300 MW prototype thorium
high temperature reactor (THTR). Construction for the
reactor began in 1971 but is not scheduled for comple-
tion until 1984 at the earliest. Development has been
plagued by political problems, licensing problems and
an inability to narrow options concerning a THTR follow-
up project. In the late 1960s, the actors involved with
HTR policy saw the need to narrow HTR options, but they
tried to do so unilaterally, i.e., within their own sec-
tors. The disputes within the manufacturing sector were
especially significant. Outcomes -- or the lack of
outcomes -- were determined more by industrial strategy
than by technological strategy.
Chapter Seven deals with HTR policy since 1975. The
post-1975 period represents a radical change of attitudes
on the .parts of the HTR actors. After the Americans
dropped out of the HTRPinarket in 1975 because of Gulf
General Atomic Company's failure, the market was left to
the Germans, and the actors knew that they had to cooper-
ate. For the first time, manufacturing firms and utili-
ties began working together -- both within their own
sectors and among sectors. The federal government played
an important role in facilitating communication. None-
theless, the willingness to cooperate does not guarantee
success, and the attempts to move to a narrowing of tech-
nological options and the possibility of commercialization
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still present problems. The actors, however, have learned
certain lessons about reactor development strategy, for
example that it is best to proceed incrementally and stress
practical projects rather 'than more sophisticated R&D pro-
jects which take too long to realize.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE H.T.R: CHANGING OBJECTIVES AND MARKET CALCULATIONS
After 1955, the German government and industrialists
wanted to make the German reactor industry internationally
competitive. Given the success of the American light
water reactors in the mid-1960s, however, the Germans de-
cided that they could not match skills with the Americans
for the first generation LWRs. Instead, they placed em-
phasis on the next generation of reactors, namely the
high temperature and fast breeder reactors. The HTR, at
least in the pebble bed design pursued by the Germans,
was a solely German design. Because of this and because
of the German wish to be internationally competitive,
the HTR provides an examnle of a technology in which we
might expect the government's stakes in the technology's
success to be high. The auestions that interest us are
to what extent is it true that the government had a
special interest and what influence can the government
exert in such a situation?
The last two chapters on overall German nuclear policy
indicated how German attitudes toward the market deter-
mination of technological development and the commercial
possibilities of LWRs combined to limit the government's
influence. The HTR example allows us to see how applicable
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these limitations are when governmental interest in a
technology is seemingly high. To examine this issue, we
need first to examine carefully the nature of the govern-
ment's interest to see if it is indeed high; then we
have to look at the interactions of the policy actors,
not only between the business-state sectors, but also
within them. To put the issue in terms of our theore-
tical framework, we will be looking again at the balance
of market and political-organizational factors, but the
analysis will dwell more on disputes and agreements
within individual sectors. Specifically, we want to see
how market factors have affected decisions about the HTR
since commercialization has always been more distant
than it was for LWRs.
In this chapter we will first explain what the high
temperature reactor is and why it is attractive to the
Germans. Then we will outline several reasons why the
HTR is a good case study for seeing how technological
choices are made. Finally, in the major part of the
chapter we will relate HTR developments to overall Ger-
man nuclear policy by seeing how applicable the three
phases of development from Chapter Two are for HTR
policy. With commercialization possibilities more re-
mote than with first generation LWRs, the HTRs are less
subject to market considerations. We want to see-how
this influences the decisions of policy actors. The
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utilities, for example, have not been as instrumental in
steering HTR development as they were with LWRs, but the
eventual success of the HTRs may still hinge on greater
utility commitments because they are the potential fun-
ders. The HTR case offers an opportunity to see how
technological choices are affected when development in
the R&D and demonstration stages lasts longer than it
did with the LWRs. The LWRs moved rapidly to the com-
mercialization stage.
Like Chapter Two, this chapter focuses on changing
objectives in German nuclear policy, but it lets us see
the effects of such changes when development stretches
out over a longer period. This chapter also reinforces
the argument that the market approach is an inadequate
guide for explaining how technological choices are made;
market factors are critical for development at a certain
point, but that point often comes late in the development
of a technology. This chapter stresses that market fac-
tors have to be understood in the context of political-
organizational factors. The three chapters following this
one go into- greater detail'to show how the political-
organizational factors became relevant and how they shaped
overall policy.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE HIGH TEMPERATURE REACTOR
The development of the high temperature reactor in
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the Federal Republic is closely associated with the nu-
clear research center at Julich (KFA) and the Land North
Rhine-Westphalia. Industrially, the primary actors are
Brown Boveri and Cie as the reactor manufacturer and a
group of small electrical utilities as the orderers and
operators. The reactors in the German HTR program are
a 15 MW experimental reactor, the AVR (Arbeitsgemeinschaft
Versuchsreaktor), at the KFA and a 300 MW demonstration
reactor, the THTR (thorium high temperature reactor),
being constructed at Hamm-Uentrop. Discussion continues
within government, industry and the nuclear research
centers about the next phase after the completion of the
THTR. Both the AVR and THTR have utilized the German-
developed pebble bed reactor design, and this design
has continued to receive support, at least until late
1981, at all levels -- government, science, reactor con-
struction industry, utilities -- despite the lack of any
serious interest in ordering the pebble bed HTR outside
of the Federal Republic.
The 15 MW AVR reactor is the only experimental high
temperature reactor still in operation in.the world.
The other two experimental reactors, the 20 MW British
Dragon reactor and the 40 MW American Peach Bottom reac-
tor, have both been shut down. .Two HTRs beyond the experi-
mental stage have been or are being built: the 330 MW
reactor at Fort St. Vrain, Colorado was constructed in a
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remarkably short time between 1968 and 1974, but was then
plagued with operating difficulties which have finally
been overcome; the THTR-300 has been under construction
since 1972 in the Federal Republic but will be completed
in 1984 at the earliest. For several years the THTR
has been within three years of completion, but new li-
censing requirements keep delaying any further progress.
The AVR, in any case, has been in operation since 1966.
and it has been remarkably successful.1
High temperature reactors were just one of many
reactor systems being considered in the 1950s. Nearly
every reactor system had been discussed by pioneering
scientists in the 1940s. and the attributes of a good
system were widely recognized. According to Edwin Shaw,
an analyst from the EEC:
There was no sea-ret about the attributes that
should be looked for. In addition to being
self-sustaining as far as the basic chain re-
actor was concerned, a good power reactor
would have a high temperature outlet fluid, an
economic use of neutrons so that the majority
of spare neutrons could be used to produce
new fuel, high burn-ups of fuel to minimize
fuel handling costs, compact and simple en-
gineering design, stability of thg materials
employed, and no supply problems.
The HTR, in fact, was developed as an improvement on Great
Britain's Calder Hall type advanced gas reactors (AGRs).
The Calder Hall reactors had the disadvantages of low
steam temperatures and very large dimensions which were
necessary because of the use of natural uranium and graphite.
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The AGRs demanded large capital investments, and their
low efficiency made them uncompetitive with conventional
power plants.3
The high temperature reactors, on the other hand,
were designd! more compactly, achieved higher gas outlet
temperatures, and used nuclear fuel more efficiently.
A 1977 International Atomic Energy Agency report cited
the potential advantages of the HTR:4
(1) It also shows great flexibility in the
mode of fuelling, allowing an adaptation
to various boundary conditions such as
availability or non-availability of
highly enriched uranium, existence or
non-existence of a closed fuel cycle, etc.
(2) The HTR system offers a good potential
for adoption to very strict safety
standards.
(3) The HTR system permits using either the
indirect steam cycle or the direct cycle
with a closed helium turbine. Dry air
cooling can be employed without major
economic penalties, especially in the case
of the direct helium cycle.
(4) The HTR system has the unique and proven
potential to supply helium of 950-10004C,
and of even higher temperatures if the
necessary materials become available.
This permits the direct use of nuclear
heat for the production of gaseous or
liquid secondary fuels from coal and
other fossil fuels. On a more extended
time scale thermochemical water splitting
seems a realistic goal, opening an enor-
mous new market for nuclear energy.
The development of the HTRs suffered somewhat because of
the early success of the LWRs and the expected future
role of the fast breeder reactors, but starting in the
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1970s the possibility of process heat and coal gasifica-
tion applications had made the HTRs more attractive
again. Such applications would allow HTRs to contribute
to more than just electricity needs; the importance of
these additional uses is particularly relevant to the
post-1975 era.
The question remains, though, why the Germans chose
to focus on the pebble bed design rather than on block
fuel-elements. The German-designed HTRs used pebbles
for nuclear fuel-; elsewhere, in HTRs relying on block
fuel-element designs, prismatic fuel was used. The main
differences in the design of the pebble bed and prismatic
cores are the loading and unloading systems and the con-
trol rod systems.5 Each system has certain advantages:-
the prismatic core reactor allows better accessibility
to the individual fuel element and it has a more conven-
tional control rod system; the pebble bed reactor can be
refueled without shutting it off, it gives great flexi-
bility in the types of nuclear fuel it can use, and it
has the potential of reaching higher outlet temperatures
with a fixed maximum fuel temperature.6 This opens the
way for other uses in addition to electricity production.
Several German nuclear experts felt that the Dragon
and Peach Bottom experimental HTRs in the TU.K. and U.S.
were overly influenced by light water reactor developments,
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and that the German AVR was designed from a more logical
overall point of view.7 German HTR experts, however,
have never claimed that their pebble bed reactor is bet-
ter or worse than the block fuel-element designs. They
have preferred to welcome the development of both reac-
tors. In brief, the Germans do not maintain that there
were significant reasons for emphasizing the pebble bed
design. They made a choice, but the choice could have
been different.
No one was convinced that the pebble bed was the
ultimate reactor or the only course to follow, but it
was seen as a suitable technical alternative for the
Federal Republic. The Germans felt that they trailed
other Western nations so much in terms of first genera-
tion light water reactors that the best strategy for
catching up would be-to concentrate efforts on second
generation reactors like the HTRs. When the AVR project
was launched, it was independent of any other HTR work
elsewhere in the world.8 Moreover, the technological
gap caused the reactor manufacturers, BBC/Krupp, to fol-
low an innovative strategy -- for instance, (a) the fuel
load system used pebble-shaped balls, (b) the transfer
of heat to the steam cycle was done through conventional
steam generators, and (c) the fuel cycle relied on ceramic
materials rather than metal coating so that efficient oper-
ation would not be dependent on reprocessing.9
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USING THE H.T.R. AS A CASE STUDY
The high temperature reactor is a technology in
which the Germans have placed high hopes for over 25
years. The pay-off has yet to be realized. Support in
other countries has dropped to almost nothing, but the
German interest continues. Since 1979, however, the
government (through the Ministry for Research and Tech-
nology) has been demanding that some hard choices be
made about the future of the HTR. The government has
put pressure on the manufacturing industry and even
more on the utilities to decide what future steps will
be taken by the private sector to support the HTR. The
government feels that the technology is set to move be-
yond the demonstration stage of development and hence
should be less dependent on public funding.
The justifications for the reactor have changed over
the course of its development. National pride was es-
pecially important at the outset because the Germans
wanted above all to be internationally competitive in
high technology areas such as the construction of nuclear
reactors. The competition in the Federal.Republic was
not between designs, but between industrial actors trying
to establish themselves. By 1968 and the government's
third atomic program, federal support was primarily directed
to advanced reactor designs such as the HTR. The HTR,
however, suffered from having too many options, both
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domestically and internationally. The challenge has
always been to narrow these alternatives. Still, as the
justifications for the HTR shifted from national pride
to economic reasons and then to the reactor's applica-
tions beyond the production -of electricity, the number
of options has increased. This has complicated develop-
ment. At the same time, though, the HTR has developed in
a context relatively free of international influences; in
the early years the government guarded against too much
international involvement for fear that German ideas
would not have a chance to be expressed; later, the Ger-
man project was the only one being seriously pursued
internationally. International factors were not re-
sponsible for any major turning points in the German HTR
program as they were for the LWR program -- except be-
tween 1971-1975 and the decisions from that period have
now been reversed.
For these reasons, the HTR is a good case study of
how technological choices are made for an advanced tech-
nology; moreover, the HTR case can be distinguished from
the LWR case for several reasons:
-- The HTR case allows us to see the role the
government plays when its interests in a
project seem to be high.
-- It indicates how market forces operate when
the number of technological options is high.
-- It provides an example of how a technology
develops when commercialization is distant.
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-- It lets us assess the role of domestic con-
siderations carefully because the German
HTR developed relatively free of
intervening international variables.
The paterns set out in Chapters Two and Three for
the LWRs are not necessarily generalizable to West German
HTR development. There were specific reasons why the
utilities played such a key role for the LWRs. The HTR
example demonstrates again that both the stage of develop-
ment of a technology and the policy leadership in a given
stage are important: the shifts between stages and be-
tween policy leaders have to be considered carefully.
Market factors have not been the primary shaping force
on HTR policy because the technology has not yet reached
the commercial stage; the LWRs had reached that stage so
the utilities could be more influential. Nonetheless,
it is important to examine HTR development to see how
political-organizational decisions of the past 25 years
are affecting the context in which market factors will
eventually be significant. It is necessary to examine
the particular German circumstances which led the govern-
ment, industries and utilities to work together after
1975. The HTR case provides a good example of how these
three sectors interact in the light of differing and
changing economic, technological and political objectives.
THREE PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT APPLIED TO THE H.T.R.
In examining overall nuclear energy policy in the
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Federal Republic, we suggested three phases of develop-
ment since 1955: (1) an open-ended period of develop-
ment from 1955 - 1963 characterized by debate and un-
certainty about objectives. and directions; (2) a period
of consensus from 1963 - 1973 in which market considera-
tions guided relatively frictionless development of nu-
clear energy; (3) a period of opposition to nuclear
energy from outside the "nuclear community" starting in
late 1973 which forced a closing of ranks within the
nuclear community.
These phases were utilized in Chapters Two and Three
to indicate what role market considerations played in the
development of overall nuclear policy. The phases have
to be distinauished for the high temperature reactor,
however, because market considerations have usually been
subordinate to other factors. We will look specifically
at the HTR case in relation to each of the phases to see
how objectives have to be distinguished for HTR develop-
ment. In phase one, personal relations linking firms,
the research centers, the utilities and the government
were important; in phase tWo, market factors were used to
decide when to drop certain options, but they were not
used to decide which options to favor; in phase three,
the key motivation brining the policy actors together
was a recognition that the entire HTR development might
fail unless cooperative efforts were made. Technological
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choices for the HTR have not been made primarily because
of market considerations -- although perhaps they should
have been, and perhaps the immediate next steps in de-
velopment need to be made on the basis of the market.
Phase One: The Open-Ended Period of Development
The early years of nuclear energy policy in the
Federal Republic were not characterized by industries
and utilities making careful cost determinations of which
alternatives to follow. Rather, there was a scramble
to become involved with new projects so as not to be
excluded from future developments. Established industries
and utilities were moving into a new field which had new
ministries, new laws, new research centers, new research
orientations which had not been allowed by the Allied
military occupation a few years earlier, substantial finan-
cial support and a competitive mood. In these early
years personal relationships played a key role in de-
termining policy -- much more than was possible later
after firmer working relationships and patterns were set.
The special relationships which Rudolf Schulten, the
"father" of the HTR,developed with the utilities, manu-
facturing firms and Land government in North Rhine-
Westphalia proved to be very significant for HTR develop-
ment in the Federal Republic.
The motivation of the utilities to back the HTR
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design arose because certain utilities saw the HTR as a
means to protect their share of the electricity market.
This led them to set up working relationships which then
continued to influence HTR. development. The utilities
that first supported HTRs were not the largest German
utilities. The Stadtwerke Dusseldorf, a municipal utility,
played an instrumental role in ordering the AVR experi-
mental reactor. The Stadtwerke DUsseldorf then convinced
several other small municipal utilities that HTRs suited
their needs: the reactors would not be as big or as
expensive as LWRs. These utilities were concerned
about the expected shortage of coal and its rising cost.
They also felt threatened by the larger utilities, such
as RWE, which surrounded them and had their own lignite
coal reserves. Moreover, the Stadtwerke DUsseldorf
was involved with the KFA JUlich from the center's out-
set because the utility operated the MERLIN and DIDO re-
search reactors there. A close relationship between the
municipal utility and the KFA formed early and has
continued.
Industrial decisions too were often a function of the
working relationships which were established. The munici-
pal utilities had begun discussions about ordering an HTR
with the German firm Babock and Wilcox which had direct
connections with the British firm Babcock and Wilcox. In
line with similar reactors being developed in England,
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the German Babcock and Wilcox offered the utilities a 40
MW natural uranium gas-cooled graphite system. The utili-
ties were also in contact with BBC Mannheim about ac-
quiring a turbo-generation plant for their reactor, and it
was through these contacts that the utilities first heard
of the pebble bed system.12 BBC had long been involved
with turbo-generators through its parent firm in Switzer-
land. BBC's interest in the pebble bed HTR arose because
Rudolf Schulten, one of its scientists, convinced the firm
that his pebble bed design was superior to the British
Calder Hall design. BBC was attracted to Schulten's
proposals and was able to persuade the utilities to
choose the pebble bed HTR over the Babcock and Wilcox
offer.
As we will see in detail in the next chapter, gov-
ernment support for initial nuclear reactor designs was
generous. Manufacturers and utilities wanted to estab-
lish footholds in the reactor market; for them, too, it
was a new area. Government subsidies permitted the
business sector to get started on nuclear R&D without
having to worry about which designs were most cost effi-
cient. The business sector was not even in a position
to conduct such studies considering the newness of the
field. Just as we observed with LWRs, German firms and
utilities involved with HTRs relied on already established
ties for developing their reactors.
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Phase Two: The Period of Consensus, 1963-1973
A seeming consensus marked overall German nuclear
policy for this period. Business and state sectors shared
the notion that developing nuclear energy would bring
benefits to the German economy, and decisions were made
without any debate or disagreement. This harmony, how-
ever, did not apply on the more specific level of HTR
development. The 1963-73 period of HTIR development is
characterized by the completion of the experimental AVR
reactor and the decision to go ahead with the THTR-300
demonstration reactor. Despite the consensus among ac-
tors in the overall nuclear sector, this was the major
period of competition within the German HTR sector. De-
cisions had to be made by both industry and utilities
about reactor designs and whether to develop the reac-
tors alone or internationally.
The role of the market for HTRs was not to decide
which design was most economical, but to decide when to
turn away from certain options. Firms and utilities al-
ready had their attachments to specific designs; their
goal was to achieve the fastest breakthrough to commer-
cialization. The expectation was that the race to HTR
commercialization would be determined on a "winner-take-
all" basis, as with the LWRs. Firms had too much self-
interest to compromise on their own efforts. To the ex-
tent market factors were heeded, they were used to evaluate
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individual nuclear options rather than broad overall
policy. The Germans -- and this includes the government
as well as the industries and utilities -- were not
using market factors to select between reactor systems.
They were not even that eager to use them to differen-
tiate between the competing lines of high temperature
reactors. They were willing, however, to evaluate indi-
vidual approaches, such as GHH's effort to develop a
direct-cycle high temperature reactor, from a market
perspective. GHH eventually dropped this line of devel-
opment when it proved uneconomical. GHH had agreed to
build the reactors at a fixed cost, but they had seri-
ously underestimated the technical difficulties and the
expenses of producing a new fuel element.13 GHH had
moved too quickly in offering a fixed price contract,
and when the economic losses became apparent, they
dropped out of the HTR manufacturing field. Market con-
siderations contributed to the turning away from options.
The key for the business sector was always what the
prospects of commercialization were, but the causes of
commercialization remained unclear. The Europeans held
the lead in HTR research in the 1960s, but it was the
U.S. firm Gulf General Atomic Company (GAC) which
launched the most serious efforts at commercialization
in the early 1970s. The GAC example indicates clearly
how quickly the German business sector could shift
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priorities when the possibility of commercialization was
perceived. Gulf Oil Company joined in a partnership with
the General Atomic Company in 1967 and proceeded to push
the HTR vigorously in an effort to overcome the lead of
the American reactor manufacturers outside the HTR
14field. European experience in the HTR field was greater
than the American experience -- e.g., in the area of gas
graphite technology -- and the Europeans had all the re-
sources necessary to commercialize the system, yet the
separate countries drew back from commercialization or
went to the U.S. for help.1 5
The Germans formed a partnership with GAC. One
part of the explanation for this is that a replacement
partner was needed for Krupp in the BBC-Krupp partner-
ship after Krupp's financial problems forced it to drop
out of.the nuclear reactor area. But another part of
the explanation is that BBC was lured by the chances of
commercialization even though its previous efforts had
not been focused on the prismatic fuel design of GAC. In
any case, opting for partnership with GAC clearly meant
proceeding with the prismatic design. Gulf General Atomic's
success stemmed from a number of letters of intent signed
in the U.S. with several utilities in 1971 for reactors
ranging from 770 MW to 1-160 MW. 16 The Germans had not
yet completed their 300 MW THTR prototype, but they looked
enviously at the Americans who already had commercial
-185-
orders. The Germans too, in their new partnership, pro-
posed to build a 1160 MW HTR of the American design.
In retrospect, as we will see in Chapter Six, GAC
far exceeded its competence in proposing to build so
many high temperature reactors. When this became clear
and all the orders were cancelled in 1975, the worldwide
confidence in the HTR was shattered. But the failure was
17an industrial one rather than technological. The can-
cellations were linked to the world-wide recession which
forced utilities to cut back their growth plans, but they
were also linked to the poor performance of the Fort St.
Vrain reactor in Colorado. Utilities began to doubt
whether large-scale HTRs were feasible. GAC had tried to
more ahead too ambitiously and, in doing so, set back the
possible commercial break-through for HTRs.
The lesson from this is that the timing for moving
on to the next stage of technological development is
critical to the technology's success. Firms and utili-
ties were quick to jump at the prospect of HTR commerciali-
zation, but that did not mean that they were thinking in
rational economic terms for the specific step being taken.
Rather than relying on market calculations, GHH and GAC,
for example, attempted to bulldoze their way into the mar-
ket through aggressive marketing of their THR designs.
When it became clear that they had overstretched their
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capabilities, however, so that orders had to be cancelled,
the de.signs themselves fell into disrepute. A reactor
system cannot be successful just because of its theoretical
advantages or financial potential; the timing of its de-
velopment is also essential.18 Following the GAC debacle,
German interests 'returned to the pebble bed HTR. Its de-
velopment had been slowed down but not set back irretrie-
vably by the German interest in the prismatic fuel HTR.
The GAC failure was a reprieve for the pebble bed
HTR, and the post-1975 period shows how decisions were
reached in government, business and utility circles about
how to proceed with HTR development. There was increasing
awareness at every level that market or technical consid-
erations alone did not determine the course of techno-
logical development.
Phase Three; Opposition and the Closing of 'Ranks in the
Nuclear Community
Although overall nuclear energy development in the
Federal Republic was directly affected by the rise of
anti-nuclear groups after 1973, the situation differed
for HTR development. On the one hand, ongoing projects
like the THTR were slowed down considerably due to new
and changing licensing requirements. On the other hand,
though, the dearee of coordination among the various sec-
tors of the nuclear community increased significantly,
not because of nuclear opposition but because financial
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constraints on the firm level and state level forced
close consultations about technological developments.
The types of decisions that had to be made related to
technological factors that did not arouse public opposi-
tion. They involved decisions such as what type of cycle
to use and how and when to include process heat applica-
tions.
It was not the 1973 oil crisis directly which led to
this new coordination, but rather the 1975 GAC failure
which compelled the Federal Republic to ponder whether
the HTR should be pursued at all. All the relevant ac-
tors seemed to be more aware of the complexities involved
in developing the HTR technology, and thus they were
willing to pay more attention to the timing and practical
feasibility of subsequent stages. Technological coordi-
nation on a broad level was carried out for the first time;
the actors recognized the need for common approaches. In-
stead of stressing self-interest or attempting to calculate
which approach was most economical, the actors were pre-
pared to decide with .one another what technological choices
to make. HTR development has benefitted from this coordi-
nation.
The basic thrust of the post-1975 period has been to
develop a common strategy for the HTR. For several years,
the various actors had been aware of the problem confronting
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the HTR system: there were too many options. The actors,
however, had tried to remedy the situation unilaterally.
On the industry side, BBC decided that partnership with
Gulf General Atomic Company was the best route -- it
meant focusing on the -U.S. prismatic fuel design. A
BBC report in 1972 claimed, "All other firms in Europe
which have been suggested as partners would be unable to
contribute anything to the expansion of present knowledge
at Hochtemperatur-Reactorbau" (the name given to the BBC-
Gulf General Atomic Company subsidiary which succeeded
BBC-Krupp after Krupp's withdrawal). 9 The utilities had
also responded to the HTR commercial sales in the U.S. by
joining together in a company, Euro-HKG, with other Euro-
pean utilities to study the HTR's economic prospects, but
this move came too late to enable European industry to
regroup for winning commercial orders. 2 0 The federal
government made an effort to consolidate projects by
using its Third Atomic Program in 1968 to encourage BBC-
Krupp and GHH to merge efforts in the HTR field. The
government was also willing to support the BBC-Gulf
Atomic Company partnership, even though it curtailed
chances for the pebble bed HTR, because the government
recognized the need to narrow the number of HTR projects.
After 1975 the different sectors were able to coordi-
nate their desire to narrow options. Industry, the utili-
ties, the government, and the KFA JMlich sat down together
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to work out future plans. Several factors were essential
for this relationship. In the first place, the energy
situation after the 1973 oil crisis changed the orienta-
tion of the government's nuclear policy. In the federal
government's Fourth Atomic Program in 1973, energy needs
were stressed over the need to make the German nuclear
21industry competitive for the first time. In the second
place, the government made it clear that funding for all
the HTR alternative projects would not be continued.
Third, the HTR became more attractive because of its
applications beyond electricity production. There was
more talk of the relationship between "Kohle and Kernen-
ergie" -- i.e., coal and nuclear power.
Fourth, on the industrial side, BBC was joined by
the dominant nuclear manufacturing group, Kraftwerk -Union,
which had developed its interest in the HTR through pro-
cess heat applications. Since the HTR development after
1975 focused both on electricity production and process
heat, the BBC and KWU industrial groups could pursue
their interests without directly competing with each other.
A direct wo'rking relationship was set up between the BBC
and KWU groups (i.e., including their subsidiaries) so
that the HTR line is now being developed jointly by them.2 2
The inclusion of KWU was not totally welcomed by BBC, but
BBC had to accede to licensing their know-how because the
utilities wanted the stronger financial backing of the
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KWU group for the support of the line of reactors since
23the reactors were new.
The coordination among the actors started as a re-
sult of a governmental initiative in 1976 from the Min-
istry for Research and Technology (BMFT). After the GAC
pull-out from the HTR development, the BMFT wanted to
accelerate the decision about what to do next. The min-
istry wanted to decrease its financial involvement and
rely more on the private sector, but it was dissatisfied
with the progress being made by the utilities regarding
the next step. On February 23-24, 1976, the M1inistry
sponsored a meeting at Dernbach about the future of the
HTR. The group decided that (1) HTR development should
be continued, (2) the construction of the THTR-300 pro-
totype should be completed, (3) a viable reactor manu-
facturing industry should be maintained, and (4) there
should be agreement on one unified concept for future
HTR work.2 4
This Dernbach meeting was a critical turning point
for HTR development in the Federal Republic. Industry
and the utilities welcomed the BMFT's initiative.- The
Ministry drew on its own expertise -- unlike the early
years of nuclear development when it had relied primar..
ily on the advice of industry -- and it was willing to
play an active coordinating role. For example, the Ministry
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set up the "Projekttr ger HTR"25 which facilitates work
on the HTR and reports directly to the BMFT. The Minis-
try was able to force the utilities to support HTR de-
velopment by threatening to withdraw all support if no
interest was shown by the utilities in the reactor. At
first, the utilities were not willing to talk to one
another or to the other actors, but gradually everyone
realized how they were benefitting from the experiences
of the others.26 For example, the experiences of the
utilities with not only nuclear reactors but also with
conventional power stations were particularly valuable
because even small details, such as cable location for
servicing, turned out to be important for the overall
reactor design plans. The cooperation led to some cri-
tical decisions: (1) the market introduction of an HTR
system for both process heat and electricity production
as a long term goal would be the focal point of develop-
ment, but (2) there would be a compromise on the THTR
successor to use a steam-cycle design (rather than the
helium gas-turbine design) with no process heat applica-
tion.27 In other words, a balance was struck between
demonstrating how far advanced the technology was (with
all the accompanying licensing problems) and minimizing
risks of not being able to complete the project.
In this third phase of nuclear energy policy, then,
market objectives were incorporated into a larger framework
-192-
which showed a better understanding of the complexities
of technological development. Many of the options were
feasible, but the question was which ones to emphasize.
The failure of the Gulf General Atomic Company in 1975
highlighted for the German actors that a new orientation
or development strategy for the HTR was necessary, and
this orientation had to be agreed upon by the actors.
The actors became more aware of the uncertainties in-
volved with the development of advanced technologies.
and, thus, they were more amendable to sharing the risks.
Moreover, as the applications beyond electricity produc-
tion became more practical, the coal and gas companies
as well as the chemical industry developed more interest
in the HTR. This made coordination even more imperative,
but it also increased the possibilities of success for
the HTR.
CONCLUSION
Economic factors were less critical for HTR develop-
ment in the Federal Republic than for LWR development,
for commercialization was not imminent and thus the policy
actors, especially utilities, were less inclined to "jump
on the bandwagon" to place orders as they had done for
LWRs. HTR development in West Germany was influenced
more by domestic factors than by international conditions
which had been most critical in LWR development. The HTR
is a reactor still in the R&D stage, and hence the effect
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on the marketability of specific designs has been less
determinative. Market factors were more important in
decisions against certain options than in making choices
for the overall path of development. They also were
used more for assessing individual technologies than for
making comparatiVe analyses.
Overall, the period of development for the HTR since
1955 has been a learning experience in which reactor
manufacturers, utilities, the KFA and the government have
recognized the need to work together. Genuine cooperation
first became evident after the 1976 Dernbach meeting
convened by the BMFT to discuss the future of the HTR.
During this period, the actors have learned that it is
rare that a unique technological choice appears: -more.
often, there are several feasible options. The problem
is deciding how to concentrate efforts, and market fac-
tors alone do not suffice for this because they do not
solve the problems of which reactor design, which nuclear
fuel, which control rods, etc., should be pursued.
The actors gradually came to recognize that choosing
a common strategy was more essential than trying to iden-
tify the best technological or economical alternative.
The actors saw the need to narrow their options, but at
first they attempted to do this unilaterally -- i.e., within
their own sector. The importance of the Dernbach meeting
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was that it provided a forum in which the actors could
coordinate efforts and reduce the options across sectors.
The sobering effect of GAC's setback made the actors.
amenable to this coordination. Government, industry,
utilities and the research institutes worked together to
decide what the next step of HTR development would be.
They did this on the basis of balancing priorities between
designs exemplifying the highest state of technological
advance and designs which were more feasible to build and
license. The critical decisions since 1976 about the next
step after the completion of the THTR have been made by the
various actors working together.
The priority of making the German nuclear industry
internationally competitive was stated explicitly in the
first three "Atomic Programs" of the Federal Republic.
Only in the fourth program of 1973 was the priority of
energy needs given more weight. Throughout the 1960s
economic assessments were made only for individual options
but not for comparing systems. Firms and utilities were
mainly interested in keeping their options open and jock-
eying for position so that when the possibility of com-
mercialization appeared they could move quickly. The
problem here was that too little consideration was given
to what would bring about commercialization. With LWRs,
the impetus came from the United States. German firms and
utilities -- and other European ones too -- seemed to be
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waiting for something to happen again, and indeed the first
moves to commercialization did come from the -U.S. The
Europeans had a lead over the Americans concerning HTR
technology, but they left commercialization to the Ameri-
cans. -Unfortunately, Gulf General Atomic Company, the
American firm, moved too quickly with its plans.
The hint of commercialization, however, created a
quick rush by the French, British and Germans to the GAC
design. Both the GAC case and the GHH case in the Fed-
eral Republic in the late 1960s show that the move to
commercialization is often more a function of aggressive
marketing than of anything else. The GAC case taught
the Germans a lesson about how to make technological
choices. After GAC's failure, the government moved quickly
to bring all the HTR actors together to coordinate sub-
sequent efforts. The call for the meeting at Dernbach
was not startling in itself, but the actors were finally
prepared to work together because they recognized that
the complicated nature of HTR development required this.
We see that a learning experience took place in
which firms and utilities, after an initial period of
keeping options open for HTR development, decided that
the time had come to narrow options. The government,
i.e., the BMFT, had started with little expertise and thus
could play only a limited role in the early years, but it
too had the capability of being more actively involved
after 1975. In sum, a main tool needed to explain how
technological choices are made is an understanding of what
underlines the decision to begin narrowing options. This
chapter has shown that market factors alone do not explain
this. Subsequent chapters examine the process in more
detail and clarify what other factors are involved.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRST EXPERIMENTAL H.T.R.
This chapter and the following two chapters parallel
Chapter Three in purpose, but here the subject is the high
temperature reactor rather than overall policy: these chap-
ters will examine the structural determinants behind policy
by focusing on how arrangements between the institutions,
actors, etc., were set up and how responsibilities were
distributed. Each chapter corresponds to a specific
stage of development of the HTR:* this chapter looks at
how decisions were made about the 15 MW experimental high
temperature reactor, the AVR (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Versuchs-
reaktor); Chapter Six concentrates on the demonstration
300 MW thorium high temperature reactor (THTR); Chapter
Seven deals with the efforts after 1975 to determine what
the follow-up project to the THTR should be.
The benefits of looking at the HTR case in detail are
threefold. First, we can differentiate the HTR case from
* It should be remembered that the three stages of devel-
opment are R&D, demonstration and commercialization.
The three phases of development outlined in Chapter Two
are not necessarily the same as the stages. For the HTRs
the phases and stages are essentially similar, but they
are not for LWRs. That explains why we used the mechanism
of the phases for overall development. Our point is that
technological choices are influenced markedly by the stage
of development of a project, and therefore the patterns
from the LWR example should not be generalized too quickly.
-200-
the apparent patterns we saw in overall German nuclear
policy. For example, the utilities which developed the
HTR were not the most influential ones in the Federal
Republic. In addition, the utilities lacked the inter-
national technological options which they had had for
light water reactor commercial orders. Second, instead
of describing merely the struggles among sectors, we can
see the struggles within the sectors themselves. We will
consider the significance of the fact that the HTR was
developed initially by a manufacturing firm which did
not dominate the market, by small utilities, and by one
region of the country (North Rhine-Westohalia) in the
early years. Third, in comparing the HTR case with over-
all nuclear policy, we can examine whether it was impor-
tant that the pebble bed HTR was a purely German tech-
nology. In many respects, being a "Land technology" (i.e.,
the special project of North Rhine-Westphalia) was more
critical than being a German technology.
The first part of this chapter looks at the back-
ground for the AVR experimental reactor. The main part
of the chapter then examin6s the structural conditions
underlying AVR development on a sector-by-sector basis.
The pattern of technological choices for HTRs does not
differ too much from the pattern for overall nuclear policy
in the AVR stage, but distinctions are already visible.
The divergence will become still more evident in the fol-
lowing periods which are covered in the next two chapters.
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE A.V.R. DEVELOPMENT
The milestones in the history of the AVR can be
sketched out easily. The order was placed for the re-
actor in 1959 by the utility group which developed the
experimental reactor. This followed two years of plan-
ning, first by BBC and subsequently by a consortium be-
tween BBC and Krupp. During these two years the emphasis
was on basic research and the problems associated with
this new technology -- e.g., concerning fuel elements,
coolants, etc. The small utilities in the AVR group also
started their cooperation in 1956 and in 1958 their in-
terest was drawn to the pebble bed reactor. The number
of utilities affiliated with the group increased from nine
to 16 in the 1956-59 period. It was the Federal Govern-
ment's agreement in 1959 to assume a major share of the
financial responsibility for the reactor which stimulated
the order placed by AVR. Construction a- the property of
the KFA Jilich could not be begun, though, until August
1961 because of legal and administrative difficulties.
Both the German Atomic Law and special legal ordinances
(Atomanlagenverordnung) had to be passed first. Efforts
to involve Euratom in the AVR project began in 1962, and
finally in April 1964 an association including Euratom,
the KFA and BBC/Krupp was formed.
The 15 MW reactor went critical in August 1966 and
first supplied electricity on December 17, 1967. The
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goals of the reactor were to;
-- demonstrate the feasibility of HTRs with a
pebble bed core;
-- test out certain main components, especially
fuel elements, under HTR-specific conditions;
-- demonstrate the reliable and gafe operation
of high temperature reactors.
Once in operation, the AVR proved extremely successful.
Throuqh the end of 1976 it achieved a strikingly high time
availability of 78 percent, including the inevitable
lower availability of the initial phase and shut-downs
necessary to the AVR's experimental program. 3 1976
marked the best year of operation for the AVR: availa-
bility reached 92 percent. Another significant accomplish-
ment of the AVR was the raising of the gas outlet tempera-
ture from 750 degrees centigrade after seven years of
operation to 950 degrees. Fission products in the cooling
gas still remained at a low level, showing the feasibility
of the HTR for both direct cycle operation and nuclear
process heat,
Technological Purpose of the AVR
The AVR was an experimental reactor and the utilities
which placed the order were aware of this. The utilities
were looking for a reactor to test which was suitable to
their needs, but they did not have a set of ideal condi-
tions in mind. One AVR official said the decision for
the HTR rested partly on fears that RWE, the largest German
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utility, would swallow up the smaller firms and partly on
a "fascination with the newness of the design." Werner
Cautius said that the decision was not just for a reactor
type, but whether the utilities were going to support
nuclear energy at all.5 He felt that the Stadtwerke
DUsseldorf and other municipal utilities should be involved
in the development of the new technology, even though
costs were not predictable. Through early involvement,
the utilities could develop the expertise and personnel
necessary eventually to operate the reactors. 6
The basic development of the AVR design took place
from 1956-1958 at a time when the British Calder Hall
type reactor was the dominant model. The AVR attempted
to overcome some of the shortcomings of the Calder Hall
reactor such as the low operating temperature and the
problems with seals which necessitated large container
vessels for the reactor.7 In contrast to the Dragon and
Peach Bottom experimental HTRs, which focused respectively
on basic HTR technology without electricity production
and on the generation of electricity at a steady rate,
the AVR focused mainly on fuel elements, the irradiation
behavior of the fuel, and the high availability of an
HTR.8 Because of this, it was advantageous to be able to
load and unload the elements while the reactor was still
in operation.
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In short, the pebble bed design, which allowed this,
meshed particularly well with the experimental goal of
the AVR.- Coincidentally, being able to load the reactor
continuously turned out also to have important applica-
tions in neutron physics concerning high conversion or
breeding factors for nuclear reactors, but this was not
foreseen at the time.9 In contrast, the design of the
reactor containment vessels ended up being unnecessarily
complicated. A second container surrounded the primary
container due to the danger of emission of contaminating
gases, but the development of "coated particles" in the
U.S. obviated this problem. The development of coated
particles came too late for the AVR, however, even though
construction did not begin until 1961, because design
plans were already too far advanced to allow for a simpler
vessel system.10 The contract for the design study was
placed by the AVR utilities with BBC/Krupp in April 1957,
and the study was completed in April 1958.
The mood influencing nuclear energy in the Federal
Republic was affected by the Second Geneva Atomic Conference
in 1958 and by the end of the oil shortage in the same
year. The surplus of oil meant that the urgency for -de-
veloping nuclear technology vanished. The Geneva con-
ference highlighted that the initial optimism about nu-
clear energy's competitiveness with conventional sources
was overstated.1 1 In addition, the Germans present in
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Geneva felt that the gap separating Cerman nuclear tech-
'12
nology and other countries' technology had grown larger.
The results of the changed conditions were that:
(1) the utilities were even less willing to order nuclear
reactors since they were not needed; (2) the coal industry
argued against moving to nuclear energy too quickly; (3)
the manufacturing firms claimed that more government
guarantees were needed before they would go further with
nuclear technology; and (4) the government ended up in-
creasing its support for nuclear energy dramatically to
protect its interests. The Ministry for Atomic Questions
doubled the amount of operating losses it would cover for
each of the five reactors in the Eltville program from
DM 50 million to DM 100 million per reactor. It also made
DM 400 million available for their construction, and DM
70 million available for the construction of two foreign
reactors, again with operating losses up to DM 100 million
to be covered.1 3
German industry was subject to criticism in these
early years for lack of support for nuclear energy.
According to Chrysanth Marnet of the AVR group and the
Stadtwerke DUsseldorf, the Minister for Atomic Questions,
Balke, urged German firms at the annual meeting of the
German Atomic Forum in 1961/62 to show more initiative in
14the energy field. Marnet also relates that the president
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of Euratom, Heinz Krekeler, reproached the German industry
in a speech for showing too little interest in new reactor
techniques.15 Wolf H'dfele, then the project director for
the fast breeder reactor at the Karlsruhe nuclear research
center and now the chairman of the board at the KFA
Julich, was not as directly critical of industry, but
he claimed that a new approach to technical development
was needed. Instead of relying on competitive projects
to determine technologies to pursue, industry, government
and the research sector should work together "to estab-
lish a concentration of men and means."1 6 HEfele criti-
cized the exaggerated pessimism of the 1958-59 period,
and he especially blamed the coal interests for their
worries about holding their prices down. 7 In view of
the special circumstances in the nuclear energy field
regarding personnel, financing, 'organization and politics,
Hdfele.was willing to have the state join in as a direct
partner to industry and the universities.) 8
The German priority at this time was to develop the
international competitiveness of its own nuclear industry.
There was more emphasis on the organization of technical
know-how than on energy. Even though industry may not
have taken the initiatives which the government wanted,
and even though the utilities showed no interest in or-
dering the large 100 MW experimental reactors called for
in the Eltville program, the people developing the pebble
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bed HTR were optimistic and pleased with their work.
Schulten said in 1960, "The idea of the pebble bed HTR
was born-in Germany. We will be doing everything pus-
sible in the future to retain the lead we now have in
the development of the HTR." 1 9 Schulten was not attracted
by an unofficial offer by Euratom at the 1958 Geneva con-
ference to join the Euratom project because he had too
much "joy and enthusiasm" for his own project.2 0
The Isolated Development of the AVR
Although considerable work was being done on. HTRs
internationally, and although other German firms were
quick to tie themselves into industrial arrangements with
foreign partners, BBC and Krupp carried out their own
HTR efforts basically only as a national project. There
was little international collaboration. The Geneva Con-
ference and a follow-up conference on gas-cooled reactors
in October 1958 at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in
the U.S. revealed how much work was being done interna-
tionally on HTRs. Details were given on Oak Ridge's gas-
cooled reactor, General Atomic's helium cooled reactor
with metal clad fuel elements, and a pebble bed design
in the U.S. for which the Battelle Institute was investi-
gating different methods of manufacturing the fuel balls.21
In November, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission announced
that, in response to its invitation, an order with the
Bechtel Corporation and General Atomic as prime contractors
had been placed for a prototype 30-40 MW.HTR.2 2
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In every other area of nuclear reactor development
,German firms aligned with American firms. These align-
ments involved not only Siemens and AEG with their long-
time partners Westinghouse and General Electric; in
addition, GHH and MAN were linked with General Atomic
while Demag -and B'abcock were linked with Atomic Interna-
tional.23 With BBC, however, the firm's involvement with
advanced turbines and its Swiss parent company contributed
to BBC's not having an international partner. BBC's
interest in nuclear reactors turned logically to the HTR
from the very start because the company was involved in
the most advanced steam turbine developments and only the
24 1
HTR allowed the application of this technology. LWR
turbines, in contrast, were based on technology which had
been available since the turn of the century.
Brown Boveri in Switzerland shared interests with
BBC, but the industrial situation in Switzerland was
quite different. The Swiss firm decided to focus on the
production of turbines. It intended to provide general
engineering skills and rely on firms such as Siemens or
General Electric for nuclear parts of the reactors. This
did not work for BBC because it was in direct competition
with Siemensin the Federal Republic and thus could not
rely on competitors for a major component of its own
product'. 25
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BBC felt compelled to switch its interests to other
reactor lines. Initially, the firm was involved with the
English Babcock and Wilcox, but the shortcomings of.,the
British reactors convinced BBC to pursue another course.
The Germans were more willing to use highly enriched
uranium for their HTR line, but the fuel had to be ob-
tained from the U.S. The British wanted to avoid the en-
riched uranium fuel in order to insure British indepen-
dence in military applications of nuclear energy. Because
the German HTR was to use highly enriched uranium, it
could be much more compact in design than the British
natural uranium CO 2 -graphite moderated reactors. BBC was
convinced that its reactor line was better; therefore, it
cut its relationship with the German Babcock and Wilcox
(through which it had access to the British Babcock and
Wilcox) and instead formed a partnership with Krupp. 2 6
BBC ended up without international partners largely
because arrangements with the most logical partners fell
through. This was compounded by some gross miscalcula-
tions of the time and money required for developing the
HTR line. One BBC official says that he doubts that the
HTR direction would ever have been followed if the costs
had been accurately foreseen then -- and he adds that
the same is true for the fast breeder reactor.27 More-
over, it was expected that the progress from the AVR ex-
perimental reactor to a prototype reactor to commercialization
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would go quickly. These miscalculations led to Krupp's
leaving the Partnership in 1971.
The Germans, indeed, were not actively interested
in international cooperation. The Bonn government con-
centrated its interest and funds on the Karlsruhe center,
and it paid little attention to HTR development. Within
the HTR project itself there was surprising lack of
knowledge about similar work being done abroad.
Chrysanth Marnet, then a physicist working for the
Stadtwerke Dusseldorf and now ainember of the Board,
recalls that the first time he learned there was a
British high temperature gas-cooled project was on a
visit to Harwell, England for discussions in mid-1958
when he saw the drawing of one on the wall. 28 The Ger-
man team at JUlich was only conscious of the Dragon
project after the agreement had been signed and the
members were asked to nominate staff to work on it;
Schulten did not meet some of the key figures on the
Dragon project, such as Leslie Shepard and George Lockett,
until the 1958 Geneva Conference. 2 9
In sum, the German HTR project remained a strictly
national one mainly because of industrial decisions and
not because of any particular political decisions. The
government was eager to foster domestic technologies
and it emphasized this in its 1957 atomic program, but
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it took no steps to hinder other international coopera-
tive agreements arranged by German firms. National
pride in the pebble bed technology did not strongly in-
fluence the decision to develop the project on a domestic
basis: not only did the federal government display
little interest in the HTR project, but it also voiced
little objection when another "German" technology, the
Siemens heavy water reactor, was dropped. The federal
government knew almost nothing about the AVR until the
research study plan was completed and requests were
made for federal funding assistance in the construc-
tion of the reactor.
The interests of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia
appear to be more critical than national interests for
explaining the pebble bed reactor's progress. The Land
felt itself in competition with the federal research
interests in southern Germany. Some NRW officials
were upset and envious that much of the nuclear research
was being carried out south of what they called the
"Weiss-Wurst" (whit e wurst) equator.30 The northerners,
in other words, felt better qualified to lead German
research. Moreover, North Rhine-Westphalia had been
the birthplace of German industrialization, remained
its industrial heartland, and the NRW government wanted
very much to guarantee its role for the future. The
Land consequently encouraged the HTR actively both
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through funding and through providing a site for the
new JUlich research center including the first experi-
mental reactors.
STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS UNDERLYING THE A.V.R. DEVELOPMENT
The imprint of certain people and firms on the
early phases of the AVR is striking. They were respon-
sible in large part for establishing the working relations
that persist to the present. The possibility of such
an impact existed because the high temperature reactor
technology was so new -- as were the attitudes and
arrangements within the Federal Republic. Later, when
policy directions were more defined, individual actors
could not exert similar influence. As an acknowledge-
ment of the role played by individuals, the nuclear in-
dustry brochure published to commemorate 10 years of
service by the AVR even begins by listing on its first
page four key personalities affecting the AVR develop-
ment: (1) Rudolf Schulten, the present director of the
Institute for Reactor Development at the KFA who is
not only the father of the pebble bed reactor, but also
the person who has guided its development for 25 years;
(2) Werner Cautius, the managing director of the AVR
utility group and one of the directors of the Stadt-
werke DUsseldorf (the.Dilsseldorf municipal utility);
(3) Leo Brandt, the state secretary of North Rhine-
Westphalia who was always the strongest proponent of the
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HTR in Bonn; and (4) Wilhelm Engel, general director
of the Stadtwerke DUsseldorf (and friend of Leo Brandt)
who also. supervised installation of the two research
reactors at the KFA.3 1
Schulten developed the idea of a German pebble
bed reactor. Formerly a student of Werner Heisenberg,
the scientist who conceived the present idea of the
structure of atomic nuclei, Schulten had been one of
the first scientists workinq on reactor development at
the Max Planck Institute in Gbttingen. When the Federal
Republic was permitted to resume nuclear research in
1955 he had moved on to work on reactors for BBC.
Similarly, Siemens and AEG also turned to the Max
Planck Institute group for the scientists to head their
research.32 Other scientists who were affiliated
with the Gbttingen group and who subsequently played
important roles in German nuclear policy included
Karl Heinz Beckurts and Wolf Hafele.
Although Winnacker and Wirtz in their book on
German nuclear energy credit Schulten with "the ini-
tially surprising idea of a high temperature reactor," 3 3
he was not the first to propose a pebble bed design.
The United States considered the concept in the 1940s,
and the U.S. Bureau of Mines considered applications of
process heat in the early 1950s. The Oak Ridge National
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Laboratory even took out a patent on the pebble bed
reactor shortly before the West Germans were able to
begin nuclear research again. The problem was that
there was also a debate concerning whether to follow the
pebble bed or prismatic design. In contrast to the
Germans, the U.S.' concluded in the late 1950s that higher
temperatures could be achieved with the prismatic de-
sign so it was selected as the focus of the HTR program.
British consideration of the HTR started with Ste-
fan Bauer's ideas in 1948-49 about a gas-cooled reactor
with a fuel bed of beryllium oxide balls coated with
uranium and recoated with beryllium oxide. Along more
conventional lines, there were evaluations for the Navy
of a helium-cooled graphite-moderated reactor as a
possible submarine propulsion unit. This research,
with modifications, led to the decision to build the
34Calder Hall reactors. Nonethless, even though the
pebble bed HTR was not just Schulten's idea, he has
always been the key figure involved with the German
project, first as a scientist at BBC, then as one of the
two managers in the BBC-Krupp partnership, and then
as head of the HTR project at the KFA Julich.
Cautius was the motivating force behind the utili-
ties. He was connected with the Stadtwerke DUsseldorf
which was engaged in a quarrel between small and large
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electrical utilities about how electricity should be
produced. The large utilities felt that it was cheaper
to ship coal a long distance and then produce electri-
city whereas the small utilities advocated producing
electricty at a local utility and then transporting
it. Cautius was eager to prove that the small utili-
ties could be competitive. Thus, under his guidance
the Stadtwerke DUsseldorf took the lead in 1956 in
bringing together several small utilities into the
AVR group. Their interest was in the British Magnox
reactor, but Schulten convinced Cautius that the peb-
ble bed HTR would be preferable to the Magnox reactor.
Schulten had spent time in Harwell England observing
the natural uranium reactor there, and he felt that
several improvements were needed which he set out to
achieve with the pebble bed design. In Schulten's
words, Cautius was smitten with "love at first sight"
for the HTR.35 Cautius immediately agreed to proceed
with Schulten's pebble bed design, and a warm friend-
ship between Cautius and Schulten ensued. This was at
a time when, according to the Mannheimer Morgan, very
few experts placed any confidence in the HTR.36
Leo Brandt, in the meantime, recognized the signi-
ficance of the HTR and became its chief political
backer both in North Rhine-Westphalia and Bonn. He
was a man who, according to the German financial news-
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paper, Handelsblatt, "contributed -more to the support
of research than anyone in any other German Land."3 7
Minister-Presidents of the Land changed,
but Leo Brandt remained and simply changed
ministries. First in-the Ministry for
Economics, then in the Ministry for Cul-
tural Affairs, later directly under the
Minister-President, he had his "working
group for research" which -- if one is
permitted to say so -- was a combination
of the most honorable, self 1ss and
effective lobby in Germany.
Although Leo Brandt was an SPD man, he really was
viewed as above politics by all the German parties.
A CDU Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia,
Karl Arnoldt, was responsible for bringing Brandt into
the government in the mid-1950s. Brandt, who during
the war had worked on the development of German radar
systems for Telefunken, had been the head of one of
Dusseldorf's two municipal companies, the Rheinbahn,
before he joined the Land government. Wilhelm Engel
was the head of the other company, Stadtwerke Dussel-
dorf, and he and Brandt continued their close working
relations for several years. The ruling parties in
NRW changed often, but every government kept Leo Brandt
in office. He was extremely open-minded about inno-
vative ideas, and it was with him that the Land's
tradition of supporting industrial research in NRW
began. He also is responsible for involving NRW's
universities with the research center in Julich so that
each university did not feel obligated to construct
its own expensive reactor.3 9
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Brandt had negotiated the research reactor agreement
with the British that brought the DIDO and MERLIN reactors
to Julich; they were initial equipment for the planned
nuclear research center there. He made it clear that
North Rhine-Westphalia, the largest and richest Land in
the Federal Republic, intended to play a special role
in the atomic field.40 After Schulten and Brandt dis-
covered their shared interests, the focal point of this
special role for North Rhine-Westphalia became the HTR.
These individuals played a key role in initiating
the working relationships among business, the government
and the scientific community. The links between the
people were not inevitable, but they were based on
personal friendships and common interests. Nuclear
energy was a totally new field in the Federal Republic,
and everyone was pondering which directions to take.
Still, individuals alone did not make policy because
the major institutional actors also had interests at
stake that merit consideration.
The Electrical Utilities and the AVR
The utilities in the AVR group were interested in
a simple design which they could afford to build and
operate. The HTRs represented one possibility which
seemed particularly appropriate for reactors in the 100-
300 MW range favored by the smaller utilities. One can
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ask why the largest utilities, especially RWE, never
adopted the HTR. Part of the answer relates to the ad-
vantages of the already established LWRs which the large
utilities saw, but another part of the answer had nothing
41to do with technological assessment. In fact, the
then chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, influenced the deci-
sion somewhat. As the former mayor of Cologne, he had
a special interest in the small municipal utilities com-
prising the AVR group. He had long familiarity with
their problems since he came from the area. In the
mid-1950s the German railway system, the Bundesbahn,
was being electrified, and some of the technical de-
cisions which had to be made carried political impact.
A decision had to be made whether the electricity should
be 50 herz or 16 2/3 herz. If 50 herz had been selected,
only RWE could have produced the electricity. The choice
of 16 2/3 herz meant; however, that the federal railway
could build its own electrical network in which the
smaller utilities would play a role.
The decision for 16 2/3 herz was made on the basis
of a joint offer by the Stadtwerke Dusseldorf and the
German Bundesbahn for a power station along the Rhine in
Dusseldorf. Acceptance of the offer implied that sub-
sequent development would all be 16 2/3 herz. RWE was
not happy with the decision, which Adenauer and Leo
Brandt helped to push through, even though some had
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expected Adenauer to favor RWE because the father of
his son-in-law was chairman of the board at RWE (H.
Werhahn). One person affiliated with the HTRs since
their start claims that RWE's "angry reply" was to build
the 15 MW boiling water experimental light water reactor
at Kahl. Another person with similar HTR experience
maintains, however, that the RWE decision was a more
reasoned one: RWE was not happy and that might explain
why they did not negotiate for HTR rights, but the de-
cision really persuaded RWE to look for a better market
strategy. RWE aimed for better marketing approaches
and commercial attitudes and hence settled on the
boiling water LWR for _RWE's own experimental reactor
because management saw better operating passihi1iti 
throuqhout the world for it.
The people doing the technical work on the pebble
bed reactor were not even aware of the controversy, but
some of them still feel that it led to a hostile stance
on the part of the large utilities toward the HTR which
persists to the present. In any case, the large utili-
ties did place their interests in the LWRs while the
smaller utilities opted for the HTRs because they felt
the cost and size better met their needs. The AVR de-
cision, though, was not a long thought-out process with
a careful weighing of options -- no one saw it as the
only way to go. Rather, it was a personal decision by
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Cautius who viewed it as a feasible project which favored
smaller facilities. One scientist who has been affili-
ated with the AVR from the start said flatly that the
utilities did not believe that the HTR was the best
technological alternative, but it had high potential
and was economical on a small-size level. 4 2
The interests of the Stadtwerke Dusseldorf fit
naturally with the HTR on several levels. Cautius and
his "love at first sight" for the HTR accounted for one
level, but another level concerned the ties of the Stadt-
werke DUsseldorf with the JUlich research center: the
utility was installing the British research reactors.
More significantly, the Stadtwerke Dusseldorf was con-
cerned about the expected shortage and rising cost of
coal because it was surrounded by bigger utilities,
notably RWE, with large lignite reserves,43 This was
the major reason why the Stadtwerke DUsseldorf felt
compelled to undertake a project developing an alter-
native energy source, and given their own small size,
they preferred setting up a joint project, They felt
that nuclear energy would be more economical than coal,
and thus the contract for a design study was placed in
April 1957 with BBC/Krupp for a 15 MW plant.
The point to note concerning the electrical utilities
is the differentiation within the sector itself. There
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are local utilities, regional utilities and the inter-
connected grid utilities which have a network across the
country. (T.he Germans call the interconnected grid utili-
ties the super-regional utilities.) On the regional and
local level most -utilities are distributors, not genera-
tors, of electricity. Some companies, however, do gen-
erate their own electricity but have no access to an
interconnected grid. These companies belonged to an asso-
ciation -- the S.V.S., Studiengesellschaft fUr Verbrau-
chende Stromerzeuger -- of which the Stadtwerke DUsseldorf
was a member. When BBC was looking for utilities which
might be intrigued by the HTR, it turned to the Stadtwerke
DUsseldorf because the two had had a good partnership
for conventional power plants. The Stadtwerke DUsseldorf
then asked the other 19 members of the S.V.S. association
how many would be willing to place a design contract
with the BBC. Altogether, 15 of the utilities were
willing and the AVR e.V. was formed. 4 4
The energy supply sources of the various utilities
have an important impact on their policies. PWE is not only
far bigger than any other electrical utility; it also is
unique because of the soft brown coal supplies it has.
As one non-RWE utility official said, "RWE's bread and
butter is brown coal. Why opt for nuclear energy when
you have brown coal?"45 RWE was only willing to pursue
the nuclear route when the pay-offs seemed clear. This
also explains partially why RWE's interest in the HTR has
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always been limited: it has enough other sources of
electricity. In contrast, VEW -- another large utility
although only one-fifth the size of RWE -- has a totally
different energy supply. It has had to rely on Dutch
gas and expensive German hard coal. This puts VEW at a
disadvantage which continues today to hamper their de-
ve-lopment policies.
The situation for utilities in northern and southern
Germany has always differed. The southern utilities
lacked coal, and therefore they did not have the access
to cheap base-load electricity which the northernutili-
ties had in the early years of the Federal Republic.
Either they.had to have higher cost levels for their
areas or they had to buy base-load electricity from
46
RWE. With the advent of nuclear research and the
cheap oil prices which came in 1958, however, two new
lines were available to the utilities: they could build
oil-fired or nuclear power stations. The decisions of the
various utilities should be analyzed in the context of
their own resources: RWE did not want its position weak-
ened so it was lukewarm toward nuclear reactors; the
AVR utilities were anxious to establish some independence
from RWE;47 Badenwerk from southern Germany was investi-
gating the organic-moderated reactor because of the utili-
ty's lack of coal, but the reactor did not prove feasible.
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The Manufacturing Industry
On the industrial side, too, it was not the largest
firms such s Siemens and AEG which became involved with
the HTR, but rather medium-sized Brown Boveri & Cie
through its subsidiaries. These included Brown Boveri/
Krupp Reaktorbau GmbH (BBK) -- which started off with
Schulten as one of the two managing directors -- and
Hochtemperatur-Reaktorbau GmbH (HRB) established in
1971 after the break-up of BBK. The subsidiaries were
set up primarily for legal and tax purposes. In exam-
ining the industrial involvement with the HTR, it is more
important to ask what relations were arranged between
the large industrial firms and the government than to
ask why BBC was involved with the pebble bed reactor.
As we saw earlier, BBC had prior experience with turbo-
generators; that, combined with Schulten's work on pebble
bed reactors, steered'them in the direction of the HTR.
The LWR turbines were not sophisticated enough for BBC
to be interested. Since government programs financed
so much of the initial R&D work, BBC faced a relatively
costless venture and that spared the firm from having
to make some hard choices about the reactor's long range
prospects.
One question is why BBC brought Krupp into the HTR
development. A former BBC official claims that BBC felt
that it could not manage the project alone because of the
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costs and risks involved. The head of BBC consecuently
approached one of the directors of Krupp, Dr. Kallen,
who accepted the idea of partnership. Krupp was singled
out because it specialized in steel which was important
for the construction of the reactor. No other firm was
48
contacted. A contrasting interpretation of Krupp's
involvement -- and simultaneously a criticism of the
course of development of the HTR -- is that Krupp was
49brought in at the behest of Leo Brandt. Brandt wanted
the HTR project to be a North Rhine-Westphalia develop-
-ment; hence, he wanted a local company to be involved
with BBC. Brandt pushed Krupp onto BBC which had little
choice but to accept it since North Rhine-Westphalia
was providing such extensive support for the HTR. The
two firms were equal partners and that in itself almost
killed the project because of the policy conflicts
that arose.50 The same person who criticized Krupp's
involvement claims that the differing philosophies of
the firms delayed HTR development significantly: BBC
had Swiss ties and an "international elegance" whereas
Krupp was rooted in old traditions and knew nothing but
the steel business.
One key aspect to note, regardless of whether the
above accounts are accurate, is that common practice in
German industry essentially mandated a partnership. The
standard approach for building conventional power stations
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had always been to order different parts of the plants
such as containers or turbines from different firms.
The idea of "turnkey-contracts" in which one firm is
responsible for delivering a completed reactor was in-
troduced by U.S. firms such as Bechtel. 51 BBC in the
early years was hardly prepared to fill this role. It
needed a partner with the kind of experience which Krupp
had in producing heavy components. Together, BBC and
Krupp thought they could break through to a new market,
but they were unsuccessful.
Governmental support for nuclear industry in these
early years reduced the need for individual firms to
compete with one another and take large financial risks.
The construction costs of the AVR were estimated at DM 40
million at the start of the project with the federal
government and the AVR utilities each agreeing to pay DM
20 million and the government and BBK sharing overruns
on a 4:1 basis. The eventual cost, however, amounted
to DM 113 million so that the federal government paid
DM 78.4 million, the AVR utilities UM 20 million, and
52BBK DM 14.6 million. We saw in Chapters Two and Three
that the government supported essentially every nuclear
reactor proposal and thereby relieved industry from
having to calculate whether it was profitable to pursue
specific designs. The priority of industry in the 1955-57
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period was to establish a "division of labor" between
basic research supported by the state and industrial.
53development. Industry accomplished this goal primarily
through its influence on the formation of the Ministry
for Atomic Questions and the German Atomic Commission
and, through them, on the first governmental atomic pro-
gram, the Eltville program.
In sum, the way the government provided support
affected subseauent developments. The uncertainty sur-
rounding the new technology was so great that some
assurances were appropriate. Government support, though,
was not concentrated on increasing energy supplies per se,
but rather on fostering nuclear technology. Decisions
about the wisdom of certain technological possibilities
were therefore left to industry rather than the govern-
ment, and the government was left with administrative
54details. Although these practices are not necessarily
bad, they do mean that nuclear energy policy was not
part of an overall energy policy but rather was a policy
geared to the structure and demands of industry. In
short, in the early years during which the AVR was being
discussed and ordered, the German program adhered to the
notion that technical developments are the responsibility
of industry, even for nuclear energy technologies. De-
velopment was oriented to an essentially "engineering
approach," and new technologies were viewed "in terms of
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the realization of complete plants or customer-directed
products." 5 5 For industry, there was a wide scope of
action and a reduced incentive to narrow reactor choices.
The Government'*s Role
As the above section indicates, the government's
influence was limited to general overall support for
reactor projects. Probably the first time that the
federal government in Bonn -- and, in fact, the Ministry
for Atomic Questions -- was made aware of the nature of
the AVR project, according to an analyst from the Euro-
pean Community, was in 1957 when the government was
approached for assistance in funding after the AVR-
commissioned design study had already been completed
56by BBC/Krupp. The reactor was then estimated to cost
only DM 40 million. A major reason for this lack of
knowledge about the project was the independent status
of both the Lander and the industrial organizations.
Moreover, the federal government was concentrating its
support on the Karlsruhe research center rather than
on JUlich which Bonn viewed as an unwelcome step-child
of North Rhine-Westphalia.
In the Federal Republic the independent actors and
the federal structure of the administration worked against
the establishment of a well-defined national policy.57
Rather than developing in a linear fashion, policy developed
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as a series of parallel activities. Government did not
seek to impose a specific direction to technical devel-
opment; instead, it offered support to the industrial
firms which it felt had the best machinery for deter-
mining the soundest commercial lines of development. 5 8
The Eltville program envisioned support for a 100
MW high temperature reactor to be built by BBC/Krupp.
In the Eltville program, every firm or consortium in-
terested in reactor construction was offered financial
support and no firm had to give up anything. But not
all projects were carried out under the auspices of
the Eltville program: this was true for the heavy water
reactor research done by Siemens and for the AVR. Be-
cause the AVR utilities (and RWE) felt that 15 MW reac-
tors rather than 100 MW reactors should be constructed,
they placed their order for the smaller design study
at practically the same time that the Eltville program
was devised. Government officials then stressed that
the reactor would not be considered part of the program,
and the design contract was given without government
support.54 Eventually, though, the utility group re-
ceived the support of the government for the construc-
tion of the AVR because no orders were being placed for
the larger reactors. Originally the AVR plant was in-
tended to yield experiences to aid in the construction of
a 100 MW plant along the lines of the Eltville program,
-229-
but the delays resulting from technical problems pre-
cluded this..60 Eventually, the 300-MW THTR became the
follow-up project to the AVR.
The Role of the KFA
The Landtag of North Rhine-Westphalia approved the
construction of a nuclear research facility in December
1956 and in November 1957 Julich was chosen as the site.
Leo Brandt was responsible for both decisions. Not
until February 1961, however, was the title Nuclear
Research Center JUlich (Kernforschungsanlage Julich
e.V.) given to the facility. Although the center was
involved with HTR activities from the outset, it was
not really until 1966 when Rudolf Schulten was made di-
rector of the institute for reactor development at the
KFA that the HTR'hecame the clearly defined -main task of
the center. Thus, the influence of.the KFA on the HTR
in these early years was minimal, but the center cf fered
a means for North Rhine-Westphalia to concentrate re-
search on the HTR. The KFA has never tried to guide
HTR development, but it offers a center for expertise
on the reactor and has always been an effective lobbying
force for HTR interests.
The Tmpact of the Discovery of Coated Particles
For all the differences in the HTR development on
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a domestic and international level, there is one element
of the HTR ,which drew the projects together -- coated
particles. The coated particles prevent the emission
of fission products of the HTRs. Both the pebble bed
and the prismatic HTRs had to find complicated design
solutions to overcome the danger of such emissions.
The.pebble bed reactor had a second container vessel --
the AVR is an example -- to protect against emissions,
while the prismatic fuel HTR had a special purification
loop for ventilation.
The development of coated particles was essential
if HTRs were ever to become operational. Otherwise,
the high level of radioactivity would have eliminated
any practical applications of the reactor. The countries
involved with HTRs recognized this and therefore es-
tablishe.d cooperative arrangements. For example, the
KFA, the Federal Republic, the Dragon project and Eura-
tom set up a special project on coated particles in
1959-60 and this made the links between the projects
much stronger. All these experimental HTRs -- Dragon,
Peach Bottom and AVR -- were designed to operate without
coated partciles. The breakthrough on the particles came
in 1962 from U.S., British and Austrian sources.
For the Federal Republic the cooperation on coated
particles was a means to increase contact with other HTR
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projects. Much of this contact came through Euratom.
The Germans concluded an order with Union Carbide in
the U.S. in May 1964 for the fabrication of the coated
particle core for the AVR.62 The Germans were not pleased
with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's demand for
maximum technological information and know-how gener-
ated by the AVR facility. The Americans were resistent
to the inclusion of Nukem, a German firm, in the fuel
fabrication. The U.S. AEC wanted to put in a full core
under completely controlled conditions for testing
fission-product release. Eventually theGermans decided
to go with a private American fuel supplier rather than
the AEC, and the Germans also dropped demands to in-
clude their firm Nukem.
The development of coated particles forced the
German project out of isolation.63 At the early stages
of the pebble bed design development, the Germans felt
the fledgling design had a better chance to succeed as
one of a few unique German designs than one of many
Community projects.64 As of 1958, estimates gave the
German concept a nine month edge over British and Ameri-
can high temperature programs, but this had disappeared
65by 1960 because of the work on coated particles. The
Germans were compelled to join in the cooperative efforts
on coated particles.
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Delays in the Construction of .the AVR
The design study for the AVR was completed in 1958
and the order for the reactor was placed in 1959, b-u-t
construction did not begin until 1961. In 1961 it was
projected that the reactor would be completed by 1964,
66but construction took until 1966. Some of the delays
were technical but others were political.
After the order for the-reactor was placed, BBK
needed a license for construction. The Germans had
not yet passed a new law governing atomic energy so
the old Allied provisions still were in force. After
the new law was finally passed in December 1959 and the
complementary legal statutes enacted in April 1960, the
initial efforts which BBK had taken had to be started
over completely.67 The site for the reactor in Julich
could not even be opened until the summer of 1960.
Then the coal companies with brown coal interests in
the surrounding area threatened to hold up construction
indefinitely through legal suits unless very detailed
conditions for the building foundation were met.6 8
Thus, the delays in the start of construction were caused
by legal requirements -- which we saw in Chapters Two
and Three arose because the parties worried about the nu-
clear defense implications of the new atomic law for the
Federal Republic -- and by demands from the competitive
coal firms.
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Once construction began, _delays arose more for tech-
nical reasons which is not surprising given the first-
of-its-kind nature of the AVR. According to an article
in the 1962 German Atomic Forum publication atw, BBC-
Krupp had intentionally set off in creative technological
directions for the HTR (e.g, regarding the way in which
the reactor was fueled the fuel itself, and the heat
transfer system) to try to catch up with HTR progress
elsewhere.69 Overcoming the problems of these new tech-
nologies was a learning process which necessitated con-
tinual adaptation of the AVR construction plans. The
main problems encountered were with the heat exchanger.
which had to be rebuilt and with helium in the gas
circuit, a problem which necessitated the rebuilding of
all the valves. The German regulatory officials were
also gaining their first practical experience with the
HTR and were therefore particularly demanding.72
The coordination of the AVR project with Euratom
activities caused additional delays. Euratom was essen-
tial to the AVR at first because all arrangements for
the highly enriched uranium which fueled the reactor
had to be made through it. Euratom subsequently also
became an important funding source for the AVR, both to
supplement immediate resources and to guarantee finan-
cial support over a longer time period (five years) than
German federal grants which were only annual. 7 3 Additional
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funds were requested in 1964 from Euratom, for example,
when the problems with the heat exchanger arose.
The decision to approach Euratom for funding coin-
cided with the German government's desire to redress the
low percentage of Euratom contracts placed in the Federal
Republic, and although the request for an association
agreement was made in 1962, a formal contract was not
made until May 1964. Henry Nau describes the situ-
ation on the basis of personal interviews he conducted
with German and Euratom officials:
The negotiations which took place between
these dates were difficult and complex .
Government negotiators deferred to the in-
fluence of private German groups, especially
industry; government and industrial parties
dealt bilaterally with the USAEC as well as
T.S. industry as a means of exerting leverage
on Euratom; and German industries carefully
safeguarded potentially valuable commercial
information. The purpose of these policies,
as .in the fast reactor and participation
negotiations, was to secure Euratom funds
without compromising industrial freedom
or becoming too dependent on what was per-
ceived as a French-dominated Brussels
bureaucracy.7 5
This attitude fits with the traditional German notion
(described in Chapter Two) that technical developments
should be led by industry, and nuclear energy, at
least in these early years, was not an exception. The
government did not try to impose specific directions on
technical development, but rather to support and coordi-
nate private industrial efforts.
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In terms of delay, it should also be noted that
the influence of certain people was also important.
Minister Balke, for example, was more interested in the
application of process heat' to chemistry than in the
use of thorium as a fuel for the HTR; his attitude was that
the Germans had the money to finance their HTR project
alone, and hence he did not favor Euratom participation.7 6
One top official involved with the AVR accuses one of
the other top officials of being a "fat-head" who held
77up work unnecessarily. Altogether, the probleirs of
obtaining rights to use highly enriched uranium, working
out arrangements with Euratom and resolving personal
difficulties caused two to three years of delay in the
78AVR at a cost of probably DM 3 -million. Technical
problems alone did not slow the progress on the first
German HTR.
CONCLUSION
This chapter on the AVR has examined the early years
of HTR development and related them to overall nuclear
energy policy in the Federal Republic. The HTR case
differed in several important respects from the overall
development. It is most striking that the utilities
did not play the exclusive role they played in LWR de-
velopment, although their involvement was still essential.
With commercialization further off in the future and no
internationally available technology competing with German
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ideas, the German utilities were more willing to partici-
pate with industry in development projects.
By focusing on the development of one reactor,
we also can see more the dynamics of development within
each of the sectors rather than just among them. The
differences of opinion among the utilities, the manu-
facturing firms, the research centers, and within govern-
ment circles were critical for determining the direc-
tion of technological development for the HTR. It is
also important to recognize which firms, utilities and
areas of government ended up supporting the HTR; it was
neither the largest manufacturing firms, nor the big-
gest utilities, nor the federal government (at least
at the start). For the actors involved with the HTR,
the HTR design in many ways represented an alternative
to the major designs being pursued by RWE (the largest
utility), Siemens and AEG (the largest reactor manu-
facturers -- later they combined efforts to form Kraft-
werk Union), and the nuclear research center at Karlsruhe
upon which federal efforts were concentrated. The struc-
tural factors outlined in Chapter Three concerning the
German Atomic Commission, the Ministry for Atomic Ques-
tions, Bundestag, etc. are still relevant for HTR develop-
ment, but the HTR case has to be differentiated from the
overall case and the LWR case because it allows us to
see how German attitudes and structural factors affected
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nuclear policy in a context involving more advanced re-
actor technologies.
The AVR was one of several reactors being developed
in the Federal Republic in the late 1950s, and the aim
of initial government programs was to encourage all
feasible designs. National pride was not automatically
linked with the pebble bed HTR even though the reactor
was often referred to as a pure German technology. The
Siemens' heavy water reactor was also a German tech-
nology, but no efforts were launched to salvage it
when Siemens switched its interest away from the re-
actor line. National pride, to the extent it existed
for the HTR, came later. We should recognize, though,
the important involvement of North Rhine-Westphalia
in HTR development. Regional pride may well play a more
significant role than national pride for the HTR. The
reason for NRW's interest is closely linked with the
Land's coal industry, and this link between coal and
nuclear energy has continued to remain important. The
HTR might well have been discontinued long ago were it
not for the support of North Rhine-Westphalia.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE DEMONSTRATION STAGE OF H.T. R. DEVELOPMENT
This chapter continues the argument set out about
the first small high temperature reactor, the AVR, that
market reasons were not mainly responsible for tech-
nological choices concerning the pebble bed HTR. Here,
the focus is on the demonstration stage of HTRs, speci-
fically on the 300 MW thorium high temperature reactor
(THTR) in Schmehausen which has been a study in frustra-
tion. German HTR policy became stalled in this demon-
stration stage. The construction of the prototype re-
actor started in 1971 and was to be completed in 1977.
Now, however, the time of completion is still uncertain
except that it is three years away at the earliest.
The delays have been partly due to technical problems,
but mainly due to continual changes in the licensing
requirements and to the shift in emphasis in 1971-75
from the pebble bed to the block HTR. The main utility
involved with the THTR, VEW, has grown quite discouraged
and pessimistic about future HTR development.
The reasons for the snags in development in this
period can be attributed to: (1) a continuation of the
struggles within the individual sectors; and (2) the
unwillingness of the reactor manufacturers or operators
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to follow an aggressive marketing policy. In general,
the development of advanced technologies goes through
an initial period of broad development followed by a
narrowing of alternatives; the THTR development from
1966-75 reflects how these hard decisions about narrowing
choices can be avoided. Still, the frustrations of
this period paved the way for a more directed and
realistic policy approach beginning in 1976.
The structural arrangements which affected the AVR
development continued into the THTR phase of develop-
ment. The involvement of North 'Rhine-Westphalia re-
mained important, but a turning point became evident
in 1968 with the Third Atomic Program. Because of the
worldwide breakthrough of the American LWRs, the Ger-
man government put its major emphasis on advanced re-
actors. Despite the "additional funding, though, this
period still shows the Federal Republic groping for a
priority. On the one hand, centralized programs, such
as the British and French ones, tended to make decisions
about reactors too soon. For the British and the French,
making the transition fram the government-directed pro-
grams to efforts led by industry and the utilities
proved to be difficult. The Germans and Swiss on the
other hand, were more accustomed to government assis-
tance following industrial initiative. For the Germans,
it was not the transition but the choice of reactors
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that provided a stumbling block: the diversity of efforts
made it difficult to narrow choices.
The Germans had too many options. This was clear to
several actors in nuclear policy even in the late 1960s.
Still, a lack of clear purpose, a tendency to be overly
ambitious regarding sophisticated technology, and pride
in the pebble bed design precluded a choice being made.
The government had helped to facilitate a concentration
of industry in light water reactors through the forma-
tion of Kraftwerk -Union. It tried to do the same for
HTRs, but neither the utilities nor the manufacturers
could get together successfully. American firms proved
to be bolder and more aggressive. Especially from
1968-71 there were some missed opportunities .regarding
German HTR development which we will see. Not until
1976 was real progress made toward a consolidation of
interests.
Again, the problem centered around commercialization.
Rudolf Schulten has always been one of the first to
stress how difficult it is to introduce a.new reactor
type.2 Conflicting inclinations were unleashed among
firms as commercialization approached. BBC and Krupp
had different perspectives: BBC wanted to increase
orders for nuclear reactors and become more competitive
with KWU; Krupp was more interested in delivering parts
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to the reactors. After Krupp left the partnership
with BBC, BBC jumped at the chance to join with the Ameri-
can firm Gulf General Atomic Company because of the
prospects of commercialization. In turn, though, the
federal government, the NRW Land government and the
KFA Jtlich took steps to protect the pebble bed design,
and through these steps KWU was brought into the HTR
picture via the process heat application of the HTR.
The THTR case shows how essential it is to have
agreement on the development strategy for a specific
line of reactors such as the HTRs. Several options
were feasible, but no common strategy was formulated
and the THTR suffered accordingly. On an international
level, the same problem plagued the Dragon project in
Britain: international cooperation worked as long as
everyone's ideas were pursued. As soon as Britain sug-
gested eliminating some options, opposition arose be-
cause countries would not give up their own ideas,
Similar conditions occurred within the German context,
only there it was the specific companies that refused
cooperation if that entailed giving up their own ideas.
Through all of this, the utilities were also at a loss
about which design to support. This contrasts with LWR
development in which the utilities were the key decision-
makers. For overall German nuclear energy policy, we
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categorized the years 1963-75 as a period of consensus;
for HTRs, however, the years reflect a time of infra-
structural struggles and the outcomes were significant
for subsequent development.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE T .11. T'. R. DEVELOPMENT
The following chart summarizes the early development
of the THTR:3
Development of the project by BBC/Krupp. . .1964-68
Formation of HKG utility group, Hagen.. .6/14/1968
Order placed for THTR offer through
the Consortium THTR-BBC-BBC/Krupp ...... 10/1969
Application for 1st license.............1/12/1970
Formation of HKG utility group,
Uentrop...............................7/17/1970
Receipt of federal approval............. .7/28/1970
Letter of intent with Consortium THTR...7/30/1970
Beginning of preliminary construction... 12/1/1970
Beginning of actual construction.......... 2/1/1972
BBC first launched the idea of a 300 MW thorium pebble,
bed demonstration HTR in 1963 and started developing
the project the next year. The construction of the
experimental HTR, the AVR, was already underway in
1963 and BBC was looking to the future. The use of the
thorium-uranium cycle also offered a means to minimize
the use of enriched uranium. Euratom was interested in
the potential use of thorium as a nuclear fuel; the
Germans -- who were eager to recoup some of their
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contributions to Euratom and expected Euratom funding for
several projects in return for these contributions --
started negotiations early, involving Euratom first
with fuel development and then as a contract partner
in the THTR Consortium. 4 Originally the reactor was
scheduled to go critical in April 3975 and be delivered
to the operator in July 1976.5
The following chart indicates the number of months
needed for construction of the reactor until actual
operation could be started. 6
Construction Time for the THTR
Months
until Delivery
60
Actual Time
40 3 Years
Initial
Plan
20
oV 1 -7, MA-erh'77 .N. mav'83
20 40 60 80 100 120 135
Total Number of Months for Construction of THTR
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Since 1975 the time to completion has been basically
the same -- three years.
VEW, the leading utility involved with the THTR,
has grown discouraged because of the uncertainty re-
garding completion and costs. On the one hand, the
following chart on the financing of the building pro-
ject shows the low contributions of the utilities:7
Capital from the utility group ......
Long-term loans.....................
Federal subsidies...................
Land (NRW) subsidies................
. . . ............. 3%
. . . . .. ...... 10%
....... 61%
....... 13%
Investment allowance........................9%
Participation of THTR Consortium .... ...... 4%
On the other hand, however, the following table shows how
the costs have risen in terms of millions of D-Marks. 8
Proposed Delivery March
1977
Delivery Time (Months)
Extension of Delivery Time
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
1. Fixed capital
2. Long term loans
3. Federal subsidies
4. Land subsidies
5. Additional subsidies
6. THTR consortium's
share (i.e., utilities)
(Year) 1971
50,0
126,0
374,0
100,0
60,0
1300,0 1750,0
61
Sept
1981
May
1983
Dec
1977
70
9
1973
50,0
175,0
475,0
100,0
85,0
115
17
April
1980
98
28
1976
70,0
215,0
714,5
152,0
125,0
23,5
135
20
1978
75,0
232,5
1012,5
212,8
167,0
50,2
1980
75,0
232,5
1435,1
304,4
219,7
93,3
2360,0Total Costs 710,0 885,r.0
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This table can also be extended as of-April 1981 so that
delivery time would become 151 months and costs would
amount to DM 3 billion.9 The delays now add an additional
DM 1 million per day to the cost of the project.10 The
causes of the delays have been not only the changing
safety regulations to which the THTR has had to adapt,
but also the fact that in the first half of the 1970s
the pebble bed HTR was relegated to second place in the
German HTR program behind the block fuel element reactor.
Since 1976 there has been general agreement among all
the actors involved with HTRs that the top priority in
the HTR field is completion of the THTR. Still,
there is no certainty regarding when completion will
occur.
Technological Purpose of the THTR
The THTR was conceived as the next step toward
commercialization of HTRs beyond the experimental 15
MW AVR. The aim of the THTR consortium -- comprised of
BBK, BBC and NUKEM with the financial participation of
Euratom -- was to develop design studies for a proto-
type nuclear power plant.12 These studies were completed
by early 1968 for a 300 MW prototype and they envisioned
an extrapolation up to 1200 MW. The large reactor,
assumed in 1968 as an immediate next step, was never
built because of delays in the THTR and the switch of
emphasis to other types of HTRs. In the construction of
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the THTR-300, BBC was responsible for the overall plan-
ning, design and supply of the secondary part of the
reactor (the electricity generating plant); BBK -- a
partnership subsidiary formed by BBC and Krupp -- supplied
the primary part (the reactor plant); and NUKEM was
responsible for supplying the fuel elements.1 4
The design characteristics of the THTR are essen-
tially similar to those of the AVR except that the
reactor core and all components of the primary system
are housed in a prestressed concrete pressure vessel
and the core structure and control system have changed. 1 5
Special features of the THTR include: 1 6
a) the pebble bed core with approximately
675,000 spherical fuel elements;
b) the location of the core within a
graphite structure;
c) the use of helium as a coolant for the
primary circuit with a temperature of
750 degrees centigrade;
d) the integration of six steam generators
in a prestressed concrete pressure vessel;
e) continuous refuelling;
f) the direct insertion of 42 absorber rods
into the pebble bed core (the 36 control
rods move in bore holes in the graphite
reflector as in the AVR).
The Bonn government attached some far-reaching
hopes to the THTR which also explains Bonn's willingness
to finance so much of the project. The new container
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vessel was considered so safe that even reactor sites
in heavily populated areas would be conceivable. Core
melt-downs were not possible, given the design. Poo-
sible applications of process heat to the chemical in-
dustry and the future use of more efficient direct
helium turbines also affected government attitudes.
In sum, the pebble bed HTR had certain technological
benefits to offer, and these were recognized by all the
actors in German nuclear policy-making. The challenge
was to convince reactor purchasers to select HTRs
over the well-established LWRs.
Periods of Optimism for the HTR
In the years 1967-72, the prospects for HTRs
seemed bright. In 1967-68 the Germans were optimistic*
that the pebble bed design would be successful. By
1971-72 its chances had diminished, but the Germans
joined the rush to the American block fuel element de-
sign which appeared on the verge of commercialization.
In retrospect, these years reflect a series of missed
opportunities: as one official claimed, commercializa-
tion might have been possible during this period if
18
different strategies had been followed.8 The table on
the next page indicates what expectations the Germans
19
had for HTR development in 1968, This period from
1967-71 shows how German industry was exposed in the
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first place to nationalist pressures to maintain the
pebble bed program and in the second place to competi-
tive pressures to cooperate internationally in marketing
prismatic fuel reactors.20 Industrial interests
shifted to the international emphasis as the economic
promise of the prismatic fuel reactors increased.
The optimism in German circles in 1968 about the
pebble bed HTR's future stemmed from several factors.
The first experimental HTR was functioning very well
and design studies for the follow-up THTR prototype
were completed. Utilities were impressed by the AVR
performance and several of them joined together to
form the Hochtemperatur-Kernkraftwerk GmbH (HKG) which
had the objective of commissioning the erection of a
pebble bed power plant. The decision of VEW to join
this group was particularly significant because it
meant that no longer were only smaller regional utili-
ties involved with HTRs. Moreover the government also
was more amenable to financing HTR development. In
the Third Atomic Progrng support for reactor develop-
ment jumped to double the amount in the previous pro-
gram; the HTR was a major beneficiary although no spe-
cific figure was set for supporting it.21 The Land North
Rhine-Westphalia was also much more forthcoming with
support.
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Nonetheless, commercial orders required more than
bright prospects. No such orders were forthcoming and,
hence,industrial interests were attracted to the more
successful American design. VEW was not large enough
or experienced enough with HTRs to order a large com-
mercial reactor by itself. RWE, five times larger than
any other German utility, was fully engaged in fast
breeder reactors so it had little interest in HTRs.
The Germans had also always developed their pebble bed
system in isolation and, thus, there were no international
partners in view. Neither BBC nor VEW had large stakes
in the pebble bed design. They were more interested
in building an HTR than in worrying about what type of
HTR was being constructed. It was at the KFA Jtlich and
in Bonn and North Rhine-Westphalia that more focus was
put on the pebble bed system.
Although the shift to the American design was a
setback for pebble bed advocates, the optimism about
the HTR's future remained in 1972. The thought was that
the pebble bed system would still be developed in the
long-run because of the advantage it had over the block
HTRs in non-electricity uses. The situation for HTRs
looked favorable at the start of 1972 because:
-- construction of the THTR had just begun and
the reactor was expected to be completed by
early 1977;
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-- the Fort St. Vrain reactor in Colorado was
nearing completion and General Atomic had
several orders for follow-up already in
hand;
-- England and France were still interested22
in the possibilities of HTR development.
In March 1972 VEW and HKG presented the results of
a study about the development of advanced HTRs. At
that time the commercial future of electricity-producing
HTRs seemed assured, and the general view was that no
more public money would be needed for them. Instead,
many claimed that support should be shifted to the more
complex direct-cycle helium-turbine HTRs. The 1972 VEW
report argued against this shift. It urqed that the
main priority of the HTR program should be to develop
the technical and economic potential of the more con-
ventional two-cycle HTR to its fullest before stressing
advanced applications.23 Again, in 1972 as in 1968,
we see that the inability to determine a common course
of development hindered the reactor's chances for com-
mercial success.
Obstacles to Commercialization and Delays in the THTR
A commercial breakthrough for HTRs during these
years seemed to be a distinct possibility. Orders were
placed in the U.S. and VEW indicated its willingness
to place orders in the Federal Republic, but nothing
materialized. Undoubtedly, the economic uncertainties
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surrounding HTRs prevented both utilities and manufacturers
from taking larger risks, but market factors alone were
not determinative. Gunter Hirschfelder of VEW attributes
the lack of success in the'Federal Republic, U.K. and
U.S. partly to the strong competition from LWRs, partly
to the question of when and if the fuel cycle could be
closed, and largely to the huge investment costs and
accompanying risks that reactor operators face.24 He
feels that the financial means needed for market intro-
duction of the HTR may well outstrip the capabilities
of individual national economies, let alone firms. As
a result he emphasizes the need for international cooper-
ation, especially concerning the fuel cycle, 2 5
A BBC assessment in 1975 of why commercialization
did not occur related the problem mainly to competition
with LWRs. 6 First, the HTR was hindered because poten-
tial operators insisted that the new reactor immediately
had to have more to offer than the state-of-the-art LWRs
before they would place orders. The customers for HTRs
were not impressed that the HTRs then available could
already offer essentially the same attributes as LWRs,
and they completely overlooked that future HTRs -- such
as the helium-turbine direct-cycle reactors -- could
offer substantially more. The BBC authors urged opera-
tors to keep long-range possibilities in mind.
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Second, size of the reactors also hindered a mar-
ket breakthrough. Regardless of positive results from
small experimental reactors, HTRs lacked credibility
because no larger reactor of a comparable size to LWRs
was in operation.27 In the U.S., commercial orders for
HTRs were placed even before the prototype Fort St. Vrain
reactor was operating. When that reactor encountered
problems, the credibility of the entire HTR line was
questioned. The strategy followed for fast breeder
reactors is different than for HTRs: for the fast
breeders no efforts to obtain commercial orders are being
made at all until a commercial-sized prototype is in
operation. By implication, the BBC authors are critical
of the HTR marketing strategy dictated by Gulf General
Atomic in the U.S. because, in contrast to the FBR stra-
tegy, Gulf General Atomic forced decisions too auickly.
In the case of LWRs in the Federal Republic we saw
how the utilities jumped at the prospect of commerciali-
zation. With the HTRs, it was not the utilities but
rather the American manufacturer which jumped at the
prospect. Gulf became a partner with General Atomic
Company in order to compete with the other American
reactor manufacturers. In turn, it convinced American
utilities to sign letters of intent for HTRs but under
terms which GAC later could not fulfill. Eventually the
orders were cancelled. German utilities were definitely
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interested in a variation of the GAC reactor, but they
were never given enough information about cost and per-
formance to merit placing an order. VEW was ready to
order a large HTR in 1974 if only BBC could make a con-
crete financial offer competitive with LWR prices. In
light of the absence of any offer and of a June 30,
1974 deadline from the Federal Ministry for Research
and Technology for rebates on new reactor orders, yEW
felt obliged to opt for an LWR rather than the HTR.
The point here -- and it will be elaborated in this chap-
ter and the next one -- is that the prospect of com-
mercialization of a reactor design tends to unleash
certain unpredictable forces, but it is not only the
utilities but also the manufacturers which quickly
shift priorities in an attempt to reap a share of the
commercial benefits.
STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS UNDERLYING THE T.HI.T.R DEVELOPMENT
In the early years of German nuclear policy-making
the effort was to support all approaches and make the
German nuclear industry internationally competitive.
By the late 1960s it was re important for some specific
choices about German policy to be made than for a blanket
approach to be followed. Choices were made, but often
in haphazard fashion and with too little thought given
to the implications. As with the period covering the
AVR project, the period covering the THTR -- at least
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until 1976 -- is characterized by disputes within the
various sectors. Those within the manufacturing sector
are particularly significant. For the AVR development,
an open-ended approach to 'developing nuclear technology
seemed logical; for the THTR development it was not as
necessary. Several actors recognized the need to narrow
options and thereby increase the chances of technolo-
gical success, but individual interests prevented
agreement on how to proceed.
The Manufacturing Industry
BBC, the main manufacturing firm behind German HTR
development, faced a difficult series of challenges
which affected HTR strategy during this period from
1963-1975. Certainly the consensus which prevailed at
the time about options in the German light water and
fast breeder reactor programs was missing for the HTR.
For the other reactors there were some specific fac-
tors operating to narrow choices: international tech-
nology, governmental preferences and industrial policy
worked together to determine which path should be fol-
lowed for the LWRs and FBRs, but not for the HTRs. The
choices for the HTRs were more confusing and less clear-
cut. The challenges confronted by BBC in this period
included: (a) domestic competition from GHH which was
seeking to develop the prismatic fuel HTR and was in-
volved in an international consortium for HTR development,
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InterNuclear; (b) the loss of its partner in BBK, Krupp,
just at the time that construction of the THTR was to
move forward; (c) the need to find a new partner and
then to determine the new strategy with the American
partner, Gulf General Atomic, for HTR development; and
(d) the entrance into the pebble bed HTR field of Kraft-
werk Union, the largest German reactor manufacturer,
after BBC opted to stress the American GAC design. Each
of these challenges will be examined in turn.
Competition between GHH and BBC: BBC's first chal-
lenge came from the firm Gutehoffnungshutte Sterkrade
(GHH) which was also interested in the development of
HTRs. The GHH example is instructive for showing (a)
the contrast between GHH's more internationalist per-
spective and BBC's isolationist approach; (b) the dif-
ferences of opinion even within the BBC-Krupp partner-
ship about how to proceed with the HTR; (c) the need to
balance the most sophisticated and the most realistic
applications of a technology; and (d) the weight which
Kraftwerk Union assumes as the dominant German reactor
manufacturer.
GHH's nuclear department was established in 1962,
and it was headed by a former German Babcock and Wilcox
manager who had experience from an early date with gas-
cooled graphite-moderated reactors. GHH, under this
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leadership, viewed the U.S. as the main nuclear country
but saw no chance to enter the LWR or FBR fields, so
GHH turned to another U.S. possibility -- General Atomic
29
and the prismatic fuel HTR2. GHH did not recognize
adequately the limits of what it could achieve. The
case provides a good example of the relationship be-
tween market considerations and technological choices
which often pertains to German nuclear reactor policy
-- namely, the market considerations are determinative
for deciding when an option should be dropped.
In addition to its interests in the prismatic fuel
HTR, GHH also became interested in the direct cycle HTR
system through its cooperation with the German nuclear
ship research organization GKSS (Gesellschaft fUr
Kernenergieverwertung in Schiffbau und Schiffahrt m.b.H.),
and it .found in Dragon a corresponding enthusiasm.30 In
1965 the Dragon project concentrated on gas turbine
applications of the HTR, but even after that approach
was dropped both Dragon and General Atomic officials
encouraged GHH to continue its work,31 Until the mid-
1960s the Dragon and THTR projects had cooperated
well, but as signs of commercialization appeared, "open
wounds" between the two programs were created.32 Dragon
also scored a public relations advance over the pebble
bed design in 1966 because at the same time that the THTR
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was experiencing some design problems concerning the in-
sertion of control rods into the reactor core, Dragon
officials announced that their reactor could also operate
33
on low enriched uranium. This increased Dragon's
attractiveness internationally and gave the impression
that the pebble bed concept was falling behind.
Henry Nau blames BBK for this impression because
the German firm essentially isolated itself by "keeping
the lid on information outputs" and by awarding essen-
tially no THTR contracts to non-German industries.34
Dragon attracted -more interest because people knew more
about it. Even BBC requested an official exchange agree-
ment with Dragon in -1966, and according to Nau, there
were differing opinions within BBK about THTR prospects:
Krupp displayed more faith in the pebble bed concept
than BBC.35 GHH's focus at this time was on large gas
turbines suitable for full-scale power stations and on
the design of a 25 MW direct cycle demonstration plant.
The Land Schleswig-Hostein was a potential customer for
this demonstration plant, and in the spring of 1966 an
offer of a direct-cycle HTR was -made at a price com-
36petitive with large LWRs. With the acceptance of the
offer, the Kernenergiegesellschaft Schleswig-Holstein
(KSH) was formed to own and operate the reactor which
was to be built at Geesthacht.
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The competition between Dragon and THTR was viewed
as wide open by all parties -- the British, the German
and Euratom officials. Euratom convened a joint sym-
posium on Dragon and THTR 'in May 1967 and concluded that
"the commercialization of high temperature reactors only
has a chance within the framework of an international
consortium. . . . 37 British firms were wary of such
a consortium unless other international firms were in-
volved. An Italian firm, a French firm and GHH joined
the discussions in January 1968 and a formal agreement
was concluded (without the French firm but with a Bel-
gian firm) in October 1968, creating the company Inter
Nuclear. 3 THTR people were sharply critical of Inter
Nuclear which they saw as an attempt to isolate the
THTR program and force consolidation on Dragon; German
opinion was also critical of GHH joining a foreign con-
sortium which was competing against the German pebble
bed system.39 The German Research Service's special re-
port on nuclear energy said, "We would have welcomed it
more if beforehand GHH had come to an arrangement with
BBK concerning cooperation on the development and con-
struction of a German prototype reactor."4 0
The evidence in this section suggests that GHH and
Inter Nuclear were serious competitors to BBC, but that
overstates the case. Inter Nuclear was never more than
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an organization on paper. It lacked the capital to be a
serious reactor company. Rudolf Schulten maintains that
the company was not a threat, did not offer any competi-
tion, and could never have been successful. According
to him, GHH .was not a reactor -manufacturer; it simply
wanted to sell turbines. 41 The German program did face
the question directly of whether to cooperate with the
Dragon project, but the Germans saw cooperation as an
either/or proposition and they were not prepared to give
up their own approach.42 After 1966 process heat became
a major goal of the German HTR development; British ad-
vanced gas reactors were therefore less attractive be-
cause of their low efficiency. In 1966 the decision was
made by the Germans to proceed with the THTR, and KFA
officials .today say that Henry Nau's conclusion that
progress on the THTR was effectively terminated in 1966
because of a stalemate within the European Community
which affected the THTR consortium is wrong.43 Utility
and North Rhine-Westphalia officials also claim that GHH
caused them no concern; in fact, they thoucht a certain
amount of competition was healthy.4 5
The GHH policies did have an impact, however, on both
the government's approach and BBC's willingness to co-
operate with other firms. The federal government wanted
to shed some of the financial burden which it was
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increasingly shouldering for nuclear development. It
wanted to consolidate the national HTR effort, and it
encouraged this in the Third Atomic Program of 1968
which set out a 600 MW HTR project specifically designed
to foster cooperation between BBC and GHH. The govern-
ment was anxious to avoid having a monopoly exist for
Kraftwerk Union in the reactor -manufacturing sector so
it encouraged its research ministry to bring BBC, Krupp
and GHH together.4 5
BBC was not averse to considering HTR approaches
other than the German pebble bed system. According to
one representative from the manufacturing industry,
officials at BBK decided in 1966 that they should work
more closely with the Americans, and hence they conducted
secret negotiations with U.S. officials in Dtsseldorf
in 1966-67.46 BBK felt that the HTRs would be success-
ful only if there were international cooperation designed
to make the HTR competitive with LWRs. The negotiations
broke down, however, because each side insisted on ad-
47
hering to its own concepts. BBC was not opposed to
international arrangements. It would have welcomed co-
operation with the Americans, or later with the French,
but nothing worked out. BBC also blames the Bonn govern-
ment partly for the failures. BBC felt that Bonn should
have stressed more the equal development of HTRs with
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FBRs; the minister of research, Hans Matth5ffer, over-
emphasized the FBRs in establishing international
arrangements according to this industry representative.4 8
A lack of international cooperation was also at the
heart of GHH's inability to deliver the direct-cycle HTR
it had agreed to build for the KSH at Geesthacht. GHH
had contracted to build the reactor at a fixed price of
DM 65.8 million; but 14 months later it was already
apparent that the firm had underestimated the difficulty
of technical problems, and the extra costs would nearly
double the price.49 The major problem concerned the
fuel element. The problem had been foreseen before GHH
made the offer to KSH, but GHH assumed that its license
with Gulf General Atomic would give it access to the
broad technical know-how of the American firm.50 From
the very start of negotiations with GAC, however, it was
evident that the American firm was only interested in
the more conventional two-cycle HTRs and did not want
to risk the failure of its fuel element technology on
the "avant-garde German concept" for fear of setting
0 51back the overall development program. GHH then wanted
to utilize Dragon's fuel element, but that proved im-
practical enough that GHH was compelled to develop the
technology itself. This seemed feasible, but would have
been expensive and time-consuming.
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In short, GHH obtained the contract for the 25 MW
HTR and then realized that it might not be able to ful-
fill it. In an effort to meet its responsibilities,
the firm brought in outsid-e consultants and then shook
52
up management. A major goal of the new management was
to develop broader contacts -- at that point GHH had
some ties to General Atomic in the U.S., minimal ties
to Dragon and essentially no ties with the KFA Jilich.
It quickly became evident, though, that money and tech-
nical personnel were simply too limited at GHH so the firm be-
qan looking for a way out of its contract.53 It welcomed
the suggestion made by the federal government that BBC,
BBK and GHH form a joint company to take over all HTR
projects including international cooperation such as with
the U.S. firm or the British consortia.
Negotiations were started, a pre-contract was signed
and offices were set up in Cologne, but then the joint
54
company fell apart. Krupp decided suddenly to drop out
of the organization.
Both Krupp and GHH were in the heavy component
business and received many orders from Kraftwerk Union.
Kraftwerk Union was displeased with the whole development
in the HTR field which impinged on KWU's dominant posi-
tion in German nuclear policy: the Americans were entering
the German market and BBC was merging with GHH. Kraftwerk
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Union put pressure on both Krupp and GHH, saying you can-
not expect both to deliver components to us and be major
competitors. -
A second reason for the failure of the merger was
that it became apparent that the new company would be
bearing financial responsibility for the unrealistically
priced Geesthacht reactor. That project was abandoned
late in 1971. Many officials in BBC are quite critical
of GHH in retrospect. They doubt that GHH was ever
serious about joining with BBK. but rather was just
buying time and waiting until liquidation of GHH's con-
tracts occurred.56
GHH's competition did not alter BBC's reactor stra-
tegy significantly, but certain lessons can be learned
from it. The competition underlines the issue of na-
tional versus competitive interests. Paradoxically,
through GHH licenses with Gulf General Atomic, BBC came
into closer contacts with the American firm which even-
tually became its partner. The competition also con-
vinced the government to try harder, although unsuccess-
fully, to bring about a merger in the German HTR industry.
The pressure and influence of the dominant German reac-
tor manufacturer, Kraftwerk Union, is also evident in
the BBC-GHH negotiations. The roles played by Kraftwerk
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Union and RWE should not be underestimated concerning the
extent to which they limit the flexibility of other actors.
Finally, the BBC-GHH competition was significant because
it served as a warning to BBC not to overstep its capa-
bilities as GHH had done or else the credibility of the
entire German HTR line would be undermined.
Krupp's Departure from the BBK Partnership: The
competition with GHH may not have altered BBC's develop-
ment strategy for the HTR, but the loss of Krupp as a
partner certainly did. This was an important change
that shifted the entire emphasis of the German program.
One industrialist involved with negotiations at that time
said there was regret that GHH did not join the new
HTR company, but "Krupp's departure shook up matters
much more.' 57 Looking at the circumstances surrounding
Krupp's leaving and the search for a new partner
(covered in the next section) shows how politicized
industrial arrangements are.
In this case the choice of arrangements essentially
determined the type of HTR technology which would be
pursued. With the departure of Krupp, the emphasis
shifted away from the pebble bed reactor. Competitive
interests favoring the prismatic fuel design asserted
themselves over national interests -- or more precisely,
Land interests. Relations between Krupp and BBC
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also indicate how essential it is for firms to balance
expectations with realistic possibilities for a particu-
lar project: Krupp expected that the pay-off for HTR
development was much closer than it was, and it was not
prepared to wait too long.
BBC was becoming exasperated with its lack of suc-
cess in obtaining nuclear reactor orders. It was inter-
ested in competing with large firms like AEG and Siemens,
but it received no orders besides the AVR between 1960
and 1970. BBC felt that it had to do something, that
it could not just wait for the HTR; in fact, BBC had
always considered other partners including Gulf General
Atomic in the U.S. and Babcock and Wilcox in Britain
and Switzerland, but no arrangements emerged. Krupp, in
contrast, was not as interested in building nuclear
reactors. It wanted instead to provide reactor parts
for other firms, and the pebble bed reactor was essen-
tiallv a "hobby" for it.5 9
This is not to say that Krupp's involvement was un-
important. ~ The firm's broad palette of activities made
it a good partner for reactor development. Krupp thought
that the HTR breakthrough to marketability was 10-15
years away so it was interested in the technology, and
the firm also wanted to get away from the image carried
over from the war that it was only engaged in producing
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military armaments.60 We saw in the previous chapter
that there was some controvery right from the start about
Krupp's becoming a partner with BBC. There were also
some insinuations about different styles of leadership
in the two firms. The partnership lasted over 10 years,
but it was not always a happy one.
The disputes between BBC and Krupp had a direct im-
pact on the THTR progress. One newspaper account quotes
BBC officials who claim that the quarrels led to one-
and-a-half years of delay in the THTR construction by
197.61 A KFA official went further and said they held up
the project four to five years.62 The delays were created
because Krupp was siding more with domestic groups which
supported the pebble bed system. Henry Nau suggests
that Krupp's decision reflected the firm's pessimism
that the pebble bed reactor could overcome growing com-
mercial skepticism even if the THTR prototype were con-
structed.6 3 The breakup of the partnership, though,
should not just be blamed on Krupp's pessimism.
The pessimism existed, but the reasons for Krupp's
departure went far beyond the HTR. The firm was in a
very tense financial crisis brought on by iron and steel
ventures, specifically,involving a Spanish steelwork
project from 1965-68.64 Krupp was near bankruptcy and
the German banks forced a management change in the Board
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of Directors and installed the crisis manager GUnther
Vogelsang as commissioner. Vogelsang had enormous power
to rearrange Krupp's financial commitments. At first
he fought for the THTR and he nearly concluded a con-
tract for new arrangements with BBC. The reports he
received about the prospects for HTRs were positive,
but in the end he decided that the distant prospects
65
of marketability made the venture too risky. Vogelsang
sold a half-dozen of Krupp's firms and cancelled several
contracts; the THTR was one of the victims.66 Krupp was
worried about the risks it was undertaking: it estimated
them at DM 75 million and the firm was especially con-
cerned about the unpredictable follow-up costs.67
Vogelsang himself was a controversial person who got
involved in personal struggles with other Krupp exec-
utives and the Research Minister, Hans Leussink, but
the general consensus was that he did a good job saving
Krupp.
Krupp also left the BBK partnership because it was
not receiving the subcontracts for the THTR which it
had expected. The THTR was basically financed by the
federal and L !nder governments. Because of these sub-
sidies, there was a legal reauirement that all sub-
contracts go out for competitive bids. Krupp was dis-
pleased that they kept losing out on these.68 In any
case, the backing down from the partnership was sudden
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and surprising. The cornerstone of the THTR was scheduled
to be laid on June 23, 1971, but on June 18 the contrac-
tors for the reactor announced that the ceremony would
be cancelled; a statement was issued which said, "For
internal reasons within the (THTR) consortium the con-
tract which we are prepared to conclude cannot be signed." 6 9
The contract had been ready for signing for five months,
and it came as a surprise when Krupp pulled out of the
arrangement.70
The year 1971 turned out to be doubly difficult for
West German HTR development. Krupp backed out of the
BBK partnership and GHH abandoned the Geesthacht project.
BBC faced the sizeable task of finding a new partner
with whom to continue HTR development.
The New American Partner: After the breakup of BBC
and Krupp, BBC and the electrical utility group which
ordered the THTR, HKG, continued the partnership for the
prototype reactor on a temporary basis. BBC held 80 per-
cent of the shares and HKG 20 percent, but the under-
standing was that Krupp would sell its share within a
year, by October 15, 1972 at the latest. Several partners
were mentioned in discussions -- Kraftwerk -Union, the
German Babcock and Wilcox, the Land North Rhine-Westphalia,
the Inter Nuclear consortium, and Gulf General Atomic Com-
pany in the U.S. -- but soon the talk was concentrated
solely on GAC.
-275-
The huge amounts of capital needed to support a new
reactor line made it mandatory for BBC to seek a partner
(and the German utilities wanted this added support);
GAC was one of the few firms whose interests and finan-
cial capabilities permitted it to consider partnership.
KWU, for example, had the financial assets but its in-
terests were directed to other reactors. The fact that
Gulf itself sought out a Dartnership with Royal Dutch
Shell to share the costs of HTR development demonstrates
the degree of risk involved. The Financial Times ex-
plained Gulf's and Shell's partnership by saying, "The
alarming size of the sums needed to launch a new nuclear
steam supply system commercially . . . (is) guaranteed
to make even governments wince."7 1
The partnership between BBC and GAC to form Hoch-
temperatur Reaktorbai (HRB) provides a striking example
of how industrial decisions can steer technological de-
velopment. The choice of GAC as a partner essentially
guaranteed that German HTR emphasis would shift from the
pebble bed to the block design. This recognition un-
leashed a controversy in West Germany among pebble bed-
advocates who tried to find a new application for their
reactor. But it was the failure of GAC, as opposed to
the efforts of the pebble bed advocates, which caused
a return to the pebble bed emphasis five years later in
1976.
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Gulf General Atomic was a willing partner in this
enterprise. It had landed several orders with U.S. utili-
ties in the early 1970s on the strength of its 300 MW
Fort St. Vrain demonstration reactor, and it was eager to
expand its success to Europe. Gaining a foothold in
Europe was important to GAC because Europe was home to
almost all of the world's experience with gas-cooled
72
reactors. Krupp's withdrawal from the THTR project
provided GAC with its great chance.73 GAC had made a
deep impression on European utilities and atomic energy
commissions at the 1971 Geneva Conference on the Peace-
ful Uses of Atomic Energy because it could point not only
to progress on the 300 MW demonstration reactor but also
to two commercial orders in August 1971.75
These successes, which coincided with the BBC/Krupp
split,.prompted Gulf to make immediate efforts to break
into the European market. A licensing agreement was con-
cluded with the French high temperature consortium and
discussions were started with a British group of nuclear
firms, but Gulf's offensive had the most noticeable con-
75
sequences in the Federal Republic. One retrospective
German account five years later said, "The Germans threw
themselves into General Atomic's arms," and felt they
had found their "fairy prince."7 6
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The explanation for the-willing shift in emphasis
to the American design lies partly in the successes of
GAC at the time and partly in BBC's own priorities.- We
saw that BBC was eager to get more reactor orders and it
did not have huge vested interests in the pebble bed HTR.
There were others who did, however, and they tried to
block the BBC-GAC partnership. Negotiations between
BBC and GAC intensified the domestic debate. GAC ex-
pected to announce its acquisition of 45 percent of HRB
at the October 1972 Nuclex '72 meeting in Basle, but
Gulf's aspirations were checked "by an unexpected up-
surge of technological and economic nationalism in West
Germany."
According to David Fishlock's account:
The cause of the storm is Professor
Rudolf Schulten . . . . In an eleventh
hour bid to block the deal with Gulf,
Prof. Schulten persuaded the politicians
of North Rhine-Westpahlia that Gulf's
admission would mean the death of the
first all-German power reactor, and
moreover could jeopardize future energy
supplies for this highly industrial re-
gion. Prof. Schulten argued that.Gulf
was not interested in the pebble bed
reactor, . . . (but) was interested only
in selling its own, more conventional
reactor design. Once admitted, Gulf
would unleash its massive commercial
strength to ensure that the native
ideas made no further progress.
We see here that national pride (or Lgnder pride) was
present at certain levels. As one industry official put
it, "the problems with the pebble bed reactor are
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enormously complex because they quickly become emotional
and lapse.into the area of personalities." 78
In this case, the pebble bed adherents were not
strictly opposed to more emphasis on the block-fuel
element HTR, but they wanted guarantees that the pebble
bed design would also be pursued, especially for process-
heat applications which they saw as the big advantage
of the pebble bed concept. Government officials were
worried that GAC would gain majority control of HRB and
neglect the German pebble bed project, thus making all
the government subsidies useless.79 The qovernment's
concern is one reason why only 45 percent of the HRB capi-
tal was sold to GAC. BBC, at the same time, argued
resolutely that only an association with GAC could broaden
and enrich the technical basis of German programs.80
GAC executives were taken unaware by the whole do-
mestic storm in the Federal Republic and professed ve-
hemently that they had no intention of killing the pebble
bed reactor. They stressed that the delay had nothing
to do with choosing between the two reactor systems --
a decision which they saw as at least two years away
and which might even reveal a clear future for the peb-
ble bed HTR. But privately GAC did admit to some doubts
such as whether the pebble bed reactor could be scaled up
successfully to commercial sizes of 1000 MW.8 3
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The Land North Rhine-Westphalia was, not surpris-
inglv,. especially supportive of its "favorite-son" de-
sign. The NRW cabinet actively followed the BBC-GAC
negotiations. The economics minister, Horst-Ludwig
Riemer, stressed that the reasons for backing the pebble
84
bed design were not nationalistic but industrial.
According to the minister, it would not be good business
to stop development of the pebble bed reactor. As long
as the independence of the pebble bed line were assured,
the minister said he would have no objections to coopera-
tion with the American firm.8 5
Some discussion occurred within the NRW government
about whether the Land should assume Krupp's share in
the BBC-Krupp partnership. That would have guaranteed.
an emphasis on the pebble bed HTR. Minister Riemer
even got to the point of bargaining with the Krupp manage-
ment about a price, but BBC was not willing to go along
with the deal -- and it had the right to reject arrange-
ments.86 Henry Nau, on the basis of interviews he con-
ducted at the time, reports that BBC was eager to "dilute"
its commitment to the pebble bed system and therefore
was pleased with the GAC partnership.87 David Fishlock
of the Financial Times described the idea of NRW buying
the Krupp share as "panicky talk."88 In contrast, one of
the top Land officials involved with the negotiations
then, Dr. -Hans Olivier, still maintains that that would
have been the best course to take.89 The notion of NRW
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taking over the Krupp share was very alien to German
thinking -- and according to one BBC executive, it would
have been "damned difficult"9 -- but the fact that the
proposition could be seriously considered shows how great
the Land interests were. Eventually, NRW decided against
either sponsoring Krupp to stay in the BBC-KrupD partner-
ship or buying out Krupp's share itself, but it made
efforts to get other German firms (rather than GAC) to
take over the share.
German officials were skeptical about GAC. One KFA
official said he was surprised at first that BBC brought
in GAC, but it was a logical choice because of GAC's
commercial success and because GAC's involvement would
free BBC from the high costs of reactor development.91
Another KFA official said that the government's wariness
eased as it became eVident that GAC was the only logical
partner. The government was in a dilemma because it was
trying to strengthen the German industrial base for the
gas-cooled reactor line, and it recognized that partner-
ship with GAC would probably be the most effective means
to achieve this.93 GAC's assurances that.the pebble bed
reactor might still have uses for more advanced HTRs
assuaged the government, although Schulten and his team
still saw the new partnership as a blow.9 4
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Bonn overcame its concern about GAC because it de-
cided that the American partner was most able to make
German advanced reactor systems competitive. Karl Ueinz
Beckurts, then director of the KFA, felt that the break-
through of the American design was inevitable.95 BBC
was striving to win its first commercial reactor order
and was confident it could do so with GAC's backing.
One of its executives said that the first order of busi-
ness was to "get rid of the emotion," and the Bonn gov-
ernment echoed that view because it wanted to see a
second nuclear company emerge in West Germany to rival
96the powerful Siemens-AEG concern, Kraftwerk -Union.
In sum, the crucial decision to bring in the Ameri-
can firm of Gulf General Atomic was made largely by BBC.
The decision was forced upon BBC because its German
partner, Krupp, stepped out of the business of building
nuclear reactors for financial reasons. Because of this
decision, the pebble bed HTR line was de-emphasized --
despite some protests and efforts on the Land level --
and not stressed again until 1976. The attraction of
GAC lay not so much in its technological skills as in
its marketing skills. GAC seemed on the verge of com-
mercial success with the HTR, so once again the prospects
of commercialization were influential in directing the
line of technological development.
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One should note that BBC had had a long-run interest
in the GAC design, but the complete shift in emphasis
would not have occurred without Krupp's withdrawal.
Given the opportunity, through, BBC was quite willing to
go the American route. It was not receptive to sugges-
tions that North Rhine-Westphalia -- and the major pebble
bed proponents -- assume Krupp's share in the THTR part-
nership. BBC's interests were more in the high tempera-
ture reactor line in general, not in a particular
approach. BBC did continue its involvement with the peb-
ble bed THTR project, however, because it needed the pres-
tige, the experience and its own reactor facility; other-
wise it would have been little more than a GAC licensee.9 7
KWU's Entrance into the HTR Field: The fourth chal-
lenge to BBC in this period came from Kraftwerk Union,
and it too influenced the direction of HTR development
in the Federal Republic. KWU realized that it had to
pursue the HTR domestically both because of some of its
own interests and because it would make the firm appear
more as an international reactor supplier since it would
add diversity to its reactor line. The dominant position
of KWU in the German nuclear market also meant that BBC,
as a smaller and unproven supplier, had little chance to
resist the KWU participation. .KWU's interest was primarily
in process heat applications of the HTR while BBC, once it
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opted for the GAC block-fuel element design, was more
interested in electricity production. This emphasis on
electricity, however, lost importance with the failure
of GAC. KWU, at the urging of Rudolf Schulten and other
pebble bed HTR backers, focused its interests on the
pebble bed reactor in 1972 after BBC decided against it.
KWU was attracted to the high temperature reactor
by the possibilities of process heat application and by
the public acceptance of the HTR. Two forces drove KWU
to its interest in the HTR in 1972.98 First, there were
good business reasons to pursue the HTR. It had some
parallel lines of development with the fast breeder reac-
tors -- a major concern of KWU -- and parliamenta'ry
committees were continually calling for parallel develop-
ment of the two lines. Second, the utilities wanted
KWU involved with HTR development because of the firm's
broad reactor construction experience. On the one hand,
the utilities wanted KWU involved due to its experience;
on the other hand, they wanted a stronger BBC role to
preclude a KWU monopoly of the German nuclear market.
The utilities could also foresee the financial problems
at AEG, one of the two partners in Kraftwerk Union. These
problems soon compelled AEG to sell out completely to the
other partner, Siemens. The utilities felt that an alter-
native to KWU was valuable. This was not a paradoxical
position because, as is often the case in German nuclear
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development, the real priority was to strengthen- the
domestic industrial base.
The utilities did not feel that a choice had to be
made between reactor lines. .They just wanted to bolster
the German nuclear industry. Thus, when problems arose
concerning the HHV project (Hochtemperatur-Heliumturbinen-
Versuchsanlage -- i.e. helium turbine HTR) at the KFA
JUlich so that BBC's technical management was called
into question, the utilities welcomed a broadening of
the technical basis through the inclusion of KWU.9 9
There were questions about BBC's capability to manage
HTR development successfully. For KWU, which had been
attracted to process heat applications and at first had
even tried to use its light water reactors for process
heat, the partnership with BBC offered an easy way to
monitor its competitor's progress at minimum risk. 1 0 0
BBC had to go along with licensing its know-how to
KWU in part because it needed the business and in part
because the utilities felt that the financial backing of
BBC alone for a new reactor line was inadequate. 1 0 1 The
dominant electrical utility, RWE, carried the risk for
the fast breeder reactor, but the utilities involved with
HTRs were not confident that BBC could play a similarly
strong role for the high temperature reactor. BBC's
-285-
funding was tied up with a controversial LWR at MUhlheim-
Kdrlich which the utilities scornfully called MUhlheim-
Kluglich (loosely translated, the pitiful reactor in
MUhlheim). To complicate matters further, the government
made it clear that money would only be available for one
major HTR project, thus putting pressure on the KWU and
BBC industrial groups to formulate a common R&D program.102
It is interesting to note that the government was trying
to force technological choices and narrow options, but
it did so at an early stage of development so that neither
firm would be severely penalized.
KWU never felt threatened by BBC's competition, but
it kept a watchful eye on developments. We saw earlier
that KWU exerted certain pressures on Krupp and GHH in
the late 1960s because it did not welcome competition.
Likewise, it had some concerns about the new BBC-GAC
partnership and consequently was quite willing to provide
a challenge to BBC in the HTR field. 10 3 It did this by
moving into the pebble bed reactor gap left by BBC.
Schulten convinced Hans Heinrich Frewer, chairman of the
board at KWU, to start work on the pebble bed HTR through
KWU's subsidiary firm Interatom.104 Thus, the pebble
bed advocates, who had suffered a setback when BBC
formed a partnership with GAC, did not give up their
case. They turned to KWU for support.
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Without much commitment, KWU was able to enter the
HTR field claiming that its interests in process heat
did not conflict with BBC's interests in the production
of electricity. Process heat applications are another
effort to define a future for coal in the German economy.
Coal gasification has been the major thrust of German
HTR development since the failure of GAC in 1975. Coal
always has been a special national problem for West
Germany -- with North Rhine-Westphalia leading the cause.105
KWU thus entered the debate on the side of the coal in-
terests. This did not force changes in the BBC strategy,
but it imposed restrictions on what steps could be taken.
We see that the apparent freedom of action which BBC
exerted in establishing partnership with GAC was really
rather limited. The coal interests, the pebble bed advo-
cates, and the presence of KWU in HTR policy meant that
subsequent steps could not be taken so independently.
The Electrical Utilities
The previous section leaves little doubt that con-
ditions in the manufacturing industry most directly steered
the THTR development, even though utilities were important
at certain levels. The impact of the utilities was not
as critical as with LWRs. Instead, the utilities played
the role of potential partners waiting to be convinced by
the manufacturers regarding which direction to go, but
the utilities were unable to coordinate efforts. Thus,
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in contrast to the experimental AVR phase and post-1975
phase of HTRs, the role of the utilities in the demonstra-
tion THTR phase was less significant. The items to.note
in this THTR phase are (a) the lack of coordination
among utilities both at home and internationally, (b)
the low financial commitments which they made, and (c)
the gradual dissatisfaction of VEW with HTR prospects.
VEW today remains skeptical about prospects for finishing
the THTR and is not eager to pursue a THTR follow-up
project.
Views of the utilities' role in German HTR develop-
ment vary considerably. Only a few of the utilities
showed interest -- or were in a financial position to
show interest -- in nuclear energy. On the one hand,
Rudolf Schulten says that it was the electrical utili-
ties which made the THTR possible.106 On the other hand,
a German politician states bluntly that the cooperation
of the utilities concerning nuclear energy has always
been "hiserable," and they finally had to be brought to-
107
gether under pressure after 1976. Der Spiegel accuses
the 380 utilities of acting like "17th century princes"
with their cartelized energy fiefdoms (i.e., each utility
has a monopoly in the area it serves), and the magazine
says the utilities lack not only the money but also the
courage to switch to nuclear energy.108
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These views are not contradictory because they en-
compass different scopes. For the HTR, though, it was
critical to involve a major utility. The Stadtwerke
DUsseldorf had always been a friend of the HTR and it has
remained so, but the participation of VEW in the THTR
project was the step needed to put the reactor on more
solid footing.
The Stadtwerke DUsseldorf, in fact, is not part of
the consortium building the THTR. The utility, according
to one of its board members, Chrysanth Marnet, was in-
volved in helping to convince the HKG consortium to place
the order. The Stadtwerke itself, however, is part of
the city of Dusseldorf and needed city council approval
before becoming part of the consortium. The approval
was not given for budgetary reasons, and thus the leading
utility for the AVP project was not involved with the THTR
follow-up project. 109
VEW opted for the HTR because BBC convinced them to
do so.110 The utility had not been involved with the
AVR, but process heat applications of the .HTR were be-
coming apparent and that attracted VEW. It chose the
HTR simply due to the technology, not due to the specific
participation of firms in West Germany or elsewhere --
i.e., VEW had no specific relationship with BBC. For VEW
it was important that its competitior RWE had committed
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itself fully to the LWRs; in response, VEW preferred the
HTR alternative, and that probably explains why the
smaller utilities made a similar choice.
In other words, the size of the utilities per se
does not explain why RWE pursued the LWR while the smaller
utilities and VEW followed the HTR. The reason relates
more to RWE's early decision for LWRs so that the other
utilities sought an alternative. VEW, for example,
already had its own 250 MW LWR at Lingen. It considered
the British advanced gas reactors but had reservations
about the AGR's process heat applications. That left
the HTR as a logical remaining option.
This orientation also indicates why VEW was less
concerned about building the pebble bed reactor and
more interested in simply moving ahead with HTRs as soon
as possible. The utility immediately showed interest in
the block-fuel element HTR-K when it was first proposed
by BBC and GAC. The HTR-K 1160 MW reactor seemed to offer
the chance to bring Gulf's commercial success to Europe,
and VEW was more interested in that than in which fuel
element would be used.112 VEW's interest in the project
was the real breakthrough in the German switch to the
prismatic fuel design.
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VEW, the CEGB (Central Electricity Generating Board
in the U.K.), the SSEB (South of Scotland Electricity
Board), and EdF (Electricite de France) analyzed the 1160
MW reactor and asked for changes to enable it to have
application throughout Europe. The Ministry for Research
and Technology (BMFT) financed the work to make the
plant licensable in the Federal Republic. 1 1 3 We will
focus more on the influence of the BMFT on nuclear
policy in the next chapter dealing with the post-1975
situation, but it had influence before then too. One
utility official points out that the utilities were com-
pelled to participate on the THTR, but that the osten-
sible participation rate of 25 percent is actually much
lower once federal financial guarantees are considered.1 1 4
Moreover, in the early 1970s, the BMFT told the utili-
ties either to support the 1160 MW reactor or else the
ministry would withdraw support. The utilities had some
doubts about committing themselves, but they also were not
convinced that they wanted to drop the whole project. 1 1 5
The BMFT was able to use the unions -- who favored the
HTR -- as a point of leverage with the utilities. 1 1 6
The 1160 MW HTR was never ordered. The British
and the French were ready for 15 percent participation
each in the project, but they lost interest when German
considerations swung to the one-cycle reactor. The other
countries favored the two-cycle HTR, and, in fact,German
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interests also returned to the simpler concept just a
few years later. VEW decided not to order the 1160
MW reactor because of technical difficulties relating
primarily to the protection system of the PCPV (pre-
stressed concrete reactor vessel). Gunter Hirschfelder
of VEW says that the HTR's container vessel has long been
a significant discussion point concerning HTR development.1 1 8
It does not attain economies of scale and thus makes the
HTR expensive. VEW wanted to develop a substitute con-
tainer using cast iron. That would have allowed indi-
vidual parts to be replaced if problems arose rather than
replacing the entire container, and it would have meant
smaller and cheaper reactors. At the same time, though,
it would have required a whole new prototype, and neither
VEW nor the BMFT wanted that so the suggestion was
dropped. 119
The order for the 1160 MW HTR also failed because
BBC/HRB could not make an offer in the appropriate time.
They made a technical offer but no financial offer.
Hirschfelder says that VEW sometimes is blamed for not
ordering the reactor, but he asks how the.utility could
have been expected to order something when no price was
offered.120 And the reason no price was given was that
BBC could not be sure of costs, The GAC failure in the
U.S. also affected VEW's decision. Even more importantly,
the BMFT had offered a six percent rebate on nuclear
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reactors ordered before June 30, 1974; BBC could not
meet the deadline so instead an LWR order was placed with
121
KWU. VEW had had a positive orientation to the HTR-
K 1160 and had started licensing procedures, site
selection and a safety assessment, but it could make no
commitment without a price. 12 2
Earlier in this chapter we saw the open-ended na-
ture of the costs and completion possibilities for the
THTR-300. At best, the costs will be four times the
original estimate and completion will be eight years
later than the original projection. These figures,
combined with the situation described in this section,
have dampened VEW's enthusiasm for pursuing the HTR.
As Hirschfelder says, "The schedule for completing the
THTR is completely open, and that means the costs are
wide open . . . . Under these conditions no one can see
fit to order an HTR."1 2 3 An LWR today costs DM 3 billion
-- or DM 6 billion when all the extras including in-
terest are added. Hirschfelder says that a similarly-
sized HTR costs the same amount, and he says that no
individual firms or utilities can afford that. 1 2 4
In brief, the utilities wait to see what the manu-
facturers have to offer. This does not imply a lack of
coordination between the groups, but it does indicate
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that utilities have not been the most significant factor
in determining HTR development in the Federal Republic.
One utility official described contacts with manufac-
turers as very good and says the manufacturers will not
produce what the utilities do not want.125 Again,
though, this represents more of a veto power than a
steering power. This follows the traditional German
approach to non-nuclear power plants: it was left to
the manufacturers to develop technologies and make
offers to the utilities.
The German utilities provide electricity for a cer-
tain area and they have a monopoly for that area. They
have always assumed that they were therefore less suscept-
tible to competitive economic swings, and this may ex-
plain to an extent why they have been less willing to
provide money for commercialization. The more traditional
pattern -- whether domestically as we see with VEW or
internationally as we saw in Chapter Four when we de-
scribed how European utilities were convinced to pool
experiences only after Gulf's commercial sales successes
-- has been to wait for manufacturers to offer com-
mercialization possibilities. Two qualifications are in
order here, however: first, utilities are quite able
to move quickly toward commercialization when opportuni-
ties arise, as with the LWRs; second, the complexity and
expense of nuclear development is necessitating some re-
thinking of the traditional patterns. The next chapter
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centers on new directions in coordination among manu-
facturers, utilities and the government.
The Suddeutsche Zeitung in 1974 called the THTR-
300 a "gift to the participating utilities from the
126federal government." In the first part of this chapter,
we saw that the utilities only had to provide three per-
cent of the capital for the entire THTR project.1 2 7
These arrangements will not be repeated in the future.
Research and Technology Minister Andreas von BUlow told
the heads of several utilities, "There is a credibility
gap between your interest in atomic energy development
and your willingness to finance these developments." 1 2 8
He was critical of contributions for both SNR-300 fast
breeder reactor and the THTR-300. He pointed out that
only RWE had set a good example on the SNR-300 (for which
it is the main shareholder) and promised to contribute
DM 62 million in 1981 and 1982.129 Even this, however,
is a mere fraction of the present estimated cost of DM
5 billion. The utilities and the manufacturers will
have to shoulder more of the costs because Bonn is not
prepared to' let its share of expenses keep rising.
The Government
The last two sections have given an indication of
the development of the government's role in German nu-
clear policy-making. The government has not been too
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involved with the THTR project itself, but we see an
unmistakable trend toward more influence on overall
policy direction. The government is guite actively in-
volved in the formation of post-THTR policy. By the
term government, we refer both to the cabinet level in
Bonn -- mainly the BMFT -- and to the Land level,
The influence of the Bundestaq on the THTR is still
minimal, although the parliament is beginning to be much
more concerned with nuclear energy. For the THTR, though,
the Bundestag's influence is restricted to financial
appropriations. Thus, some pro-HTR members of the
Bundestag held up the money in the budget for the fast
breeder reactor because they felt the HTR was being
slighted relative to the FBR, but the BMFT argued con-
vincingly that there was no discrimination and the funds
were released.130 Besides that, there has been little
131debate in the Bundestag about the THTR.1
Government influence on the federal side has increased
not only because its budgetary share has-continued growing,
but also because its expertise has increased. Originally,
the Ministry for Atomic Questions was little more than
a tool of the German Atomic Commission, but the Commis-
sion was disbanded in 1971. By then it had grown old,
it lacked the key people, and it had become a huge body
with too many sub-commissions.132 The ministry had become
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more competent and self-confident, and a new advisory
system was needed to reinforce this.133 Manfred Popp,
head of energy and research at the BMFT, suggests that
the early 1970s may have marked the time when the ministry
had the most power because the role of its 'advisory com-
mittees had diminished and the Bundestag was minimally
involved.1 3 4  If the power of the BMFT reached its peak
in the early 1970s, then the developments since then should
not be described as a reduction in power, but rather a
sharing.
The increase in the BMFT's power did not come sud-
denly. It was more of a "quiet transition" which related
somewhat to the change of government in Bonn to the coa-
lition between the Social Democrats and Free Democrats,
but the change should not be seen as a "sharp edge,"1 3 5
The Fourth Atomic Program, drafted in 1972-73, was the
first one formulated by the Ministry. Formerly, the
responsibility lay with the Atomic Commission. The min-
istry also reorganized itself in 1975-76 so that nuclear
and non-nuclear programs were not divided and so that
fundamental scientific research on nuclear energy was
treated with other fundamental scientific issues. 1 3 6
Public hearings were held on the Fourth Atomic Program,
and the BMFT is proud that in the talks about alternative
energy sources they were the ones who first raised the
issue of conservation. 1 3 7 The ministry has taken on a
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new more active role as it has developpe its own
expertise, but officials point out auickly that one can-
not even begin to compare BMPT's resources with the U.S.
1 38Department of Energy. In examining the post-1975
period, we will get a better. idea of what influence the
BMFT can exercise. In the Third Atomic Program in 1968
the government attempted to bring BBC and GHH together
in a common HTR project and failed. After 1975 the
ministry was able to steer policy directions most suc-
cessfully, but certain conditions contributed significantly
to this.
The Land qovernment in North Rhine-Westphalia has
also increased its influence even though it could not
keep pace with increased expenditures the same way
Bonn did. The THTR was the real starting point for NRW's
support of the HTR adcording to Dr. Hans Olivier; the
Land contributed DM 80 million to the project, as opposed
to DM 1.8 million for the AVR.139 We saw how involved
NRW was in trying to influence events after Krupp with-
drew from the BBK partnership.
The simple fact is that coal is essential for NRW
(and for the West German economy), and the HTR seemed to
be a means to provide a brilliant new future for coal.
One BMFT official said, "We are interested in the HTP,
but the people in North Rhine-Westphalia, they are the
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priests of HTR development." Given the historical
role of coal in Germany, that is understandable, especially
in NRW which is the historical center of German indUstri-
alization which was based on coal. As one politician
put it, the view on HTRs in NRW is "my technology --
right or wrong."1 4 1  The view in NRW is that the BMFT is
far less supportive of the HTR than is NRW itself, and
that the Chancellor's Office, the Bundestag and the
federal Interior Ministry are all more pro-HTR than is
the BMFT.1 4 2  In NRW, the view is that 80 percent of the
Bundestag members favor the HTR over the fast breeder. 1 4 3
The Land has an undeniable interest in the promotion
of the HTR. Not only does it have a 17.6 percent share
in the THTR project, but also it seizes the initiative 'in
many situations such as alternative uses of coal or nu-
clear process heat. Part of Bonn's Fourth Atomic Program
stemmed from discussions within North Rhine-Westphalia:
the NRW research ministry brought together interdiscipli-
nary groups to formulate an energy program; their ideas
were passed on to the NRW Minister-President, who passed
them on to Chancellor Willy Brandt, who passed them on
to the then BMFT Minister Horst Ehmke; eventually the
1 44
ideas were incorporated in the new program. The
wishes of NRW also carry weight in Bonn (1) because NRW9
is the biggest Land, (2) because coal is a national issue,
(3) because the proportional representation system for
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choosing Bundestag members guarantees a strong voice for
regional interests, and (4) because Bonn and the NRW
developed close links since NRW provided the model for
the SPD/FDP coalition in Bonn. In sum, the Land was the
major factor in bringing about the marriage of coal and
nuclear energy in West Germany.
The Nuclear Research Center in Jllich
The KFA Julich did not steer the development of the
THTR, but it provided valuable back-up support for the
pebble bed HTR in general. This ranged from convincing
the federal government to give more support to the KFA
and its HTR activities in the mid-1960s to assisting in
keeping up interest in the pebble bed design even during
the height of interest in the prismatic fuel HTR. Through-
out these years, Rudolf Schulten has maintained his
leading role in advocating the pebble bed HTR.
According to Schulten, there were some people even
at the KFA in the mid2 60s who opposed the pebble bed
1 45
approach. He includes the scientific-technical direc-
tor, Alfred Boettcher, as an opponent who preferred a
different emphasis and therefore arranged a study on
several different reactor types. Leo Brandt, however,
stood out as a strong. countering force in NRW who was
"absolutely against the stopping of the pebble bed reac-
tor," and in the long run he won.146
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Boettcher himself relates the story somewhat dif-
ferently. He felt that it was his responsibility as
head of the Julich research center to support the pebble
bed approach, but he also saw a need to look into alter-
natives.1 4 7  Focusing on one. route would be bad and the
selection of which design to pursue should not be made
sooner than necessary, according to Boettcher. He there-
fore recommended looking into alternatives such as the im-
pressive thermal breeder work conducted at the Oak
Ridqe laboratories in the U.S. and the molten salt reactor. 1 4 8
In Boettcher's own words, however, "One.cool word about
the HTR brought down the wrath of Leo Brandt," and more-
over, the utilities and chemical companies showed no in-
terest in the alternatives because the immediate appli-
cations were not evident. 1 4 9
This position of Boettcher's, though, was not against
the HTR, and, in fact, he and Schulten led a successful
fight to get the federal government to support the Jilich
center at the same level as the Karlsruhe nuclear research
center where the light water. reactor and fast breeder re-
actor were being developed. Boettcher feels that it was
a tactical error for the KFA Julich to be so Land-oriented
at the outset, and that is the one mistake he attributes
to Schulten.150 The KFZ in Karlsruhe went so far in
making claims for what the FBRs could do that belief in
the FBRs, according to Boettcher, became almost a "religion"
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for them; he, in turn, worried that Leo Brandt was trying
to make Schulten the "pope" of HTR development, and-
Boettcher wanted to avoid this because of the credibility
151
problems which could be created. Still, the focus at
the KFZ Karlsruhe and the need for the KFA Julich to
attract more federal fundina led the KFA Julich to di-
rect its work primarily at the pebble bed HTR. In Decem-
ber 1967, Hermann Laupsien reported in the Handelsblatt
that large nuclear research centers seem to need a cen-
tral task in order to stimulate the researchers and give
them a common purpose, and Julich had lacked such a focus. 1 5 2
Laupsien argued that the THTR should fulfill the role.
We also saw in this chapter that Schulten and his
team did their best to keep up interest in the pebble
bed HTR in the early 1970s by helping to convince KWU to
pursue the design. A KFA Jiulich official explained the
BBC/GAC partnership as another attempt by the government
to strengthen the industrial basis for a gas-cooled
reactor. 1 5 3 This official said that Schulten and his
team saw the partnership as a blow, but that research at
the JUlich center was not greatly affected -- there
was "no dramatic change of policy."154 Looking at the
situation from the manufacturing industry's perspective,
a BBC official says there was tension between BBC and the
KFA; and the KFA Julich people around Schulten argued
their case successfully not only with Kraftwerk Union,
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but also within the Ministry for Research and Technology
where they had better connections than BBC had. 1 5 5
The focal point of the KFA JUlich since 1966 has
been the pebble bed HTR, and. naturally enough, the center
has been supportive of the design. We need to recognize,
though, that the KFA is directed mainly to basic re-
search and certainly not to commercialization projects.
Its influence, consequently, on the path of technological
development is restricted, and we see this with the
THTR. As soon as the THTR project was scheduled to be
built, the work on it at the KFA ceased and shifted in-
stead to subsequent HTR efforts. The type of influence
which the KFA JUlich could exert after that was limited.
CONCLUSION
The critical aspect to see in examining the THTR pro-
ject is the continuing disputes going on within the indus-
trial, utility and government circles. In this case the
competition with the nuclear reactor manufacturing in-
dustry is particularly significant. We saw that BBC had
to cope with several major confrontations.within the in-
dustrial sector, including having to find a new American
partner -- thereby changing the course of German HTR
policy -- and having to face the challenge of the largest
German nuclear reactor manufacturer, Kraftwerk Union,
entering the market. The utilities were not as much
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steering technological choices as waiting in the wings to
see what choices they would be offered. This has been
the traditional role for German utilities, but calls are
now being heard for them to fund much higher shares of
expensive long-term projects. With the THTR, however,
their contribution is still auite low and therefore so
is their stake in its success. Finally, within the
government the major distinction has been between the
unwavering support of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia
for the pebble bed HTR and the more internationally com-
petitive orientation of the federal government, par-
ticularly within the Ministry for Research and Technology.
The real challenge for the development of high tem-
perature reactors in the Federal Republic is to coordin-
nate efforts among these sectors. The next chapter de-
scribes how such coordination did finally occur to an
extent in the post-1975 era; this chapter gives some
indication of why the various actors involved with HTRs
had little choice but to cooperate by then. In the final
two chapters we will have to grapple with how the actors
in the future can benefit from the lessons of HTR devel-
opment and agree on coordinated measures sooner. The
partnership between BBC and GAC was both a setback and
a catalyst for German HTR technology. This chapter has
demonstrated the nature of the setback: the pebble bed
system was put on hold and no new projects related to it
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were undertaken. Schulten says that the 1972-75 period
constitued a "real break" in German HTR research.156 H.
Harder of HRB says that traditionally in West Germany the.
manufacturing industry is iresponsible for planning follo 4-
up projects; but in this case BBC and HRB could devote
no time to pebble bed applications, besides the on-going
THTR work, because of the new partnership with GAC.1 5 7
The next chapter will elaborate on how the failure of
the partnership was a catalyst to renewed efforts for
the pebble bed system.
The 300 MW THTR was a prototype reactor, and its
history certainly shows how susceptible prototype reac-
tors are to changing priorities. Put another way, the
momentum of a complicated, long-term project such as the
THTR has an important bearing on the project's outcome.
At the.start of the project, HTRs were still viewed as
competitors of LWRs for the production of electricity.
Priorities shifted dramatically, however, and the appli-
cation of process heat is now the major justification for
HTR research. Coal gasification serves as a transition
stage for the HTR, according to Karl Heinz Beckurts, and
the important long-run application will be the splitting
of water -- but that is still far off in the future. 1 5 8
In short, it is not completely clear which problems HTRs
are supposed to be designed to solve, and the next chap-
ter will show that the debate is still continuing.
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The difficulty is that priorities shift and somehow
the HTR gets adapted to the new situation. One has to
question the wisdom of adapting projects to priorities
rather than using priorities to determine which tech-
nologies are appropriate. Still, even though it might
be wise in principle to choose priorities first and then
technologies to match themin practice such choices are
not easy. One reason is that no one has the foresight
to know what priorities will be in 20 to 30 years.
Secondly, priorities alone will not identify which tech-
nological options are best. There are often too many
choices -- as with the HTRs -- and the important step.is
for industrial actors to unite efforts to define which
options are most feasible. A balance has to be drawn
between the most advanced applications of a technology
and its adaptability. Schulten hinted at this in 1968
when he claimed that, as a technician, his heart really
belonged to the gas turbine HTRs, but he knew that there
were too many technical problems to be solved first
before the gas turbine HTRs could be a top priority.1 5 9
Running parallel to the issue of how to adapt a
technology is the question of when to give up on a
technological effort. With the pebble bed HTR no inter-
national interest in placing a commercial order has been
shownj such orders are necessary if the reactor is to pay
for itself, yet the German commitment remains. In fact,
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the reason has become rather evident: it is the Land
North Rhine-Westphalia, combined with some pebble bed
adherents at the KFA Julich. We are not implying that
their support is unreasonable. Their perspective focuses
more on the role for coal and jobs for the German indus-
trial heartland, and what is interesting is the influential
weight which they carry. The manufacturing firm BBC has
also been reluctant to sacrifice all its HTR efforts
although it was willing to refocus its efforts onto
another design when prospects of commercialization seemed
good. The federal government too would think twice be-
fore dropping the pebble bed HTR considering the large
sums it has invested in the technology.
In other words, vested interests in a technological
effort sprout up quickly and hinder the termination of
a project. The successful examples of technological op-
tions being dropped in the Federal Republic usually
involve major firms, like Siemens, which already have --
or can afford to develop -- other alternatives. Or else
they involve firms like GHH which overstep their capaci-
ties and have to discontinue a technological option. In
the Federal Republic, the manufacturing industry has
made the key decisions for steering HTR policy. The
most obvious example.is BBC's formation of a partnership
with GAC, thereby guaranteeing a shift away from the
pebble bed design, but BBC's subordinate role in the re-
actor market limits their freedom of action in the HTR
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field. In addition, the utilities have not yielded all
power, and their influence would become readily apparent
if talk of commercialization became evident again. The
most interesting speculation, though, concerns what im-
pact the presence of KWU will have on HTR development.
After all, KWU fits the category of a firm able to afford
other options and in fact already having them. One has
to wonder what would happen to HTR development if KWU
decided it was no longer worthwhile pursuing its process
heat interests in the HTR.
In the development of a technology, it is essential
to have a smooth transition from the R&D stage to the
demonstration stage to the commercial stage of a specific
project. The THTR example shows how HTR development in
West Germany got stalled at the demonstration stage,
partly because of licensing problems, partly because of
changes in priority, partly because of personnel problems
(e.g., many key people were shifted from the THTR to work
on possibilities of an 1160 MW prismatic fuel HTR).
Nonetheless, the ties of industry and the government to
the HTR project have kept it going. Utilities have been
less certain about what to do, and VEW obviously is still
deliberating about what commitment to make to the HTR --
although officials from several utilities point out that
political concerns, not technological or economic ones,
are the root of the problem. The fact remains, though,
-308-
that decisions about what overall strategies are best
are still left to the market in the Federal Republic,
but the structure of the market rather than specific eco-
nomic calculations tends to have the biggest influence on
the course of technological choice and development.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
POST-1 975 ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP AN HTR STRATEGY
The THTR provided an example of how a reactor line
can suffer if there is no agreement among the relevant
actors about what common strategy to follow. Although
the THTR is still uncompleted, the critical decisions
at this point in HTR policy concern the follow-up
project. Most of the time since GAC's 1975 failure has
been directed to coordinating the next stage of HTR
development, and there have been two key turning points.
The first was a meeting at Dernbach in February 1976
for all the actors involved with HTR policy. The purpose
was to decide if the HTR should be further developed,
and if so, then how. One result of this meeting was
a concentration of efforts on the pebble bed reactor,
and a second result was that the actors agreed on the
need to move ahead with a feasible, buildable project
as soon as possible.
The second turning point was the October 31, 1979
decision by a group of electrical utilities along with
two major coal and gas concerns to plan the next steps
and place an order for a THTR follow-up reactor. The
operating consortium consists of an association of
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several utilities, the Hochtemperatur-Reaktorgesellschaft
(HRG),' and a consortium of Ruhrkohle AG and Ruhrqas AG
each holding 50 percent shares.1 This arrangement is
essential for progress on the HTR because the federal
research ministry has indicated clearly that financing
for the next HTR project has to come primarily from
non-state sources.
According to D. Kutschke, head of the section which
deals with HTRs at the BMFT, this push toward practi'al
applications is the most important impulse which the
federal government has given to HTR policy, and he
says, "We are pushing the accent from R&D forward to
the practicality of designs."3 It is a distinct change
from the government's previous support, and it remains'
to be seen how the business sector reacts. A prelimi-
nary project phase drew to a conclusion in June 1981.
The manufacturers presented their joint offer to the
utilities two months earlier, and the utilities, after
analyzing the offer, agreed to move ahead with the pro-
ject but financial arrangements are still to be arranged.4
These two turning points indicate that the main
issue in HTR development no longer relates to disputes
within the utility, manufacturer and governmental sec-
tors, but rather to coordination among them. Many of
the controversies which plagued the THTR project no
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longer remain since the individual actors have realized
that no progress will occur without agreement on the
next HTR phase. The approach to HTR development has
thus changed markedly since the initial AVR project.
At that time, in the late 1950s, all projects were en-
couraged and the goal was to put the German nuclear
program on sound footing. In the 1960s unsuccessful
efforts were made to consolidate German HT'R plans,
and a major reason for the lack of success was the
competition within sectors. By the second half of the
1970s, however, the picture had changed and the vari-
ous sectors were working together to narrow options.
This was spurred on both by GAC's failure with its
HTR design and by the recognition of the sectors that
they had to pool resources in order to have any chance
of success with the high temperature reactor. The
cooperation came about, however, because the actors
realized that they had no other choice -- i.e., they
were basically forced to work together. As Wolfgang
MUller, the editor of Atomwirtschaft says, "It was
a marriage of necessity, not of convenience. "5 With-
out cooperation, there was little chance for success
with the HTR.
THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC CALCULATIONS AFTER 1975
This evolution of HTR development is important to
consider because it suggests how complex the issues
concerning cooperation on reactor policy are. Nearly
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all the actors recognized in the late 1960s that the
kind of coordination which finally took place in 1976
was necessary, but there was no catalyst to bring them
together. Hence, if we talk about the relationship of
economic calculations to technological choices, then
we have to see that in a complex situation one has to
identify whose economic costs are relevant and how
they are figured. The interdependence among the sec-
tors is so great that no individual actor can accurately
predict overall cost calculations. There are too many
uncontrollable factors and the goals of a project are
not always evident. The problem with the HTR is that
it has never had a technological priority or impera-
tive, and thus it was never fully clear why the reac-
tor was being built. The rationalizations for why the
HTR should be pursued have changed often, and the de-
bate is. still unresolved at present -- as we see in the
continuing debate on process heat applications versus
electricity applications.
Three 'Reasons Why This Phase is Important
This phase of HTR development after 1975 is impor-
tant for understanding how technological choices are
made because it underscores first of all the difficul-
ties which remain even after a technological consensus
is reached. The German actors agreed in 1976 to pro-
ceed on the basis of the pebble bed system, but that
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solved only part of the problem. They also had to agree
on what objectives to pursue, and although they cooper-
ated well to decide what the next step should be, old
interests tended to die hard. The interests still con-
tinue to reappear.
Secondly, this phase indicates that market consid-
erations have only limited relevance to determining
the course of reactor development, partly because of
the complexity of projecting costs over a long time
frame, and partly because economics alone cannot de-
termine how one should select among widely varying
reactor applications. In the Federal Republic, for
instance, the HTR actors decided in 1977 to concentrate
efforts on the sophisticated one-cycle helium high
temperature reactor (HHT) because they thotght it would
be the most economical reactor to operate. Shortly
thereafter, the decision was reversed due to the com-
plex technological problems involved. The time needed
to solve the problems was too much; the concept remained
interesting but a project that could be completed sooner
was needed. In other words, economic needs have to be
balanced with practical needs -- such as the training
of personnel, keeping morale high on a project, and
pursuing ideas that stand a chance of being approved
by the licensing authorities. Such practical needs
cannot be quantified easily,
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A third reason why this phase is important is that
it demonstrates how the market position of a firm has
a major effect on how the firm determines its economic
interests in a project. One example is RWE which has
large soft coal reserves enabling it to produce energy
cheaply without relying much on nuclear energy. Other
utilities are less fortunate with their reserves and
therefore have to opt for nuclear reactors or else
use expensive hard coal. A second more striking ex-
amDle is Kraftwerk Union which has a very different
perspective on the HTR market than its competitor, BBC.
For KWU the HTR is one reactor line among several. For
BBC, in contrast, it represents the main thrust of
their efforts for the past 25 years. Whereas BBC
might be content just if the HTR could be a mild suc-
cess, KWU insists on a brighter prognosis with better
guarantees. According to one industrialist, KWU
moved into the HTR field in 1972 in order to exert
some control over HTR development; the firm will be
able to decide whether to drop the project or develop
it further according to the reactor's chances.6 Sub-
sequent interviews with a KFA official and a politican
corroborated this point of view.7  KWU, in effect,
acquired an option on the HTR's future, but the basis
of KWU's market calculations is very different than
BBC's basis.
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This chapter shows the need for some agreement to
be reached among actors in the policy process to narrow
choices. It took a long time before the German utilities,
government representatives and manufacturers reached
this point, but the increased cooperation is evident
beginning in 1976. The question is, however, whether
the coordination came in time, is sufficient, and has
applicability to future policy -making.
One politician described the "blossoming" of so
many HTR options 10 - 15 years ago as the "Let 100
flowers bloom" approach to reactor development.8 He
said that private industry now has to choose which
route to follow, The technological possibilities of
the HTR are recognized and acknowledged, but it is not
enough to say that the HTR is the reactor of the fu-
ture, as some claim. It is important to ask which
future the HTR should aim at and why, and what are
the circumstances under which commercial HTR orders
will be placed? And for all the complexities involved
in HTR development, the case actually remains simpler
than it might be since the factors affecting the de-
velopment tend to be domestically determined rather
than internationally determined.
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OVERVIEW OF POST-1975 ITR DEVELOPMENT
Before 1976 the HTR suffered from a multiplicity
of possible options -- e.g., the one-cycle or two-cycle
reactor, the pebble bed or block fuel element, inte-
grated versus nonintegrated systems, and a focus on
process heat or electricity production. At the begin-
ning of 1976 several HTR concepts stood in direct compe-
tition with one another:
-- the HTR-1160 proposed by GAC and HRB and
designed to use block fuel elements.
--the HTR with helium turbines which had
several variations relating to the style
of construction and number of loops.
--a reactor for process heat generation with
pebble bed fuel elements and two reactor
containers.
-- a new variation of the two-cycle HTR which
used the pebble bed system and, at the
request of the utilities, aimed at a more
practical reactor container. 9
In total there were over 10 options and they had to be
reduced. That was the purpose of the -meeting called
at Dernbach for February 1976. Finding one basic con-
cept for the two major applications of process heat
and electricity generation was particularly essential
according to Dr. H. Harder of HRB.1 0
The Dernbach Meeting and its Outcome
The meeting at Dernbach was called by the BMFT and
included representatives from the federal- government and
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North Rhine-Westphalia government, the utilities, the
nuclear research centers and the manufacturing industry.
The coal and gas industries were brought into the dis-
cussions later. At Dernbach the decision was made to
return to the German HTR orientation and not pursue any
parallel developments such as the GAC design. Karl-
Heinz Beckurts says that calling the meeting was an
important initiative on the part of the BMFT, but it
was also a "logical step," particularly since the utili-
ties had been "a little slow" on decisions. The
utilities were waiting for some signals on HTRs. One
of the directors of VEW, Erwin Glahe, acknowledged
in late 1975 that no clear decision could be made on
the utility's position on the HTR until 1976 when the
reports of several teams of experts would be available. 1 2
Chrysanth Marnet of the Stadtwerke DUsseldorf says that
the utilities were pleased ,that the meeting was con-
vened because it promised to strengthen the whole HTR
line, but he also feels that the pressure of the poli-
ticians was the reason the session was called.13
In short, the invitation to the Dernbach meeting
was welcomed and considered necessary by nearly all
the actors. It did not signify a new commitment by
the BMFT to the reactor -- the Ministry had long been
the major source of funding -- but it did remove any
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fears that the government might withdraw support. The
real issue was whether the HTR should be used for pro-
cess heat applications or electricity production. The
recognition of the importance of process heat stemmed
from the late 1960s and was behind KWU's decision to
enter the HTR field in 1972 after BBC placed its empha-
sis on electricity generation. Rudolf Schulten recalls
that he and his associates were often laughed at when
they argued the case for process heat around 1968.14
The attempt at Dernbach was to unify the technological
bases of these two approaches to the HTR into one con-
cept; this necessitated bringing KWU and BBC together.
The goal was that each firm would be responsible for
one major component of the HTR, usable for both appli-
cations. Dernbach was a recognition that one could
no longer rely on the U.S. for the market introduction
of the HTR, and consequently the Federal Republic
needed to consolidate its efforts while also seeking
international cooperation wherever possible.
Domestic considerations, as usual, were significant
in this decision. Process heat applications were im-
portant because the Germans have abundant but expensive
coal. Although the American firms General Electric and
GAC have expressed an. interest in process heat appli-
cations, coal is simply too low cost in the -U.S. for
the interest to be serious.15 Energy-poor Japan with
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its steel production needs is much more interested in
process heat. For the Germans, coal is more than a
16
materiall it is an institution. And the champion of
coal is the Land NRW.1 7
Study groups were set up at Dernbach to decide on
the next phase of HTR development. The Germans called
this period a "new orientation phase," and they outlined
five goals to achieve:
1. a. narrowing of HTR concepts;
2. a concentration of efforts by industry,
the operators and the research centers;
3. priority to an HTR utilizing process heat;
4. increased international cooperation;
5. top priority to completing the THTR.1 8
Short deadlines were intentionally set. A decision was
made by June 1977 that the next HTR for electricity pro-
docution would be the direct-cycle HHT, and the next
HTR for process heat would use the same reactor con-
tainer, integrated construction system and pebble bed
fuel system.19 That meant that the desire to have as
similar a basic concept as ,possible for HTR develop-
ment was largely achieved. In 1978 an offer to build
a demonstration HHT was anticipated for 1983 and an
offer for a prototype process heat HTR was anticipated
for 1985.20
-328-
Stated briefly, the differences among the HTR policy
actors which had to be overcome were that the various
utilities had differing priorities, KW and BBC had.to
delineate responsibilities, the BMFT wanted to strengthen
the domestic nuclear industry and reduce its own share
of costs, and NPW wanted to guarantee a future for coal.
The actors recognized, though, that compromise was man-
datory if the German HTR program was to have any chance
of success. According to utility and manufacturing
industry representatives, national interests did play
a part in the return of emphasis to the pebble bed HTR,
but the DM 2 billion already invested by the government
also influenced the choice.2 I
After Dernbach, a consensus emerged among the actors
in German nuclear policy. The long term goal of the HTR
program was the commercialization of the system for pro-
cess heat and electricity production, and the short term
goal was to demonstrate that the HTR technology was
feasible for both applications and could be economically
applied.22 The government acknowledged that a national
program was necessary which encouraged a concentration of
efforts on the technical and organizational level. Ac-
cording to the government's 1978 report:
A program of such an extent can only be per-
formed within the frame of a national program,
embedded as far as possible in international
efforts. National program means that the
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main burden of the development in the intro-
duction phase has to be carried by the pub-
lic, i.e., by the government. Major contri-
butions from the users can only be expected
and demanded as far as a commercial utiliza-
tion of the technology can be envisaged. As
the public funding resources are limited to-
day and in the future, a strong technical and
organizational concentration is indispensable.
A technical concentration will be possible
by the development and application of the
same basic design concept for the nuclear
heat supply system for both lines. This sys-
tem should have as many common features as
possible for electricity production and for
process heat application.3
The report recognized that the limited funding resources
and development capacities should be directed at estab-
lishing confidence in the new technology, and hence it
proposed the introduction strategy set forth in the
table on the following page.24 The strategy is geared
to the eventual market introduction of the HTR, and the
goal of the first phase is to demonstrate that the HTR
technology is available and can be economically applied.
The Helium High Temperature Reactor (HHT)
The deliberations after the Dernbach meeting led to
the surprising result in 1977 that the next HTR would be
the direct cycle HHT. The expectation at Dernbach had
been that the more conventional two-cycle concept would
be chosen.25 The HHT concept is characterized by coupling
the helium-cooled HTR directly to a helium gas turbine
without the use of a second cycle which would reduce ef-
ficiency.26 The HHT was selected over the two-cycle
9 3 N I A 93 1 Y IS N 011 0 n0 0H IN I I 1H Tp
0
0-4
Q)
Q) ooz056a JtqDF~ 0961 OZge06t$.
0
000 MdN *suio UOL2le.aaQ
................
a'
-330-
concept because the market for the two-cycle process was
not evident, but it was also recognized that there were
some difficult technical challenges involved with the
HHT which would require a longer development period.
By 1979 emphasis shifted back to the two-cycle design
because the HHT problems proved to be more intractable
than expected.
BBC was largely responsible for the decision favoring
27
the one-cycle system. The firm held discussions with
several German utilities, although the decision itself was
made by BBC and then analyzed and agreed to by the utili-
ties rather than being a joint decision.28 One relevant
factor was that Heinrich Mandel, the top executive at
RWE at the time, had a long-standing interest in gas
turbines.29 More importantly, BBC had been investigating
HHTs since 1972 in a joint German-Swiss program with the
Swiss BBC company. BBC had some doubts about how compe-
titive the two-cycle HTRs would be with the LWRs. BBC/
HRB thought that the market chances of the HHT were
greater. 
3 0
Moreover, the two-cycle HTR being considered, the
HTR-K, had its own problems because it reflected a bad
31
compromise between the American and German designs.
The two designs differed according to number and location
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of turbines; the Germans sought a solution to accommodate
both approaches, but the resultant reactor plant- did not
work well. The HTR-K promised only marginal advantages
over the very successful LWRs which West Germany was
building then, and hence the. utilities did not feel that
a new design was necessary. Interestingly, the very
success of the German LWRs -- in contrast to the Ameri-
can LWRs -- limited the attractiveness of the HTRs.
The advantages seen for the HHT were: (1) higher
efficiency than the LWRs or other HTRs; (2) dry cooling
towers which are economical and establish siting inde-
pendence from water sources for cooling as with the
LWRs; (3) the possibility of separating a high district
heating guantity (much more important for the Germans
than for the Americans) without losing electric power;
and (4) the potential for greater growth in know-how for
process heat applications in the critical engineering
areas.32 Everyone recognized that several technical
problems had to be overcome for the direct-cycle HTR,
but it was not until 1979 that these problems became
overwhelming enough to alter the form of the development
program. BBC, RWE and Preussen Elektra were the primary
supporters of the big direct-cycle plant; the opponents
included the coal firms, the smaller utilities which felt
that the HHT program was over-ambitious, and VEW, 3 3
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The revisions which have occurred recently in the HTR
program go back more to the wishes of the HHT opponents.
Detailed design and optimization studies were con-
ducted on the HHT between 1977 and 1979, and the studies
revealed technical details which were going to require
considerable unforeseen design and R&D work. Extrapo-
lating the pebble bed reactor beyond 300 MW to 900 MW or
more was not easy. Problem areas arose with respect to
the pebble bed core, the gas turbine and safety aspects,
fundamental feasibility studies, and plant cost assess-
ments.34 The predicted yield on plant efficiency de-
creased to the point that it was not significantly higher
than the expected steam cycle figures (40% versus 37-39%),
and the advantages of dry cooling and the utilization of
the HHT as an economic district heat source also were
questioned. The 1979 government status report on the
HTR concluded that although the HHT project should be con-
tinued, it should not be the short-term THTR successor
because "the necessary development tasks such as materials
testing, gas turbine demonstration, component development
and testing, graphite gualification, design optimization
and licensability require a longer development time and
will not allow a decision for construction before the late
1980s."35 The HHT remains an intriguing idea, but its
practical application is too far off in the future.
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The interesting point about the HHT is that it
reflects the need to balance off the technically most pro-
mising projects with the technically most feasible.- The
HHT is an example of a sophisticated idea which simply
poses too many difficulties to be the first priority of
the German HTR program. Fortunately, the recognition
was made in the planning phase so that it was not too
expensive. Developing a new reactor is a function of
trail-and-error, but the good cooperation after Dernbach
meant that problems could be recognized early in the
process.
Three working groups had been set up to study HTR
development (one on plant design, one on physics and
thermohydraulics, one on R&D necessary for the whole
plant), and these groups affected the swing back to the
steam-cycle HTR in 1979 due to the problems they dis-
covered.36 At first, discussion was difficult and the
utilities were prone to "talk around" each other, but
gradually everyone benefitted from the experience of the
37
others. The HHT plant design was changed drastically,
and it became clear both how expensive the project was
becoming and that the theoretical efficiency of the gas
turbine had been overestimated. Both the experience
with nuclear reactors. and also with conventional power
stations helped identify problems. 3 8
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The Swing Back to the Steam Cycle
and the October 31, 1979 Decision
The actors in German HTR policy agreed in 1979 that
the basis of successful industrial development and eco-
nomic application of the HTR technology could only be
achieved on the basis of further construction and opera-
tion experience and not only with long-term R&D programs.39
The emphasis was more on what could be accomplished, and
the reasons were quite practical: to maintain the- re-
actor industry's engineering capacity, to encourage the
component supply industries to invest further in HTR
technology through construction projects, to keep the
regulatory and licensing authorities engaged through
more construction, and to create users' confidence as a
basis for increasing financial engagement in later pro-
jects.40 The predictions about the construction start-
up and the licensing prospects for the HHT were simply
too uncertain.
The BMFT has been growing impatient with the slow
progress in the HTR field. The ministry has been pointing
out to the utilities that they must show a greater willing-
ness to share the HTR financial burder, and these mes-
sages have been especially strong in the early months of
1981. Der Spiegel reports that BBC and North Rhine-
Westphalia still support the HTR but that the research
ministry in Bonn believes that it has done enough for the
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project; State Secretary Erwin Stahl is quoted as saying
that the federal government still feels the HTR can .play
a role in future energy programs, but "whether the HTR
will play a role depends in large part on the engagement
of private industry."4
The decision on October 31, 1979 by a group of elec-
trical utilities together with the coal and gas firms,
Ruhrkohle and Ruhrgas, to form a consortium for the de-
velopment of the HTR was an important step in post-1975
HTR policy. Earlier, we labelled it and Dernbach as the
two turning points in this phase of development. The
importance lies in the expectation that an HTR order
will emerge from the group. The basis for discussion is
the two-cycle HTR; the formation of the group confirmed
that the BMFT, the manufacturers and the utilities all
agreed.that the HHT should be dropped as the THTR follow-
up.
Not only was the BMFT instrumental in bringing about
the formation of this group, but also it has increased
the pressure for the private sector to assume develop-
ment costs. The BMFT is departing from its approach
from the past and now wants to change the conditions
for future HTR support. The emphasis is on the practi-
cality of designs, not on R&D. Rather than removing its
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HTR support, the ministry says it will provide additional
support for the THTR line, but parallel to that it de-
mands some evidence that the reactor operators are in-
terested in placing their own orders for HTRs. The
ministry wants a clear signal. The federal government
will not break off HTR funding abruptly, but it wants
some proof that the private sector is including the HTR
in its own budgetary planning.43 Ten years ago there
was not enough technological expertise to make such de-
mands, but now there has been enough progress on the
THTR to expect the private sector to give some clear in-
dications about how the HTR fits into long-range indus-
trial planning.
The challenge, then, is to determine which HTR
design to use in trying to market the reactor. R.Rumler
of BBC says that thereactor manufacturers presented
themselves as one group to the utilities; now the main
questions for the potential reactor operators are (1)
what their financial participation will be and (2) what
size reactor they want.44 The manufacturers are pre-
pared to build reactors ranging from 200 to 900 MW, but
they need to know what the market wants. The technical
basis for developing the HTRs already exists; now the
financing problem has to be solved. When the BMFT in-
sists that the private sector assume more of the financial
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costs, it means both the manufacturers and the utilities,
45but in practice the burden falls mostly to the utilities.
Kutschke of the BMFT says the decisions have to be left
to those who will use the technology: "That is our new
approach. Perhaps it is coming late, but it is not too
late." The deputy editor-in-chief of Atomwirtschaft,
RUdiger Hossner, argues against this, claiming that the
HTR has so many potential uses that the state should con-
tinue supporting it (although not at the same 90 percent
level of the THTR) in the hope that a market breakthrough
might take place.
STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS
The effect of political-organizational structural
factors on this phase of HTR development differs con-
siderably from earlier phases. In the earlier phases,
the striking characteristic was the competition within
the individual sectors, Here, the striking characteris-
tic is the coordination among the utilities, manufactur-
ers, research centers and government. This also differs
from LWR development where the utilities, for specific
reasons, assumed a special role. The purpose of this
section is to examine the various sectors to see how and
why coordination since 1975 has taken place, but also to
see how old interests keep reappearing.
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said the utilities, including RWE, wanted the manufac-
turers together, and that left BBC little choice be-
cause the manufacturing firms have to heed what their
reactor operators want.52 If the manufacturers wanted
the utilities' business, they had to combine their total
technological potential. North Rhine-Westphalia also
welcomed KWU's involvement in the HTR field; the Land
gave KWU a DIM 1 million grant to study process heat
applications for the HTR as a means to bolster the
pebble bed concept. 5 3
The cooperation between the two firms, however, is
only adequate. Utility representatives, industrialists.
and politicians all made this point and said one should
not forget that the two firms are direct competitors. 5 4
One BBC official claimed that BBC has benefitted prac-
tically not at all from KWU's involvement with HTR tech-
nology, although it is a different story concerning the
business aspects of HTR development.55 Here, KWU's pre-
sence had a positive impact on potential financial backers.
KWU, nonetheless, lacked the know-how and the personnel
that BBC had, and its other interests made the firm re-
luctant to devote resources more fully to the HTR.5 6
KWU's real interest in the HTR, according to BBC officials
and politicians, was to exercise some control over its
development.57 Then, based on the HTR's projects, KWU
could either pursue the project more intensely or drop it.
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The Manufacturing Industry
Kraftwerk Union and BBC are the only two reactor
manufacturing firms-in the Federal Republic, and their
cooperation did not beccne serious until this post-1975
phase. KWU entered the HTR field in 1972, but its in-
terests in process heat were independent of BBC's in-
terests. Only-after the Dernbach meeting did the diver-
gent interests in electricity production and process
heat merge. One should note, however, that the rela-
tionship between the firms is clearly affected by KWU's
dominant position. 34 orders for nuclear reactors have
been placed with KWU, while BBC has had only one order. 4 8
One utility official said BBC has the technical back-
ground for developing the HTR, but KWU has the industrial
power.49 Another utility representative echoed this view,
saying BBC has more HTP experience while KWU has more
50financial capacity. In fact, the utilities and the
government are happy that BBC offers at least token com-
petition to KWU, thereby preventing a KWU monoooly on the
domestic nuclear reactor market.
BBC did not welcome the competition, but all the
other actors involved with the HTR did. One BBC official
said that the BMFT and the reactor operators were respon-
sible for bringing KWU into the HTR field.5 1 They wanted
to broaden the basis of the HTR. A second BBC offical
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The cooperation at present looks satisfactory when
one considers that the two firms agreed on a common
project to offer the utilities at the end of March 1981.
During early 1980 a confidential decision process took
place between the chairman of BBC and KWU regarding what
58
role KWU would play. Der Spiegel, however, ran an
article in January 1981 claiming that those arrangements
had broken down. Each firm was to develop its own plans
for a large HTR, but then BBC published its plans at
the HTR seminar at the KFA JUlich in January without
informing or inviting KWU.59 KWU has doubts about
BBC's plans for a large reactor, according to Der
Spiegel, and it feels that its " loop-concept" which con-
sists of several smaller HTRs placed together is safer
60.. . ..
and more feasible. The Spiegel article, though, is
dismissed by a BBC official as not well-based on facts,
and a BMFT official says it exaggerates some concerns
which KWU once had but which never became policy for the
61firm.
It seems likely that the competition which remains
is not as fierce as Spiegel implies. The 'chart on the
following page shows how-the BBC and KWU industrial
groups have divided tasks for the HTR. As H. Kutschke
says, "It is wrong just to characterize the BBC/KWU re-
lationship as a rivalry. They have fully different
areas of interest."63 The chart shows this clearly. The
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firms have differences, but mainly about projects which
exist only on paper so the differences are not signifi-
cant. KWU has been less active recently since the work
on process heat has slowed'. This bothers some of the
utilities which maintain that the manufacturing firms
have to pull together if the HTR is going to be de-
veloped. 64 They do not like the secondary role which
KWU has been playing most recently.
It is worth recalling that KWJ was attracted to
the HTR because of its process heat application. In
the Federal Republic, 70 percent of all energy produced
is for heat application and only 30 percent is for
electricity.65 The Germans were inevitably attracted
to the uses of process heat, and the HTR was the ideal
reactor for the uses because of its much higher tempera-
tures than the LWRs. In 1972 the mining companies joined
in the cooperation, and the government assessed the po-
tential in 1974-75. According to Karl-Heinz Beckurts
who led the government investigation, however, the
realization gradually dawned that "process heat is not
the simplest thing to do." 6
Again, as with the HHT, there are time-consuming
development tasks involved -- this time concerning
testing the heat-exchanging components, the elimination
of tritium in the final product, and the licensability
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of the combined nuclear-chemical plant. 67 The decision
that the process heat project, PNP, should not be the
THTR successor project came easily because all the ac-
tors agreed that PNP involved too long a waiting time
for industry's purpose.68 This meant, though, that
KWU's interest would be reduced. The distinction
between PNP and electricity production is also not as
relevant now since plans for subsequent HTRs will not
be oriented solely in one direction or the other. 6 9
The THTR follow-up will be primarily an electricity-
producing reactor, but this is not a setback for pro-
cess heat applications because an experimental chemical
plant will be connected with the reactor and thus the
licensability of process heat plants will still be
tested. 70 The decision against making PNP the THTR
successor project boiled down to the fact that a re-
actor project with process heat application would have
cost DM 4 billion without any guarantee that it would
be licensed.7 1
The Electrical Utilities
The post-1975 period was also the first time that
the utilities had to work together and reach a consen-
sus on a common strategy. The time since Dernbach has
been challenging because:
(1) the utilities had to resolve major
differences of opinion within their
own sector about which HTR strategy
should be followed;
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(2) the largest utility involved with
the HTR, VEW, backed off in its
support and a successor had to be
found;
(3) -many of the utilities wanted
stronger financial backing for
the HTR than just through BBC
so they encouraged more coopera-
tion between KWTJ and BBC;
(4) the utilities faced pressure from
the BMFT to finance more of the
HTR costs;
(5) the BMFT's pressure and the utili-
ties' shared technological interests
compelled the utilities to work more
closely with coal and qas firms, but
the utilities were reluctant to do
this.
In short, the role of the utilities has been changing
dramatically from the old traditional role of reacting
to the initiatives of manufacturing firms.
The complexity of nuclear technologies has made
it mandatory for the utilities to be involved earlier
and more fully in technological choices. The manufac-
turers need to know what the utilities want, and they
need the financial backing of the utilities; the utili-
ties also recognize the need to be involved earlier in
order to understand the potential of reactor systems
and to gather the technical expertise necessary to operate
the reactors. None of the actors in HTR policy-making
was opposed to more cooperation after 1975 but? of
course,some inevitable problems with working out arrange-
ments emerged. For the utilities, any coordination
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was an improvement because, in the words of Ulrich
Steger, a member of the Bundestag, "the cooperation
72among the utilities had always been miserable."
They knew that more coordination was a precondition
to any further progress on the HTR.
In the last chapter, we saw that the utilities
were willing to support a whole range of HTR strategies.
Following GAC's failure, the utilities were not at all
certain about what path to follow. The regional utili-
ties, including the AVR group, favored the small steam-
cycle reactor. VEW supported the big steam-cycle reac-
tor. RWE and some of the North German utilities, such
as Preussische Elektrizit)ts A.G., wanted the big
direct-cycle reactor. Some other North German utilities
shared BBC's preference for the block fuel element
73HTR. No real agreement existed until 1978 when the
large direct-cycle reactor was chosen. According to one
AVR official, E. Ziermann, the BMFT's pressure on the
utilities to agree on a common position was effective,
but it is still not clear what the final outcome will
be. 4 The individual utilities do not have to abandon
their former interests because the tentative nature of
the HTR development plans means that the old interests
may become relevant again.
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The effect of this process is that the utilities do
respond to pressure from the BMFT, but they are always
careful not to take too big steps in a new direction.
The tendency for German utilities is to hesitate on
forcing technological development and instead opt for
low risk alternatives.75 The government, on the other
hand, wants to encourage a more systematic, long-run
oriented approach. The utilities proved willing to go
along with the one-cycle HTR once a decision was made
by the manufacturers for it, and then the utilities
proved equally willing to switch priorities back to
the two-cycle reactor. The situation is rather para-
doxical because utility and manufacturer representa-
tives alike acknowledge that the manufacturers have to
listen to -the wishes of the utilities, yet the utilities
seem to wait for the manufacturers to suggest initiatives.
The government and the manufacturers want clearer sig-
nals from the utilities -- and that will involve more
of a consensus.
VEW was the-leading utility in HTR policy until
the decision for the one-cycle HHT was made. VEW had
never liked the HHT; it felt that the project was too
ambitious and it advocated -- and still advocates --
that the HTR emphasis should be on producing electricity
rather than on process heat.76 VEW had established
close international contacts with the French, English and
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Scots, but this international interest faded when the
Germans made the direct-cycle reactor their priority.
77
VEW remains bitter about the HHT decision.
VEW yielded its leading role on HTR policy to a new
utility group led by Preussische Elektrizitdts A.G.
(Preag). According to GUnter Hirschfelder of VEW, the
utility conceded its position due to personnel reasons
and the politicization of nuclear energy in the Federal
Republic which stalled development plans.78 VEW wants
to concentrate its staff expertise on completing the
THTR project, and it feels that the political conditions
are too open-ended to proceed with another HTR project
now. The politicized situation keeps the schedule for
THTR completion open and uncertain, that leaves the costs
uncertain, and as a result VEW has grown discouraged
about future HTR prospects. There also are indications
that VEW is displeased that KWU has reverted to playing
a secondary role in HTR policy.7 9
-Non-utility officials regret that VEW is no longer
involved with the THTR follow-up project. It would have
been a logical choice. At the same time, HTR advocates
are at least pleased that another large utility consor-
tium with considerable industrial strength including
Preag and NWK (Nordwestdeutsche Kraftwerke A.G.) has
filled the void left by VEW.80 In political circles,
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the explanation for VEW's backing out is that not only
was the utility discouraged by the lack of progress on
81
the THTR, but also it faced serious economic problems.
The explosion in gas price's hurt VEW which had placed
too much reliance on gas. Past decisions and a lack of
cheap energy sources haunted the utility: it had been
involved with too many overly ambitious projects, and
after the gas price increases, it had no -noney left for
82
other long-range alternatives.
in other words, there may be internal reasons con-
tributing to VEW's changed role, but it is also evident
that the utilities are restricted in their freedom of
action about reactor policy because of both their
approach to the problem and the pay-offs which are im-
portant to them. The utilities are attempting to analyze
needs from a long-run perspective, but their thinking
is still oriented to the short-run pay-offs and to en-
couraging electricity use rather than evaluating overall
energy policy. Herman Hatzfeld says that the utilities
are using clever pricing schemes and new devices such as
heating pumps to maximize the use of electricity. Their
goal is that one-third of all German households will be
heated by electricity by the year 2000.83
The utilities may be what one utility representa-
tive labelled as "the controllers" of reactor development, 8 4
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but they also favor low risk-taking in determing re-
actor policy. On the one hand, they are able to engi-
neer cooperation between the manufacturing firms.
Another utility official says that the coordination
between the manufacturers and the utilities is "very
good," and the manufacturers will not produce what the
utilities do not want.85 On the other hand, the utili-
ties tend to opt for conservative alternatives and not
force technological development in order both to reduce
risks and to add to the chances of achieving consensus
within their own ranks.
The Federal Government
Whereas the manufacturers and utilities had to
learn to coordinate policies among firms, the federal
Ministry for Research and Technology was learning to
assert itself more in steering German nuclear policy.
This represented a continuation of the pattern of
increased influence for the BMFT which was described in
the previous chapter, and the last two sections of this
chapter have also pointed to this new role. The federal
government, through the BMFT, put pressure on the pri-
vate sector after 1975 to coordinate HTR efforts, and the
ministry has maintained this pressure. One reason it
has been able to do this relates to its increased ex-
pertise in nuclear matters (especially compared to the
early years of German nuclear policy when the ministry
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played a subordinate role to the German Atomic Com-
mission), but a more significant reason is that the other
nuclear policy actors knew that coordination was essen-
tial and therefore they appreciated and accepted the
BMFT's efforts.
The nature-of the ministry's attempts to exert
influence has also been responsible for the success
of the policy. For the most part, the BMFT has only
tried to affect organizational and financial issues.
The ministry has avoided forcing issues on technical
questions. 86 Even though it has provided about 90
percent of the support for HTRs, it still leaves tech-
nical decisions to the participating firms. Since 1976
most of the decisions on HTR strategy have occurred
in the committees and working groups involving the var-
ious actors. The BMFT has always been present at such
meetings, but it considers itself a guest at them.8 7
Nevertheless, the BMFT has given some important
impulses to HTR development in this period. We dis-
cussed above that the ministry now insists on seeing
that the private sector will incorporate HTR plans into
long-range industrial planning. The message now is that
a decision on a THTR follow-up project should be made
soon, should be feasible, and should be financed by the
priavte sector -- i.e., mainly the operators. The
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federal government too has gone through a learning
process, and now feels it is time to shift from general
88
to practical applications of the HTR. Despite this
shift in focus, though, the BMFT says adamantly that
they are not forcing a selection process between the
fast breeder and high temperature reactors; each has
its own significance and there is no rivalry, but more
utility participation is needed for each system.8 9
Although there is satisfaction with the role played
by the ministry for the most part, some criticism can
be made that the ministry has become too involved in
steering reactor development policy. The criticisms
are that the BMFT assumed too much of an activist role.
One KFA official accused the ministry of going beyond
financial and organizational problems starting in 1976
with the Dernbach meeting and trying to force technical
solutions. 90 In the HTR-K decision, for example, the
BMFT went too far in deciding even what the reactor
should look like -- i.e., it was to have a pre-cast iron
vessel. Finally, after several months of working with
this assumption, the actors recognized that the decision
91
was wrong. A utility official also criticized the
BMFT for exerting too much pressure on the utilities
and being too strict with them. 92 Another utility offi-
cial, however, defends the BMFT, saying they have never
demanded technical solutions but rather have supplied
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support for the manufacturers and utilities and have
relied on them for technological development. 9 3
Some criticism has also been made that the BMFT
opposed HTR development, but the ministry vehemently
denies this. One politican claims that the BIMFT wanted
to let the HTR project die, but the North Rhine-Westphalia
government and the I. G. Bergbau trade union prevented
this.94 According to him, the Bundestag, the Ministry
of the Interior and the Federal Chancellory are all
more positive about the HTR than is the Ninistry for
Research and Technology.
BMFT officials admit that NRW's support for HTRs
has been greater than their own, but they dismiss the
accusations that they wanted to let the HTFR project die
96
as nonsense, One official stated bluntly, "At no
time in the whole HTR history did the federal government
lead an organized process to cancel the HTR."9 7 The
BMFT feels that its present efforts are constructive
because they attempt to shift the burden of financial
development of HTRs to private industry for the post-
THTR phase without abruptly cutting off government sup-
port.98 The .BMFT wants the focus to shift from possible
applications of the HTR to industrial planning for actual
orders; the ministry is asking the potential operators
to signal their interest in the concept even if high
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government subsidies are terminated. Although present
reviews and evaluations of the HTR might lead to a de-
cision against the reactor, the BMFT claims that the
process is fair and cannot be called an attempt by the
ministry to kill HTR development.9 9
The Projekttrsdger (Coordinating Agencies): One way that
the BMFT has become more active in the coordination of
energy policy is through the use of Projekttra.ger (co-
ordinating agencies for specific projects). These
"coordinating agencies" were set up beginning in 1976
as a means to involve the BMFT more in development
policy without expanding the permanent staff of the
ministry. The BMFT wanted to limit the work of its
individual sections (Fachreferate -- i.e., departments),
but it permitted the sections to rely on the coordinating
agencies for expertise on individual projects. The
coordinating agencies are part of the BMFT and they are
also integrated into one of the nuclear research cen-
100ters. The division between the two roles is not
fully defined: the agencies are linked completely to
the BMFT, but their work is all related to the research
centers and written assessments have to be submitted
to the research center's board of directors. The
task of the coordinating agency is to follow the admin-
istrative extension of the BMFT. They do not play a
political role; that remains a function of the ministry.
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The coordinating agency-for the HTR project
(Projekttr&ger HTR) is just one of several similar
agencies -- at the KFA alone there are four, including
one for non-nuclear research.lO3 The coordinating
agency for HTRs is small -- just two professional staff
members -- and it reports to the small HTR section
within the BMFT which also has only two members. The
HTR coordinating agency does not make HTR policy, but
it has responsibilities such as following committee
sessions of the Bundestag closely and issuing "status
reports" on the HTR. At times, these reports have been
quite critical of policy.
The strength of the coordinating agency, according
to a former member, A. Dworak, is the trust it has en-
gendered through years of working together with other
HTR actors; the other actors are willing to entrust the
HTR coordinating agency with confidential information
because they know the information will not be misused.1 0 4
GUnter Hirschfelder of the VEW utility describes the
coordinating agency's relations with the utilities as
good; he says that its function is not to influence de-
cision-making on technical questions, but rather to
facilitate communication among the various actors.1 0 5
This fits in with the. role which the BMFT has seen for
itself after 1975, namely, to bring the HTR policy actors
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together. The coordinating agency for the HTR project
has provided an additional means for the BMFT to improve
the exchange of ideas on HTR development policy,
Role of the Bundestag: The discussion thus far has im-
plied that federal government policy on HTRs can be
equated with the BMFT's policy, and for all practical
purposes this representation is fair. The Bundestag
has not been involved with any policy guidance for HTRs,
but it does provide a kind of brake on the BMFT's power.
All three parties support the HTR so that if steps were
taken to reduce funding for the HTR, the Bundestag
would almost certainly react. Even the members of
Parliament acknowledge that the only power which the
Bundestag has is to approve financial arrangements for
support of nuclear projects, but this power could be
effective in blocking other programs if the Bundestag
members were upset about HTR cutbacks. Whereas the
reactor industry has shown more favor to the fast
breeder reactor, the Bundestag has been more positive
toward the HTR. One KFA official suggests that the
reason for this is the attractive combination of coal
and nuclear energy.306 A member of the Bundestag says
that the size and influence of North Rhine-Westphalia
is also critical.10 7 NRW covers one-third of the area
of the Federal Republic. This guarantees that many mem-
bers of Parliament will be positively inclined to the
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HTR since it supposedly will boost NRW's industrial
base. Moreover, given the influence of the Land in
selecting candidates for the Bundestag, especially
for those not elected directly, there is a need for
candidates to pay attention to the Land's interests.10 8
Most of the Bundestag's dealings with the HTR come
through the Committee for Research and Technology,
but one member of the Parliament criticizes the people
on the committee for having only limited expertise in
technological matters. 109
North Rhine-Westphalia
In the early 1970s NRW took steps to protect the
pebble bed HTR technology, and it continued this role
as "high priest" of HTR development in the post-1975
period. This is understandable since coal is so
essential to NRW's economy, and the Land sees the HTR
as the means to ensure a future role for coal. We saw
that the federal government, through the BMFT, tried
to play a mediating role in HTR policy, North Rhine-
Westphalia plays more of an advocacv role.
NRW and the BMFT have different priorities and
therefore are not always in agreement about how to pro-
ceed with HTR development. NRW is most interested in
the application of HTRs to coal, and consequently its
priority is on developing process heat. BMFT officials
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feel, though, that such technological solutions are too
far off in the future. They say that the application
of nuclear technology to coal is a "fantastic idea" and
a good point for politicians to sell, but enormous tech-
nological problems have to be overcome before a solution
can be found to produce nuclear heat. Moreover,
finding reactor sites in the heavily industrialized
Ruhr district is likely to be impossible according to
BMFT officials, but the reactors have to be near the
coal to make them economically feasible.
The BMFT is less enthusiastic about process heat
applications because of the uncertainty involved with
the development, The ministry's priority is more to
make sure *a decision is made on a practical THTR follow-
up project. In fact, the BMFT would like to build a
consensus with NRW about future HTR policy: the HTR-
900, which places more emphasis on the production of
electricity, and the process heat project should not be
seen as competitors. 12 At present, the BMFT feels
that process heat applications involve.. too long a
waiting time for industry. The BMFT prefers to involve
industry as soon and as fully as possible in the next
stage of HTR development.
The impact of NRW is- more indirect than direct.
We saw its influence on Bundestag members, and the
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informal contacts among NRW officials, industrial rep-
resentatives and the members of Parliament are also im-
portant.' There is a close relationship between the-Land
and its coal companies and electrical utilities too.
These firms are important for the German economy and,
hence, to the extent that NRW represents their interests,
its priorities have to be heeded. The NRW Ministry for
Economics (Ministerium fur Wirtschaft, Mittelstand and
Verkehr -- referred to as the Economics Ministry) is
the main vehicle for voicing the HTR policy of the Land.
Like the BMFT, it has played an activist role in HTR
policy. It too provides financial support for reactor
parts and thus can sublet certain component contracts.
When the coordinating agency for the HTR project was
trying to arrange a cooperative agreement with the Japa-
nese for the development of HTR heat exchange components,
it was surprised to discover that the NRW Economics
Ministry had already subcontracted to a German firm
without any consultation ,
1 3
The Nuclear 'Research Center in JUlich (KFA)
The importance of the KFA in this post-1975 period
is primarily as a stabilizing factor which leaves key
decisions to.industry and the utilities. The research
center intentionally did not play a key role in the de-
cisions made after the Dernbach meeting regarding which
114reactor design to pursue. In fact, the KFA officials
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*preferred the two-cycle reactor, but they deferred to
115
the BBC/HRB decision which went against them. The
only criticism heard about the KFA was that it should
have a more practical orientation: the KFA's plans for
building a series of 500 MW reactors for the Ruhr dis-
trict were criticized because they were uneconomical
and siting would be nearly impossible.116 In the future,
however, the KFA will be involved more in practical
aspects of development programs since it is essential to
complete the early stages of a program in order to keep
to a time schedule for later stages.1 1 7
CONCLUSION
In contrast to the AVR and THTR phases of HTR
development which reflected competition among and within
the government, manufacturing and utility sectors, the
post-1975 phase is chracterized by coordination among
the sectors. The direct cause for this was the failure
in 1975 of the HTRs offered by Gulf General Atomic Com-
pany. German HTR actors realized that they could not
rely on anyone else for the market introduction of HTRs,
and consequently they were compelled to work together.
The initiative to consolidate HTR efforts came from
the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, but
the other actors all welcomed it. They had to learn,
however, to work together more closely than they were
accustomed to doing.
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The working relationships which have evolved are
often uneasy ones. Manufacturing firms and utilities
are not comfortable working as partners with their com-
petitors, and old interests are not given up readily.
Nonetheless, the post-1975 phase reflects an important
step to better cooperation among the HTR policy actors,
and it provides some important insights into how tech-
nological choices are made in the Federal Republic.
First, traditional patterns are changing. The
utilities used to wait for manufacturers to make offers
before the utilities would decide whether to place or-
ders. Now, the complexity of technological projects
and their long-term nature require that utilities be
involved much earlier. The utilities accept this change
in principle, although in practice they still show
some reluctance to break from the old approach.
Second, more emphasis is now supposed to be given
to actual construction projects, rather than to long-
term R&D projects. The credibility of a technology de-
pends on tangible progress on a step-by-step basis, and
therefore it is not wise to opt for the most technolog-
ically sophisticated projects. This explains why the
helium direct-cycle HTR was dropped as the THTR follow-
up project. The type of policy which has evolved in
German nuclear policy is incremental, conservative, and
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oriented to construction and operating experience rather
than long-term R&D projects. In other words, the policy
is geared to low-risk alternatives because it may prove
impossible to build the high-risk alternatives. The
federal government has proven to be more inclined to a
pragmatic approach for the next stage of HTR development
than has the Land North Rhine-Westphalia. NRW is more
intent on developing process heat because of its appli-
cations to coal, but the federal government feels that
there are too many technological uncertainties involved
with the development of process heat to place too much
emphasis on it at this time.
Third, the most difficult problem for German nuclear
policy remains how to attract private financing for re-
actor projects. The BMFT is currently trying to shift
the financial burden from the government to private
business, meaning mainly the reactor operators. This
switch of emphasis from government support for possible
applications of HTRs to industrial support for ordering
the reactors has occurred since 1979, and the BMFT con-
siders it as the most important impulse it has given to
HTR development. It remains to be seen how successful
the BMFT will be with this impulse. The willingness of
all the HTR actors which emerged after 1975 to coordinate
efforts still remains. One business manager expressed
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the view that there have been no winners or losers in
the HTR policy of the last five years; it has simply
118been an attempt to find a common orientation. Still,
the goals after 1975 were to bring the policy actors
together (1) to decide what the next stage of HTR devel-
opment should be and (2) to obtain specific orders.
These goals have yet to be achieved.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUS ION
This thesis has examined how technological choices
are made in German nuclear energy policy-making. Be-
cause the development of sophisticated technologies
such as nuclear reactors is a long-term process in-
volving multiple actors, we organized our analysis
around (1) the stages of development of German nuclear
reactors and (2) the shifting leadership roles among
the actors through these stages. We looked at how
responsibilities have been shared among reactor de-
velopers, vendors and operators from the initial stage
to commercialization. The analysis compares "market"
and "political-organizational" approaches to explaining
technological choices. The two approaches are not
mutually exclusive; rather, each provides a special
perspective on the way in which political and economic
objectives are balanced in German nuclear policy-making.
We first considered overall German nuclear policy
and then analyzed in more detail a specific second gen-
eration reactor, the high temperature reactor. The
former suggested the significance of differing outlooks
among the government, manufacturing and utility sectors-
the HTR case showed how important disputes were within
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these individual sectors. A major advantage of the in-
depth case. study method used here is its ability to re-
veal the complexities of the policy process. At the same
time, any generalizations from case studies have to be
drawn cautiously, for technological choices are strongly
influenced by national patterns and traditions. Although
caution is necessary, it is nonetheless useful to seek
lessons from this case which -may improve our under-
standing of technological choices applicable to future
policy-making both in the Federal Republic and elsewhere.
This chapter links our findings about German nuclear
policy to the conceptual framework presented in Chapter
One. First, we look at two contrasting studies of the
German nuclear energy program: one considers it a suc-
cess, the other stresses its problems. With these
divergent opinions as background, we then make our own
assessment of the German program in the context of the
market and political-organizational approaches de-
scribed in this thesis. Second, we present a more
general series of policy observations and conclusions
about technological choices. Finally, we examine the
implications for future technological choices in HTR
development. We consider both international and do-
mestic factors and close by considering the key role
which the utilities will have in future HTR policy.
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ASSESSMENT OF THE GERMAN APPROACH TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES
Opinions as to whether the German nuclear reactor
development program has been successful vary widely.
Peter DeLeon compares reactor development in several
nations and terms the German program a success due in
large part to its decentralized policy process. In
contrast, in a report for the "International Consulta-
tive Group on Nuclear Energy" Mans L5nnroth and William
Walker find that West Germany and other countries with
strong private sectors are at-a distinct disadvantage
to countries where governments exert stronq control
over nuclear industries, espcially the electrical
utilities.2 The different conclusions result from
the differing emphases in the two studies: DeLeon
focuses on the successful development of multiple
options in the German program; Lbnnroth and Walker
stress the inability of countries with decentralized
approaches to coordinate policy and consolidate efforts.
Together, these views highlight two important features
of technological development: a wide range of options
has to be created, and then the options have to be
narrowed and effots concentrated in a small number of
areas. The remainder of this section analyzes German
nuclear energy policy-making to see what helped or hin-
dered it and discusses how the market and political-
organizational approaches apply to these two features of
technological development.
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DeLeon contends that the best strategy for reactor
development is one that relies on the development of
multiple options. This minimizes risks for high pri-
ority projects requiring major technological advances
because it compensates for the high degree of techno-
logical uncertainty. According to DeLeon, the way for
a nation to guarantee several technical alternatives
for itself is through the active involvement of a num-
ber of different participants, preferably with different
perspectives or objectives; the question becomes one
of numbers while the issue of affiliation -- e.g.,
private industries, government laboratories, public or
private utilities -- becomes secondary.4
There is, of course, a trade-off in research
strategies: focusing on just one reactor design con-
centrates resources,-while relying on multiple designs
minimizes the risks of failure. The Germans followed
the low-risk, multiple options route. One way to encourage
such multiple options is the inclusion of private in-
dustry as an equal partner with the government in reac-
tor development strategy. DeLeon praises.the United
States and the Federal Republic for doing this in vir-
tually every phase of reactor development; France and
Britain, in contrast, treated the electrical construc-
tion industry less as a contributing partner and more
as a supplier of components in a severely constrained market. 5
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Lbnnroth and Walker share the view that institu-
tional arrangements are critical for reactor develop-
iment programs, but they focus on how effectively control
can be exercised by the central government. They claim
that the structure of the industry and its relation-
ship to government have important implications for the
industry's robustness in difficult and uncertain market
conditions.6 In light of the difficult political and
economic conditions that have prevailed since the early
1970s, L5nnroth and Walker say that countries in
which governments control and share risks with nuclear
industries to a large extent are better off than those
countries in which risks are born by private concerns
and policy coordination is limited. France and Bri-
tain, for instance, are countries in which government
policy proposals have customarily been less exposed to
wide public debate at early stages of consideration,
and both have had comparatively little difficulty in
promoting nuclear power.8 L5nnroth and Walker empha-
size that countries with centralized and relatively
closed political systems and with substantial state
control over the utility and nuclear industries have
greater ease in promoting nuclear power because of
their ability to avoid both political and economic diffi-
culties.9 Countries with more fragmented decision-
making systems, in contrast, are more vulnerable to the
breakdown of political consensus and to economic diffi-
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culties such as those encountered by private utilities.
The arguments presented by DeLeon and by Lbnnroth
and Walker are not necessarily incompatible, and our
findings corroborate each of. them in part. The Germans
were remarkably successful at fostering multiple reac-
tor options right from the start of their nuclear pro-
gram. The government preferred this route, partly to
bolster as many segments of German industry-as possible,
and partly because no one in the public or private sec-
tor had strong inclinations toward any particular
reactor design. The objective was simply to establish
an internationally respected and competitive nuclear
industry. Designs were not evaluated in comparison
with each other: for example, no comparative assess-
ments of the fast breeder and high temperature reactors
were ever conducted." To this day, there is strong re-
sistance to having to choose between these two major
alternatives for second generation reactors.
The Germans were able to pursue several reactor
lines because the government provided financial incen-
tives to industry to support any feasible interests
and because there was little hesitation about relying
on imported technology. At the same time, however,
the Germans had trouble narrowing options because of
their decentralized approach. The types of difficulties
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predicted by Lbnnroth and Walker are indeed present
in German policy: there are too many points at which
the process of reactor development can be disrupted
(this does not just refer to protest actions -- differing
industrial strategies can also be disruptive), and
convincing utilities or other private sector actors to
provide funding is a constant struggle. Consolidation
of efforts on German technological projects is done on
an ad hoc basis-; as a consequence, the lessons from one
experience are not easily transferrable to another one.
The actors involved with HTRs went through a long learning
process before accepting the need to work together, but
there is no guarantee that the lessons will be carried
over into other contexts.
In sum, the German commitment to market processes
has influenced reactor development strategies signifi-
cantly. The government has tried to limit its inter-
vention in the process of technological innovation and
commercialization because it prefers to have initiatives
come from industry, but it also is willing to try to
direct industry along certain lines. Thus., the govern-
ment was ready to encourage as many reactor lines as
possible in the early years of the German program, and
it later tried to encourage consolidation in particular
industrial sectors: the government backed the Siemens-
AEG merger to form KWU, it tried to facilitate BBC-GHH
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cooperation in the HTR field, and -- as we saw in detail
-- it has prodded the -utilities and manufacturers in-
volved with HTRs to coordinate development since 1976.
In no instance, though, was heavy pressure exerted.
The role of the government has been and still remains
limited.
Assessment of the Market and Political-Organizational Approaches
Chapter One argued that the German context for
nuclear energy policy seems especially favorable for the
market determination of technological choices. The
reasons relate to the free market attitudes and the de-
centralized decision-making structure after World War
II and to the lack of military priorities to steer
nuclear technologies. The German case gives us an
opportunity, on the one hand, to test how well the pri-
vate sector can guide technological choices under con-
ditions favorable to the- market determination of such
choices. On the other hand, however, the HTR, as a Ger-
man designed and developed reactor in which the Germans
take considerable pride, offers us a case to test how
effectively the state can control technological choices
when its interest in doing so is seemingly high. Evalu-
ating these two perspectives allows us to see how eco-
nomic and political objectives interact in German techno-
logical choices.
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Relying on market considerations to guide techno-
logical choices seemed to work for German light water
and fast breeder reactors, but more problems are evi-
dent for high temperature reactors. A critical point
in early German nuclear policy was the utilities' de-
cision in the late 1950s to opt for the internationally
available LWR technology, despite the government's
wishes to stress German-developed designs which avoided
dependence on enriched uranium. The utilities were
not eager to stress basic R&D work or experimental
designs for other nuclear reactors since LWRs seemed
already to have achieved a breakthrough to commerciali-
zation. in the case of fast breeder reactors, too,
the utilities were the key factor because RWE, the lar-
gest German utility, espoused the FBR cause and relieved
the government of at least some of the funding respon-
sibilities. The utilities, though, were wary of the
cost estimates and development projections compiled
by the pro-FBR Nuclear Research Center in Karlsruhe,
and thus the money poured into FBRs by the utilities
was less than the amount hoped for by the FBR adherents
in Karlsruhe and the government.
The HTR case provides a different story: the utili-
ties have not provided similar guidance and, overall, the
case shows how the existence of too many options can hin-
der technological development. The utilities have
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demonstrated an interest in the HTRs, but they have not
provided leadership in determining the direction of
development. Market considerations could operate ef-
fectively in the LWR case because commercialization was
near. In the FBR case, the major German utility, RWE,
may have been attracted by the commercial prospects of
the reactor, but the commitment did not deepen as the
long-term nature of FBR development became clear. With
HTRs the utilities have always been uncertain about which
option to follow, given the wide-range of possibilities,
and this has led the utilities to be reserved in their
support.
Market considerations may be able to guide techno-
logical choices once commercialization is near, but the
challenge is to guide it before that stage is reached.
With the German HTRs, the manufacturing firms had to
carry more responsibility because the demonstration
stage lasted much longer than expected or than had been
the case for LWRs. Their capacity for leadership was-
limited, however, because of BBC's small share of the
German reactor market compared to KWU, and because the
utilities were unable to tell the manufacturers what
they wanted. Achieving cooperation within the reactor
manufacturing sector and between the manufacturing and
utility sectors proved difficult until the American at-
tempt to commercialize HTRs failed, leaving the German
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policy actors to "sink or swim" together on the HTR pro-
ject. The evidence which we cited on the power of the
utilities in determining technological choices thus-has
to be modified in light of the HTR example: when com-
mercialization is remote and the number of options is
large, the utilities play a less significant role.
To what extent does the HTR case confirm that the
government can steer technological choices when its
interests in doing so are high? Here, the HTR case
turns out to be less useful than we initially expected:
despite the German origins of the pebble bed HTR,
national interest and pride did not compel continued
support for it. The government certainly tolerated the
curtailment of another solely -German technology, the
heavy water reactor. It supported the HTRs through
the research and development and then demonstration
stages not only because of their unique attributes
(e.g., the pebble bed system), but because the govern-
ment sensed that the design might eventually be a com-
mercial success. With the Third Atomic Program in 1968,
for instance, the German government acknowledged U.S.
superiority in the LWR field and turned its emphasis
to the second generation high temperature and fast
breeder reactors. The continuing problem in HTR devel-
opment has been to determine whether the reactor has
realistic chances for commercial success. At -present,
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the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology has
made it clear that it feels it is time to reduce its
massive aid for HTRs; in the Ministry's opinion, the
decision about whether to continue HTR development now
depends on the willingness of the utilities and manu-
facturers to invest their own -money in the technology.
We expected to find that national interests would
explain the German adherence to the HTR project not-
withstanding the lack of international interest and
the curtailing of other national efforts. In fact,
the government showed little favoritism to the HTR
before 1968 -- many HTR adherents, especially at the
Nuclear Research Center in JUlich, complained that it
was unfairly subordinated to the FBR. The key factor
behind the continuing support for the HTR was the Land
North Rhine-Westphalia and its interest in coal. By
allowing a more efficient use of coal, the HTR offered
a link between traditional and advanced technological
uses of coal which is critical to the NRW and German
economy. Business executives and federal government
officials alike accused the Land's HTR support of being
overly emotional at times. Even Reimut Jochimsen, the
highly respected NRW Economics Minister, was willing to
say in late 1980:
I don't overlook the runaway costs for the
HTR, and I don't overlook the hesitation
abroad about this reactor line. It almost
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appears as if the North Rhine-Westphalia
government is being irrational about the
HTR questions because of our ties to the
Julich research center and out of post-
humous respect for Leo Brandt. But we
will fight to exhaust- every possibility
to help the HTR line achieve an economic
breakthrough. . . . And anyone who
wants to tangle with us will need long-
range arguments.30
The NRW government has done everything in its power
to support the HTR, especially the pebble bed HTR design.
This included encouraging KWU to consider pebble bed HTR
applications for process heat in the early 1970s when
BBC had switched interests to the block fuel element
HTRs. NRW's contribution can be evaluated positively
or negatively depending on one's perspective. Techno-
logical development depends partly on commitment and
partly on a willingness to drop impractical ideas.
NRW has been a major factor in guaranteeing a commit-
iment to the HTR, but it has also been a major factor in
blocking any moves to cut off HTR support. In either
case, we see that NRW -- and not the national govern-
ment as we first presumed -- has stood in the path of
leaving HTRdevelopment to'the course of market decisions.
Our examination of nuclear energy policy-making in
the Federal Republic indicates that free market atti-
tudes have had an important influence on technological
development, but the influence is most significant at
the commercialization stage. In the preceding R&D and
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demonstration stages, the institutions involved and
their historical relationships are essential, as are
the changing objectives of the policy actors over time.
POLICY OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Our study of German nuclear energy leads us to
suggest several observations about the policy-making
process. These observations are certainly applicable
to German nuclear policy-making; they may well be rele-
vant to German policy-making in other advanced tech-
nological areas; and they provide some lessons to
consider in trying to understand policy-making in other
national contexts.
Stages of Development
(1) Market considerations have a maximum impact
on technological choices in the later commercialization
stages of technological development. Thus, market fac-
tors alone cannot be relied on to determine technological
choices at the earlier R&D and demonstration stages.
(2) The transitions of leadership and policy ob-
jectives from one stage of development to another are
critical. The government is better able to provide
leadership when objectives concern national prestige,
military programs, etc.; the private sector is better
suited to provide leadership when cost and efficiency are
the stakes.
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(3) The best policies to promote commercialization
are still not clear. Commercialization seems to require
aggressive marketing and some luck; policy actors cannot
simply wait for it to occur. In the Federal Republic,
both the relationship between government and industry
and the method of funding-R&D prorote commercialization,
but there is no systematic evaluation of progress made
in commercializing R&D results.
Cooperation and the International Context
(4) Cooperation within and among the business-
state sectors is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion for successful technological development. A
market is also needed for the successful development;
and since the German market is too limited to support
alone the commercialization of advanced technologies
such as nuclear reactors, international cooperation
is imperative. Although the Germans were minimally
involved in joint projects with other countries, such
projects are useful because they keep the international
interest level high for a given technology. At the
same time, however, national competition tends to re-
main even in cooperative ventures, and this too affects
the path of development,
(5) International competition for a particular
reactor design limits the control of the business and
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state sectors over technological development. This is
espcially true for West Germany where the policy actors
are free- to opt for internationally available technology,
as the utilities did with light water reactors. The
HTR case is unique for exemplifying purely domestic limi-
tations, at least after 1975, because of the lack of
international competition. It is instructive to see
the complicated aspects of technological development
when only domestic problems are relevant; when inter-
national considerations are added, the issues become
still more complex.
(6) For LWRs, the German nuclear program was most
successful at modifying the applications of technolo-
gies developed elsewhere. Many felt that the German
LWRs, such as those installed at Biblis, were superior
to American LWRs. Since the German economy alone can-
not sustain a market for nuclear reactors, perhaps for
the HTRs too more emphasis should have been placed on
improving the applications of technologies already in
use elsewhere because that increases the chances of
commercial sales.
The Policy Actors
(7) The involvement of the Federal Government in
German nuclear policy-makinq has increased markedly
since 1955, as has the expertise of government officials,
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The steering of policy is basically left to the Ministry
for Research and Technology, although other ministries
play important roles concerning budgetary and regulatory
issues. The government leaves initiatives and commer-
cialization to the private sector, and although it
tries to provide some leadership in consolidating Ger-
man nuclear efforts, it neither pushes the private sec-
tor too hard nor blocks its efforts.
(8) North Rhine-Westphalia persists in advocating
the HTR despite several changes in justification for
building the reactor. NRW is now firmly committed to
the link between coal and nuclear energy. The Land,
the largest in the Federal Republic, is a powerful force
in German nuclear policy-making because it is the
source of most German coal, has important financial
capabilities, and cai exert significant influence in
the Bundestag. The Bundestag has not played any leading
role in German nuclear policy, but it does authorize
funding and thus could be a blocking force if, for
example, some members of the ruling coalition objected
to government policy and prevented passage of federal
funding through Parliament.
(9) Both reactor manufacturing firms, BBC and KWU,
are now involved with HTR development. The extent of
KWU's commitment is crucial for the credibility of the
-386-
HTR because of the firm's dominant market position.
The government welcomed KWU's involvement and the
utilities essentially insisted on it. The signs now,
however, are that KWU has lost some interest in the HTR;
this should be watched closely. In general, the policy
leadership of the manufacturers is strongest in the
demonstration stage of development. We saw this in
the HTR case, especially since the utilities were not
providing policy initiatives, but even there the manu-
facturers depended heavily on government stimuli and
utility inputs.
(10) The utilities are the key decision-makers in
German nuclear energy policy because they place the
orders for reactors. Their role is most significant
when the costs of development are easily estimated:
if it is too early in the development of a given tech-
nology or if there are too many options available, it
is difficult for the utilities to choose which route
to follow.
The Decentralized German Approach to Technological Choices
(11) The approach to technological development in
the Federal Republic is on a decentralized, case-by-
case basis. There is- no systematic assessment of likely
program impacts or monitoring of program effectiveness.
In addition, the government does not have, or intend to
-387-
develop, targets for expected contributions from new
energy technologies. This absence of targets led the
OECD/IEA review team to question whether adequate
judgments can be made about the desired pace of tech-
nological development. The review team warned that
the German program increases the risk that the right
new technology may not be available at the time and in
the quantity needed.1 2
(12) The German commitment to free market prin-
ciples restricts the possibility of government inter-
vention for technological innovation or commerciali-
zation. This increases the Germans' ability to encourage
multiple options, but makes it more difficult to narrow
options subsequently.
The Nature of Technological Development
(13) Government support affects the nature of
technological development. German support tends to be
through medium-term R&D funding. This encourages both
industrial innovations (by allowing broad flexibility
in project proposals) and commercializatiQn (by re-
quiring substantial R&D investments from the private
sector). The limitation, though, is that the govern-
ment cannot easily provide an interventionist push as
some governments with a more centralized decision pro-
cess are able to do.
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(14) Supply and demand does not provide a good
means to determine long-range development for energy
policy because it is too uncertain. As the International
Consultative Group on Nuclear Energy reports, long-term
energy supplies have to be designed not merely to match
a specified supply to a defined demand, since we can
be sure of neither, but also to create a capacity for
13
managing uncertainty. A sufficient range of energy
options has to be developed in time for a rational
choice to be made as patterns of future demand become
clearer.
(15) The course of technological development should
be geared to practical projects rather than to advanced
designs, especially once a technology moves heyond the
R&D stage. Actual construction projects keep industry
and regulatory officials actively involved in develop-
ment; projects that necessitate considerable R&D work
fail to keep skilled personnel occupied. The THTR-
300 and its follow-up projects demonstrated this
problem, and there is concern that the process heat
applications of HTRs will also encounter delays because
two complex technologies have to be developed simultaneously.
(16) The development of a particular technology
cannot be pushed too fast. There is a danger that the
government might force development in a certain direc-
tion because of certain priorities, such.as national
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pride. There is also a danger that utilities might
agree to finance a project due more to high subsidies
than to a serious evaluation of the project's feasi-
bility.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES
IN H.T.R. DEVELOPMENT
The high temperature reactor case has been instruc-
tive for seeing how technological choices are made,
but final assessment about the success of the HTR will
have to await commercialization of the reactor. That
will occur in the 1990s at the earliest. The HTR
demonstrates the difficulties involved in developing
a reactor line alone, even for a country such as the
Federal Republic. When work on the German HTR was
started in the 1950s, no one anticipated that commer-
cailization was so remote. There is some question
whether German governmental and industrial support
would have been as firm had the time frame been clear, 14
but longer development periods than originally expected
are typical for other nuclear reactor projects, too. 1 5
In this final section, we will consider the problems of
future HTR development at an internationai level, at
the domestic level, and at the level of the German utili-
ties which now have to assume a leadership role if the
reactor is to be a success.6
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We saw earlier that the development of the HTR has
been characterized by widely divergent views about the
reactor's chances. These differences are still evident
in the past year: the Bonh government has had some
pessimistic words for the HTR, but the possibilities of
private sector cooperation and contracts for a subse-
quent HTR project appear at least feasible, Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt indicated in his 1980 Regierungserkldrung
(his government program announced in Parliament after
his re-election) that a choice between supporting the
fast breeder or high temperature reactor might finally
have to be made, largely because of German economic
problems. The SPD Minister for Research and Tech-
nology, Andreas von BUlow, had similar bad news for
HTR adherents in his first press conference after the
October election. He stated that private industry
would have to share more of the costs of advanced re-
actor funding -- perhaps up to 30 percent as opposed
to the previous 10 percent -- because other research
areas would suffer if the scope of funding for FBRs and
18
HTRs continued at the present high level. Von Bilow
directed his comments mainly at the utilities and threat-
ened that a "research tax" (Forschungssteuer) might be
added to electricity use if the costs of advanced re-
actor development were not shared.
At the same time, in February 1981 the chances for a
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new HTR order suddenly revived. A controversy in north
Germany about the future of a light water reactor at
Brokdorf-resulted in a call for more attention to HTR
technology by politicians -opposing the LWR. Hamburg
SPD politicians did not want simply to kill plans for
an LWR, and they were persuaded that the HTR provided
an alternative. 9 Moreover, the cooperation in the
private sector about a THTR follow-up project has pro-
gressed significantly. Plans for a 900 MW HTR are now
being made following a study submitted in March 1981
by the manufacturers and then evaluated by the utili-
ties and coal and gas firms which are the potential
operators. The costs are estimated at DM 635 billion
for construction, but an active debate is taking place
about how industry, Bonn and North Rhine-Westphalia
will share these costs.20
The HTR example shows that even a technology which
has many apparent advantages (e.g., safety, siting,
economy in the use of nuclear fuel, and, most important,
applications other than just the production of electri-
city) and which is now characterized by cooperative
efforts among utility, manufacturing and government
actors may still not be realizable. Technological de-
velopment depends not only on such potential advantages
and on harmonious working relationships, but also on
practical political and economic conditions. As economic
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conditions worsen and budget-cutting becomes necessary
in the Federal Republic, the government's willingness
to ask hard questions and make comparisons of reactor
designs increases.
Domestically, the HTR case reveals the almost inev-
i'table need for the business-state sectors to work to-
gether. The conflicts within the individual sectors
that were visible in the period 1963 - 1975 (see Chapter
Six) were detrimental to the success of the HTR. Only
when such conflicts were overcome after.the 1975 GAC
failure was progress possible. Future problems such
as the storage of HTR nuclear waste only re-emphasize the
need for cooperation: the utilities will have to work
closely with the KFA Julich, the North Rhine-Westphalia
government and the federal government.21 The HTR
case shows us that our understanding of technological
choices is obscured if we try to see such choices as a
function either of economic objectives (as supporters of
the market approach claim) or of political objectives
(as supporters of the political-organizational approach
maintain). Instead, the interactions of the two sets of
objectives deserve attention, for the role of each set
varies according to the stage of development of the
technology.
Even if the domestic problems affecting technological
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development are overcome, the international context
also has to be considered because it has an important
bearing on a project's chances of success. The HTR has
been a special case becaus'e the reactor seldom faced
direct competition from other international projects,
with the exception of the U.S. block design in the
1971-75 period. Other than that, the German HTR pro-
ject either was isolated from other developments (e.g.,
the British Dragon reactor) or was the only serious
project being pursued (e.g., post-1975). One of the
questions we have asked in this thesis is can the govern-
ment shape technological development when its interests
in doing so are high? We have examined this question,
however, in terms of domestic barriers. For the HTR,
this seemed appropriate since no specific international
barriers to development were evident. The light water
reactor example shows, though, how international fac-
tors can undermine domestic priorities. Moreover,
the lack of international competition also points to a
very specific problem for German HTR developers: the
lack of an international market for the product.
There is international interest in the HTR, but the
same kinds of problems which prevented a consensus on
strategy domestically in West Germany now handicap in-
ternational cooperation. There is no agreement about
what kind of HTR to build. The Japanese and Soviets want
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to stress process heat applications while the U.S.
prefers generating electricity.22 Internationally,
then, we see that even the Federal 'Republic with its
strong economy, export-orientation and technical ex-
pertise has not been able to- develop a new reactor
line alone.
If the German HTR stands any chance of success,
the burden of responsibility falls to the German utili-
ties. The reactor is approaching the end of the demon-
stration stage, a stage which has lasted far longer than
expected and which has caused considerable bitterness on
the part of some policy actors such as VEW. Although
the THTR demonstration reactor still has to be finished,
most HTR planning efforts are now geared to the commer-
cial follow-up project. With the shift to a commercial
reactor, the responsibility for leadership in pushing
the project also shifts to the utilities. The federal
government has been trying to facilitate this transition
since 1979.
The simple fact to recognize is that German policy
actors, on both the state and business side, have always
recognized the market as the final determinant of whether
a technology is successful. If more interest does not
emerge for financing the next HTR from private funds,
it may be time to admit that the technology should not
be developed further. This is the position of the
federal government. It is not the position of North
Rhine-Westphalia which favors high government subsidies,
but NRW knows that money from Bonn is essential to con-
tinue the project. It is doubtful that any dramatic
decision will be made against the HTR, but if the pri-
vate sector is unwilling to support the project in a
country which is openly committed to the market economy,
the private sector firms can hardly be surprised if
the government loses interest in the reactor. As the
1980 Report. of the International Consultative Group on
Nuclear Energy makes clear, planning for energy futures
requires the freedom not to pursue, as well as to pur-
sue, any of the options available.23 The Germans need
to keep a critical eye on the feasibility of the HTR;
the commitment to the reactor line does not have to be,
and should not be, indefinite.
-396-
NOTES FOR CHAPTER EIGHT
1. Peter DeLeon, Development and Diffusion of the Nuclear
Reactor: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Bal-
linger, 1979); DeLeon, "Comparative Technology and
Public Policy: The Development of the Nuclear Power
Reactor in Six Nations," Policy Sciences Vol. II
(1980): pp. 285-307.
0
2. Mans L5nnroth and William Walker, The Viability of
the Civil Nuclear Industry, A Report prepared for
the International Consultative Group on Nuclear
Energy (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation and
London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1979), p. 17.
3. DeLeon, "A Cross-National Comparison of Nuclear Re-
actor Development Strategies," paper presented at
the International Congress on Technology Assessment,
Ann Arbor, Michigan, Oct. 24-28, 197.6. Published as
Rand Institute Paper P-5739 Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand
Institute, 1976), p. 51.
4. Ibid., p. 46.
5. Ibid., p. 48.
6. L6nnroth and Walker, Civil Nuclear Industry, p. 4.
7. Ibid., p. 17.
8. Ibid., p. 43.
9. Ibid., p. 47.
10. Reimut Jochimsen, "Zur Energiepolitik der Landes-
regierung von Nordrhein-Westfalen," (Bonn: Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung, November 5, 1980), p. 18.
11. OECD and IEA, National Energy Program Review of
Germany, 1980, p. 8.
12. Ibid., p. 38.
13. Report of the International Consultative Group on
Nuclear Energy (New York and London: The Rockefeller
Foundation and The Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1980), p. 3.
14. Interview with Rumler.
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15. See Thomas Connolly, Ulf Hansen, Wolfgang Jaek and
Karl-Heinz Beckurts, World Nuclear Energy Paths (New
York and London: The Rockefeller Foundation and the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1979) pre-
pared for the International Consultative Group on
Nuclear Energy. It predicts that commercialization
of fast breeder reactorcs will be difficult. K.H.
Beckurts said in an interview that it may be as long
as 60 years for the reactor to be successful commer-
cially.
16. This point was made by Ilf Lantzke, Director of the
IEA, in a presentation on "Structural Policy and Nu-
clear Energy" at the Landeszentral Bank of Berlin and
an interview afterwards on November 3, 1981.
17. Helmut Schmidt, "Regierungserklirung, Deutscher Bun-
destag, Verhandlungen des Bundestages, Band 117,
Stenographische Berichte, 9. Wahlperiode, 5. Sitzung,
Nov. 24, 1980, pp. 25-41, here pp. 29-31.
18. Cited in atw (Jan. 1981): p. 7; see Manfred Popp,
atw (Oct. 1977): p. 531 for comparative figure.
19. Interview with Hermann Hatzfeldt. The role of H.
Kramer, now a member of the board of the utility
Nordwestdeutsche Kraftwerke and formerly a leading
figure in HTR development at the KFA Julich, was
instrumental.
20. See atw, October 1981, p. 527-28.
21. See., for example, GUnter Hirschfelder's testimony
before the Committee for Research and Technology of
the Bundestag, "Stenographisches Protokoll," 64.
Sitzung, 8. Wahlperiode, May 14, 1980, page 60.
22. See testimony of P. Engelmann, member of the board
at KFA JUlich, Ibid., p. 18-9.
23. "Report of the Consultative Group," p. 3.
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